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ABSTRACT 
 
SENSING SOUNDING: CLOSE LISTENING TO EXPERIMENTAL ASIAN 
AMERICAN POETRY 
By Ashley Chang 
Charles Bernstein 
Josephine Park 
This dissertation examines a selection of Asian American experimental poetries 
from the 1960’s to the present day through the sensory paradigms of avant-garde 
aesthetic discourse. By approaching both the poem and racial formation in sonic terms, 
this dissertation project argues that rethinking the sensory as well as the political 
ramifications of sounding can help us recuperate Asian American poets’ often overlooked 
experimentation with poetic form. Specifically, I read the works of Marilyn Chin, 
Theresa Cha, John Yau, Cathy Park Hong, Mei-mei Berssenbrugge, and Tan Lin. By 
tracing the historical conditions of Orientalist objectification and re-interrogating 
postmodern theories of sight, sound, and the body, I seek to show how these poets’ 
invocation of sonic paradigms reworks those theories and to broaden our critical 
vocabulary for writing about sound in poetry. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation examines a selection of Asian American experimental poetries 
from the 1960’s to the present day through the sensory paradigms of avant-garde 
aesthetic discourse. By approaching both the poem and racial formation in sonic terms, 
this dissertation argues that rethinking the sensory as well as the political ramifications of 
sounding can help us recuperate Asian American poets’ often overlooked 
experimentation with poetic form. Specifically, I read the works of Marilyn Chin, 
Theresa Cha, John Yau, Cathy Park Hong, Mei-mei Berssenbrugge, and Tan Lin. By 
tracing the historical conditions of Orientalist objectification and re-interrogating 
postmodern theories of sight, sound, and the body, I seek to show how these poets’ 
invocation of sonic paradigms reworks those theories and to broaden our critical 
vocabulary for writing about sound in poetry. 
Historical Conditions of Orientalist Visuality  
In this section I show how ocularcentrism in modernist poetics influenced (and 
continues to be relevant to) ideas about transliterations and translations in order to trace 
the connections between the visual immediacy aspired to by 20th century theories of 
grammatology and racializing visual readings of race and otherness, particularly 
regarding the “Orient.” Examining this interconnected history helps us better understand 
why the visual so dominated the landscape of American modernist poetry’s aesthetic 
preoccupations (because it was linked to technological-grammatological fantasies) and 
how sensory theories of grammatology are - and continue to be - linked to the 
racialization of othered bodies. It is fundamental to this study of sound in poetry to talk 
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about the visual component of the grapheme of the written word and to (re)interrogate the 
postmodern figuring of theories of writing, because this has shaped how racialized bodies 
have been read, and also continues to inform modern practices of close listening because 
of the relationship between speech and writing. 
 In Apparitions of Asia, Josephine Park elucidates how American modernism 
shaped the emergence of Asian American poetry. In her introduction, Park outlines the 
“significant breach which divides American Orientalism from Asian American 
literature”:  
[While] modernist Orientalism rendered the Asiatic sign as a silent figure, artists 
of the Asian American movement in the late 1960s forged an ethnic coalition to 
sound a new voice in American literature and culture. My inquiry attempts to 
bridge these long segregated discourses, and the task of the following pages is to 
illuminate the formal significance of modernism’s Orient in a century of United 
States expansion in the Pacific and the repercussions of this construction for 
Asian American artists. By considering the afterimage of American Orientalism 
in Asian American literature, Apparitions of Asia queries the costs of an Asiatic 
form cast as a peculiar figure of modernity. It is my contention that the American 
Orient of high modernism has significantly influenced Asian American poetry, 
both as an onerous burden and as an opportunity for literary experiment—whether 
through or against its forms. (3-4)  
 
Park notes that the activist response of the 60’s to the “Asiatic sign as silent figure” has 
been “[sounding] a new voice in American literature culture” (3). In Chapters 1 & 2, I 
will elucidate the implications of this kind of “voice”. First, however, I wish to take up 
the sensory terms underwriting this breach in order to show that Asian American poetry 
in particular is an especially unique litmus case because both the racialization of Asiatic 
otherness and the fetishization of Chinese and Japanese languages and art were so 
predominantly rooted in the visual. This visual aspect of Orientalism is itself twofold – 
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both by visual readings of the body as well as by the attribution of particular visual 
qualities like transparency to an Asian aesthetic. 
 A close look at the history of modernist American poetry’s engagement with the 
ideogram reveals a desire for a universally accessible and instantaneous means of 
communication and representation. This linguistic immediacy was routed through the 
visual, a conclusion that Ernest Fenollosa arrived at through his sensory theorizing of the 
differences between Chinese and English writing. Fenollosa, famous for his Chinese 
Written Character as a Medium for Poetry, makes the claim that Chinese sentences are 
able to take on the status of a ‘time art' through pictorial representation, something for 
which phonetic languages rely on sound. Fenollosa wonders,  
In what sense can verse, written in terms of visible hieroglyphics, be reckoned true 
poetry? It might seem that poetry, which like music is a time art, weaving its unities out 
of successive impressions of sound, could with difficulty assimilate a verbal medium 
consisting largely of semipictorial appeals to the eye (79). 
 Fenollosa then proceeds to make a comparison between Thomas Gray’s line “The 
curfew tolls the knell of parting day” with a sequence of five Chinese ideograms 
(translated underneath the characters as “Moon Rays Like Pure Snow”) (44). Fenollosa 
asks, “Unless the sound of the latter be given, what have they in common? It is not 
enough to adduce that each contains a certain body of prosaic meaning; for the question 
is, how can the Chinese line imply, as form, the very element that distinguishes poetry 
from prose?” He answers his own question by suggesting that “the Chinese words, 
though visible, occur in just as necessary an order as the phonetic symbols of Gray. All 
that poetic form requires is a regular and flexible sequence, as plastic as thought itself” 
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(44). What Fenollosa implies here – particularly with the addition of “as form” – is that 
Chinese characters, “though visible,” have the potential to live up to English as a 
phonetic (and therefore necessarily superior poetic) language, because Fenollosa is 
concerned about distinguishing poetry from prose and perceives poetry’s sonic qualities 
(which, inferring from the Gray example he gives, would entail iambic pentameter). 
Furthermore, Fenollosa chooses examples that happen to support his reading of these 
linguistic characteristics: the Gray example describes a sound (bells tolling) while the 
Chinese line describes an image (moonlight on the snow).  
Christopher Bush remarks of modernist poetics that “the Image’s ambition to be 
both an instant captured and an accurate index of that world is doomed from the outset.” 
Bush continues, “The Imagist solution is to try to have it both ways, and the result is an 
array of paradoxical if productive figures of motion-in-stasis” (36). This last remark also 
foregrounds another key quality of immediacy – that it’s not merely visual, but the 
lightning speed, the instantaneity of the visual (to also draw on Pound’s definition of the 
image as ‘that which presents an intellectual and emotional complex in an instant of 
time’) (Pound 200). In the following well-known example, Fenollosa claims there is a 
kind of movement enabled within ideograms:   
Suppose that we look out of a window and watch a man. Suddenly he turns his 
head and actively fixes his attention upon something. We look ourselves and see 
that his vision has been focused upon a horse. We saw, first, the man before he 
acted; second, while he acted; third, the object toward which his action was 
directed. In speech we split up the rapid continuity of this action and of its picture 
into its three essential parts or joints in the right order, and say: Man sees horse. If 
we all knew what division of this mental horse-picture each of these signs stood 
for, we could communicate continuous thought to one another as easily by 
drawing them as by speaking words. (44) 
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This description of ‘rapid continuity’ is a curious oxymoron, since Fenollosa’s use of 
‘rapid’ would seem to suggest ‘breaks’ which would be the antithesis of ‘continuity.’ 
Here turning to Bush’s theorizing of the camera may usefully frame this phrase: “The 
photographic gaze embodies neither objectivity in any conventional sense nor an absence 
of subjectivity, but rather a specific and very peculiar kind of subjectivity, one tied to and 
indeed synonymous with a specific location and moment” (60). If we rethink Fenollosa’s 
remark following this passage that “The group holds something of the quality of a 
continuous moving picture” through the lens of the photographic instant, as Bush 
suggests, we get more the flipping of images in the phenakistroscope or zoetrope rather 
than the perceived seamlessness of modern-day film (Fenollosa 45). This temporality of 
imagination is only possible because Fenollosa writes, “There is little or nothing in a 
phonetic word to exhibit the embryonic stages of its growth. It does not bear its metaphor 
on its face…In this, Chinese shows its advantage. Its etymology is constantly visible” 
(55).  
Despite this ascribing of an instant-because-transparent nature to the ideogram, 
the gaze stops instantly at the difference displayed on the opaque face of the other (and 
Bush’s analysis does not deal with the visual close reading of the body).  Percival Lowell 
begins his Soul of the Far East with a physiological close-reading of ‘Oriental eyes’: “For 
they seem to him to see everything topsy-turvy…The world stands reversed, and, taking 
for granted his own uprightness, the stranger unhesitatingly imputes to them an obliquity 
of vision, a state of mind outwardly typified by the cat-like obliqueness of their eyes” (2). 
Lowell further solidifies his reading of the face of the Asiatic other as an opaque medium 
which defines the self of the gazer: “Like us, indeed, and yet so unlike are they that we 
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seem, as we gaze at them, to be viewing our own humanity in some mirth-provoking 
mirror of the mind, - a mirror that shows us our own familiar thoughts, but all turned 
wrong side out” (3). The face of the Asiatic other is not a window like the ideogram is, 
out of which Fenollosa looks to see the man seeing a horse, but a mirror even as it is also 
a blank page or screen. It’s only a matter of pages before Lowell makes the leap from 
‘obliquity,’ his visually-derived evidence of difference, to a self-confirmed diagnosis of 
‘impersonality’ as the ‘racial character’ of the East:   
We have seen how impressively impersonal the Far East is. Now if individuality 
be the natural measure of the height of civilization which a nation has reached, 
impersonality should betoken a relatively laggard position in the race. We ought, 
therefore, to find among these people certain other characteristics corroborative of 
a less advanced state of development…The Far Orientals ought to be a 
particularly unimaginative set of people. Such is precisely what they are. (213)1 
 
Roland Barthes also performs an essentialist reading of the face of the Asiatic other as 
‘blank’ in the name of a postmodern subjectivity, again with reference to the eye:  
 
The Western eye is subject to a whole mythology of the soul, central and secret, 
whose fire, sheltered in the orbital cavity, radiates towards a fleshy, sensuous, 
passional exterior; but the Japanese face is without moral hierarchy; it is entirely 
alive, even vivid (contrary to the legend of Oriental hieratism), because its 
morphology cannot be read ‘in depth,’ i.e. according to the axis of an inwardness; 
its model is not sculptural but scriptural. (Empire of Signs 102) 
 
The blank opacity of the face, under Barthes’ deconstructive treatment, also threatens to 
render it illegible as a face, as the site of an encounter with an other. 
Yet another instance can be found in the foreword to Sadakichi Hartmann’s White 
Chrysanthemums, in which Kenneth Rexroth notes, “He certainly made an indelible 
impression, and stands as clear now in memory as he did an hour after I saw him. It 
                                                
1 In a way we can think of McLuhan’s ‘the medium is the message’ onto Bush’s analysis of this 
“impersonality” trope:  “Such an indexical language does not eliminate subjectivity entirely, but 
reduces it to a space of unknowing that is as impersonal, inhuman, and unknowing as a camera—or a 
Chinaman” (Bush 63). 
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would take very little greasepaint and putty to turn his gaunt, faintly Oriental face into a 
reasonable facsimile of Doctor Fu Manchu” (Rexroth viii).  
The hypermediated figure of the blank Asiatic face is consonant with the trope of 
the ‘inscrutable other’, which played into nineteeth-century fears about the “yellow peril” 
of Chinese immigration. The danger of the “heathen chinee” in Bret Harte’s parody 
“Plain Language from Truthful James”, which only fanned the flames of its period’s anti-
Chinese sentiment, is that “Ah Sin”’s smile is “pensive and childlike,” “childlike and 
bland,” “yet he played it that day upon William/And me in a way I despise” (n.p.). In 
theorizing the coherence of Asian American studies as a field, Kandice Chuh notes that 
the term “connotes the violence, exclusion, dislocation, and disenfranchisement that has 
attended the codification of certain bodies as, variously, Oriental, yellow, sometimes 
brown, inscrutable, devious, always alien” (27). This is neither a singular nor a new 
observation; in America’s Asia, Colleen Lye observes that “The visuality of Asiatic racial 
form has a distinctive character insofar as the sense of its deceitfulness or mystery always 
points to the presence of something not shown” (Lye 7).  
As these examples have demonstrated, visual close readings of the racialized 
body’s difference have historically been ascribed to writers of Asian descent, readings 
that have inflected the critical conversation around their work. 
Asian American Poetry & Paradigms of Sound 
In order to further uncover some of the key issues around the reception of Asian 
American poets and questions of form and content, I turn to two key events of 
significance to the theorizing of Asian American poetry over roughly the last decade. The 
first is the acrimonious exchange between John Yau and Eliot Weinberger in the pages of 
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American Poetry Review over Weinberger’s selection of poets for his anthology 
American Poetry Since 1950: Innovators and Outsiders. In the exchange, Yau takes 
Weinberger to task for his privileging of a particular poetic genealogy (Pound-Williams-
H.D.) that uncritically “[honors] an aesthetic which promotes assimilationism and 
imperialism” (45). Yau names a litany of major women writers and writers of color that 
Weinberger omits, suggesting that perhaps they were excluded because their work does 
not “address and uphold male culture in an acceptable confluence of mythology, 
geography, history, and the exoticizing view of the Other” (48)2.  
Additionally, Yau argues, Weinberger’s selection of African American poets in particular 
is dictated by a particular “valorizing orality and performance in African-American 
poetry at the expense of all else”, the exclusion of “other African-American 
poets…[who] don't conform to his view of what constitutes authenticity; they aren't black 
enough, because they don't scream, stamp, or shout the blues” (51). Yau goes on to note 
that 
Thus, an African-American poet who prefers literacy to orality, singing (disparate 
things woven together) to speech (something which immediately communicates 
its message), is a person to be distrusted. And an African-American poet who 
subverts both the authenticity of orality and literacy must be mad. 
 
 There are two points I wish to draw from this exchange, the first being the way 
Weinberger’s response to Yau speaks for itself. He fires back with the accusation that 
                                                
2 I do agree that pointing to "who's left out" in the process of anthologizing is always going to yield 
something problematic (anthologizing in general, I think, is quite risky, because both exclusion and 
inclusion are risky, and because the things that lead one to include/exclude could also involve a whole 
host of factors in the publishing process beyond the subjective taste of one person). This point, 
however, does not detract from the deeply problematic nature of Weinberger's expectation that Yau's 
actions in some way "align with" or "reflect" back on his identity. Furthermore, Weinberger does not, 
as others like Dorothy Wang have pointed out, address the actual content of Yau’s accusations 
(Thinking Its Presence 173).  
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Yau has “never, before this, written on any minority writers” and asserts that “I spent 
years studying Chinese – which John barely speaks and cannot read – and have written 
extensively on Chinese poetry…I will not dignify his scum-bag race baiting with a point-
by-point response” (43). In touting his own expertise with Chinese as a form of 
credibility and using Yau’s previous lack of criticism on minority writers to de-legitimize 
his argument, Weinberger embodies the expectation that Asian American writers and 
their work are expected to have “revealed” themselves at an early stage in their careers 
and to address “identity” in a particular way that is legible to him (a notion that is also 
echoed in Perloff’s pointed “surprise” that Yau had not announced his Chinese-American 
status earlier in his career).  
 Additionally, as Yau’s critique makes clear, the stakes of how “authenticity” is 
signaled when it comes to minority poetries has fundamentally involved the figuring of 
the relationship between speech and writing, a relationship to which sound – as the 
materiality of language –  is fundamental.3 Asian American poetry has had to contend not 
only with racializing visual “close readings” of the body of the Asiatic other but also the 
modernist fascination with the supposed visual “transparency” of the ideogram. The 
visual bent of both of these paradigms, I suggest, has diverted critical attention away 
from the close listening and theorizing of sound in Asian American poetry, which for the 
poets I read in each chapter, plays a major sensory role in their recuperation of otherness.  
                                                
3 This is not to say that racialization is not also enabled through theories of sound; for example, as 
Michael Golston has observed in Rhythm and Race in Modernist Poetry and Science, mid-20th 
century writings by Jacques Dalcroze made essentialist claims about different ethnicities having their 
own natural “rhythm,” claims which were often used to support primitivist stereotypes (33). While a 
certain kind of rhythmic and repetitive sound was used to racialize African and African American art 
as primitive, Asian poetry has been subject instead to a predominately visual discourse of 
racialization. 
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The second (and much more recent) event of significance involves the controversy 
around the inclusion of a poem titled “The Bees, the Flowers, Jesus, Ancient Tigers, 
Poseidon, Adam and Eve” by “Yi-Fen Chou” in the 2015 edition of Best American 
Poetry. After the poem was chosen for inclusion in the anthology by editors Sherman 
Alexie and David Lehman, “Yi-Fen Chou” was revealed to be a pseudonym used by a 
white poet named Michael Derrick Hudson, who had taken to submitting his poems under 
this name when submissions under his actual name were rejected. Hudson explains in the 
“Contributor’s Notes” that follow the poems:  
There is a very short answer for my use of a nom de plume: after a poem of mine 
has been rejected a multitude of times under my real name, I put Yi-Fen’s name 
on it and send it out again. As a strategy for ‘placing’ poems this has been quite 
successful for me. The poem in question, ‘The Bees, the Flowers, Jesus, Ancient 
Tigers, Poseidon, Adam and Eve,’ was rejected under my real name forty (40) 
times before I sent it out as Yi-Fen Chou (I keep detailed submission records)4. 
As Yi-Fen the poem was rejected nine (9) times before Prairie Schooner took it. If 
indeed this is one of the best American poems of 2015, it took quite a bit of effort 
to get it into print, but I’m nothing if not persistent. 
I realize that this isn’t a very ‘artistic’ explanation for using a pseudonym. Years 
ago I did briefly consider trying to make Yi-Fen into a ‘persona’ or ‘heteronym’ à 
la Fernando Pessoa, but nothing ever came of it. (167) 
 
A quick read of the poem itself makes its parodic intentions evident, and as a 
poem, it is interesting in some aspects.5 The poem might even be read as a mockery of 
Poundian elements, with the opening lines vaguely reminiscent of a bad rendering of an 
Imagistic moment:   
 
                                                
 
 
5 Whether Hudson had some notion of an “Asian American poem” in mind when he wrote this will 
forever remain unknown; he claims to have only submitted it under the pseudonym after submitting it 
unsuccessfully, though certain phrases like “not-quite-right English” would seem to suggest that 
Hudson wrote the poem with some non-native speaker in mind. 
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Huh! That bumblebee looks ridiculous staggering its way 
 
across those blue flowers, the ones I can never 
remember the name of. Do you know the old engineer’s 
 
joke: that, theoretically, bees can’t fly? But they look so 
 
perfect together, like Absolute Purpose incarnate: one bee 
plus one blue flower equals about a billion 
 
years of symbiosis. Which leads me to wonder what it is 
 
I’m doing here, peering through a lens at the thigh-pouches 
stuffed with pollen and the baffling intricacies 
 
of stamen and pistil. Am I supposed to say something, add 
a soundtrack and voiceover? My life’s spent 
 
running an inept tour for my own sad swindle of a vacation 
 
until every goddamned thing’s reduced to botched captions 
and dabs of misinformation in fractured, 
 
not-quite-right English: Here sir, that’s the very place Jesus 
 
wept. The Colosseum sprouts and blooms with leftover seeds 
pooped by ancient tigers. Poseidon diddled 
 
Philomel in the warm slap of this ankle-deep surf to the dying 
stings of a thousand jellyfish. There, probably, 
 
atop yonder scraggly hillock, Adam should’ve said no to Eve. (25-26) 
 
However obvious the poem seeks to make its parody, it nonetheless completely misses 
the terms of its own irony. In the “Contributor’s Notes”, Hudson attempts to guide the 
reader through the poem as it careens from one superficial (and sometimes fictitious) 
reference to another, noting the shallow, ubiquitous citing of “Jesus wept” as well as the 
debunked joke about bees’ inability to fly. He explains his aesthetic aims:  
The result I was hoping for with all this bungling (as much as poems have results) 
was to suggest Original Sin, or at least that echt-human feeling of being wrong 
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most of the time. And how getting things wrong goes back a long, long time for 
us. I wasn’t trying to blame this mess on Eve. (168) 
 
In that sense, perhaps, Hudson can be thought to be successful; the most original sin 
being that the joke Hudson is going for with this poem - an expose of a kind of 
affirmative action within the poetry world – backfires on him given that, as AAWW 
director Ken Chen points out, “Almost 70 percent of New Yorkers are people of color, 
but all but 5 percent of writers reviewed in The New York Times are white. Michael 
Hudson saw these crumbs and asked why they weren't his. Rather than being a savvy 
opportunist, he's another hysterical white man, envious of the few people of color who've 
breached their quarantine” (“Why A White Poet Posed As Asian To Get Published, And 
What's Wrong With That”). Hua Hsu captures the ludicrous logic behind such thinking 
when he writes in a piece for The New Yorker that  
Maybe Hudson was right to believe that a Chinese name would distinguish his 
work in the world of American poetry journals, which are not generally filled with 
Chinese names. But, conservative paranoia of quotas aside, the marketplace spoils 
for someone named Yi-Fen Chou are fairly meagre. If a Chinese name were all it 
took, there would be far more authors with names like Yi-Fen Chou at the 
bookstore…Maybe Hudson, somewhere within his heart, actually felt less 
empowered than the imaginary rival he spun into reality, a fictional creation 
whose Chinese name would deliver him places his own could not. Within that 
possibility is the most perverse fantasy I have ever read. (“When White Poets 
Pretend to Be Asian”) 
 
Unsurprisingly, the poem has been met with outrage, generating several articles and 
responses from other writers that have articulated just how problematic such a move was. 
Asian American Writers’ Workshop assembled a forum, in which several Asian 
American poets responded to Hudson’s charade with poems of their own and critical 
reflections.  
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I draw special attention to Hsu’s reflection on the particular nature of this faking 
for the way it emphasizes (as Yau’s critique of Weinberger also does) the stakes of sound 
for identity and Asian American poetry:  
When it comes to such hoaxes, it seems somehow easier to fake Asia, a land still 
distant and inscrutable to many Americans; while other hoaxes work because of 
their thoroughness and care, the Asian-themed sort often get by with only a few 
details, as long as those details seem just “Asian” enough. After all, imitating the 
sound of Asian languages is something of a national pastime, from Mark Twain 
and Bret Harte’s “Ah Sin” to Wayne Campbell and Garth Algar’s “Cream of Sum 
Yung Guy.” In 2013, a Bay Area news report about an Asian Air crash listed the 
pilots’ names as Ho Lee Fuk, Wi Tu Lo, Sum Ting Wong, and Bang Ding Ow, 
presumably because these names appeared sufficiently believable. 
  
When Hudson asks in his poem, “Am I supposed to say something, add/a soundtrack and 
voiceover? My life’s spent/running an inept tour for my own sad swindle of a 
vacation/until every goddamned thing’s reduced to botched captions/and dabs of 
misinformation in fractured,/not-quite-right English:” and follows it up with an italicized 
litany of jumbled, faked proficiency with Western classical references, he exposes the 
sonic terms by which his “sad swindle” operates, at the expense of the racialized other of 
the Asiatic figure, rendered either silent or as speaking onomatopoeic non-sense that 
ridicules and dehumanizes (25). As I hope each of my chapters will show, the Asian 
American poets that I have chosen to focus on in this project resist such “voiceovers”, 
recuperating the “fractured, not-quite-right English” that they experiment with from the 
privileged domain that Hudson speaks from.   
 These two examples chart the territory that Asian American poetry must contend 
with. At the earlier end of the decade that these examples bookend, Weinberger’s 
response to Yau makes the point that not “revealing” oneself as an Asian American poet 
by signaling one’s interest in issues of identity in a particular, preconceived manner (that 
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usually entails the explicit thematic treatment of ethnic tropes or experiences) dictated by 
white critics means that race is necessarily not significant to a poet’s work, and that such 
a poet abdicates the right to assert anything to the contrary without being accused of 
playing “the race card” at his or her convenience. On the other end of the decade, what 
Michael Derrick Hudson’s appropriation of the name “Yi-Fen Chou” tries to argue 
(regardless of his claim that there was “no reason” for his actions) is that the literary 
establishment is unfairly prioritizing a form of affirmative action in selecting for poets’ 
backgrounds over the merits of their work. The (not-so) implicit mindset is this: if Asian 
American poets’ work is no longer expected to deal with identity in a specific way, and if 
American poetic criticism has now accepted that identity can be expressed without 
reference to overt ethnic signifiers, then the poem may as well be by anybody, since 
Asian American poetry that doesn’t explicitly talk about ethnic signifiers must not 
express identity in any distinctive way that cannot be aped by a white poet seeking to 
expose the “benefits” reaped by other minority poets, who has the convenient option of 
first trying to submit his poetry under his own, privileged name first before assuming the 
mantle of racial difference.  As Hsu observes, “Proper, canonical, ‘serious’ literature is 
built upon [the] flexibility of perspective [that one’s experiences can be received as 
universal], but the privilege of such perspective is rarely extended to those on the 
margins, whose work is often perceived as ethnographic—and for whom there is 
typically only one way to be “authentic”.  
These poems also illustrate the need for critical attention to paradigms of sound 
that will help us better attend to the nuances of formal experimentation in the works of 
Asian American poets, as they respond to but also reach beyond the legacy of a particular 
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racialization by an avant-garde that tends to split these poets’ investments in form from 
their interests in alternate models of subjectivity. When speaking fractures from notions 
of wholeness or deviates from norms of correct or acceptable speaking, it opens up room 
for discourse on the transgressing of these norms and questions of linguistic mastery as a 
sign of belonging. Likewise, rethinking other issues around paradigms of sound, like the 
indexing of human sounds contra the figures of the animal and cyborg, the ecopoetic 
relationality of hearing, and ambient music as a model for the hyperreality of the 
racialized subject, can begin the important work of making space for Asian American 
identity in ways that free our readings of these poems from the limits of conventional 
signaling of “authenticity”.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER SUMMARIES 
 
Chapter 1 - Phonotextual Voicings: Endophonic Reading and the Exophonic 
Writing of Marilyn Chin and Theresa Cha 
 
                                                
6 While there has yet to be a full-on study of Asian American poetry that is devoted primarily to 
examining paradigms of sound, Steven Yao’s Foreign Accents does have some analysis of 
homophonic play and translation in Marilyn Chin’s Rhapsody in Yellow. Most recently, Tara Fickle’s 
essay “English before Engrish: Asian American Poetry’s Unruly Tongue,” provides a reading of 
Yau’s poetry (as well as that of other experimental poetry by Asian Canadian poets like Fred Wah) 
and most closely models the kind of phonotextual reading that I hope to perform in my own project.  
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In this chapter, I model an endophonic approach towards the exophonic poems of 
Marilyn Chin and Theresa Cha. Practices of “close listening” to poetry often involve the 
analysis of poetry reading performances and tend to focus on the particular decisions 
made by each reader to modulate the text with vocal emphases or inflections. 
“Endophonic” criticism, on the other hand, involves the listening for the operations of 
vocality in the text without needing it to be actualized by the voice of a performer. It 
attends to the physical mechanisms of speaking while using its more fluid figuring of the 
relationship between grapheme and sound to frame moments of unspeakability or 
shibboleth-like challenges in Chin and Cha’s poems. For this reason, “endophonic” 
reading is uniquely suited to the nuances of Chin and Cha’s soundplay, both of whom can 
be considered “exophonic” writers, or writers who work outside their first language. 
“Endophonically” listening to Chin’s Rhapsody in Plain Yellow makes the text’s 
preoccupations with the linguistic signals of assimilation and belonging evident, while in 
Cha’s Dictée it highlights the difficulties of transpacific inter-lingual and inter-
generational remembering. Both exophonic texts, I show, disassociate the lyric voice 
from its representative, autobiographical conventions of subjectivity by using paradigms 
of speech that can only be fully accounted for through endophonic reading and whose 
fragmented, physically laborious nature embodies the traumatic experiences of alienation 
for these poems’ female subjects.   
 
Chapter 2 – Sounding Animal and Cyborg Others: Race and Alternate Alterities in 
Cathy Park Hong's Translating Mo'um and John Yau's Ing Grish, My 
Symptoms and Borrowed Love Poems 
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In this chapter I show how Yau and Hong Park’s poetry used the category of the 
normalized human, silhouetted against tropes of the animal and cyborgian, to show the 
extent of exclusionary linguistic racism. In America’s Asia, Colleen Lye points out that 
despite the “flatness” of subjectivity ascribed to racial otherness, Asiatic racial form 
nonetheless includes an element of un-visualized referentiality: 
We easily recognize the presence of race in visual media because of its 
identification with a set of phenotypical traits and a relative absence of interiority. 
Yet the visuality of Asiatic racial form has a distinctive character insofar as the 
sense of its deceitfulness or mystery always points to the presence of something 
not shown. To put it another way, we recognize the Asiatic as a figure for the 
unrepresentable. Yet how is the unrepresentable to be visualized? Does it have a 
human body? If not, what shape, as a whole or in part, does it take? (7). 
 
Lye’s question “Does it have a human body?” is critical because it recognizes that the 
signification of humanness - or otherwise - is fundamental to the construction of racial 
alterity. It is this “otherwise” signified by voices which share qualities with - yet 
simultaneously extend outside - the paradigm of the linguistically-determined human that 
I wish to explore in this chapter. Additionally, Lye’s question “How is the 
unrepresentable to be visualized?” not only emphasizes the privileging of sight as the 
primary medium through which difference is codified as stereotype but in turn raises 
another question: “How is the unrepresentable to be sounded?” Can listening to the way 
certain kinds of sounds index normative humanness and differentiate it from the 
otherwise lead to new readings of alterity?  
 
 
Chapter 3 – Nancian Hearing, Touch, and Resonance in Mei-mei Berssenbrugge’s 
Ec(h)opoetics of Self and Other 
This chapter investigates the paradigms of bodily subjectivity that Mei-mei 
Berssenbrugge and French deconstructive philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy critique via the 
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figuring of the relationship between hearing and touch in their respective work. 
Specifically, I argue that the subject’s sensing of self as other through sound and touch 
refigures the boundary between subject and surroundings as one of generative possibility, 
enabling the subject to be in a resonant intimacy with the other of the non-human natural 
l world without collapsing its unknowable alterity. Berssenbrugge’s Nancian, 
deconstructive play with auto-affective sensory self-constitution through sound and 
touch, particularly her melding of the two through vibrations, frequencies, and resonance, 
actually upends the traditional Cartesian opposition between body and soul that serves as 
the underlying basis for a reductive humanism. Ultimately, I show how Berssenbrugge’s 
poems uncover the similarities between the formal investments of an ecopoetry that does 
not rely on the thematization of the natural world and the formal investments of Asian 
American poetry that does not rely on the thematization of race, positing an ec(h)opoetic 
subjectivity as another possible form of alterity that resists the normativity of the human.  
Chapter 4 – Ambience and the Aunt: Muzak, Simulating Assimilation and 
Theorizing the TV in Tan Lin’s Insomnia and the Aunt 
 
In this chapter, I trace the history of Muzak and Brian Eno’s body of work in 
order to set up a frame which I hope will eventually (if somewhat unexpectedly) help us 
uncover the stakes of Tan Lin’s Insomnia and the Aunt. I am interested in how an 
understanding of the aims of ambient music and its ideal modes of reception – namely 
boredom, distraction, and relaxation – can help us elaborate on the TV in Lin’s text as the 
vehicle for an ambient poetics, one that enables Lin to call essentialist constructs of 
“authentic” individualized experience into question. I attempt to show how these ideal 
modes of reception coincide with symptoms of racial melancholia within Insomnia and 
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the Aunt and mask (or are the converse effects) the profound affect of the characters’ 
alienation. Finally, I read Lin’s novel as an example of how these symptoms of racial 
melancholia, which are also ambient poetics’ ideal modes of reception, serve as “coping 
mechanisms” by which the user/reader/consumer navigates the different media 
(specifically the meta-forms of the computer and the film) that are encoded into the 
interface of the text. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 – PHONOTEXTUAL VOICINGS: ENDOPHONIC READING AND THE 
EXOPHONIC WRITING OF MARILYN CHIN AND THERESA CHA 
 
Derrida -”I only have one language; it is not mine.” 
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This chapter centers around two texts - Marilyn Chin’s Rhapsody in Plain Yellow 
and Theresa Cha’s Dictée – that illustrate the significance of endophonic criticism for 
minority aesthetics and for sound studies at large, particularly with regard to instances of 
exophonic writing. Through an endophonic reading of these texts, we can uncover the 
formal experimentation in these poems as they resist the fixity of the grapheme and hear 
how they perform the act of bearing witness to the forging of identities through racial 
trauma. These poems invite a silent evocalization as they engage alternately with the 
difficulties and facilities of navigating language within texts that interrogate the terms of 
linguistic belonging in the face of racial difference. In this chapter, I hope to show how 
the physical – yet internal and subdued – mechanics of speaking reading can offer us a 
useful way of reading such experimental Asian American poetry as Chin and Cha’s. My 
study of two poetic texts in this chapter - Theresa Cha’s Dictée and Marilyn Chin’s 
Rhapsody in Plain Yellow - is animated by these questions: What is exophonic writing? 
What is the endophone, and why is it particularly useful for recuperating the sensory 
aspects of reading exophonic writing?  
What is exophonic writing? 
Marjorie Perloff defines exophonic writing in her 2010 Unoriginal Genius: 
Poetry by Other Means as poetry written in a “second” language, or a language that’s not 
“one’s own” (16).7 Perloff writes, “The exophonic…has become much more common 
today, thanks to the current state of mobility and migration, in which the use of English 
(of French or German or Dutch) as a second language has become almost normative” 
                                                
7 Tawada is also referenced by Perloff as an example of an exophonic writer, along with German-
language Jewish poet Paul Celan [and Caroline Bergvall]. [http://jacket2.org/feature/marjorie-perloff-
celebration] 
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(16). In her 2008 study of contemporary German literature, Chantal Wright defines 
exophony as “an emerging term which has largely, although not exclusively, been used to 
describe the phenomenon of African literatures written in European languages, 
particularly in French (cf. Heinrichs 1992: 19).7” (39). Noting that German and Japanese-
language poet Yoko Tawada herself encountered the term at a conference on the subject 
and subsequently titled her 2003 collection of Japanese language essays Exophonie, 
Wright expands this definition more explicitly as the “phenomenon of a writer working in 
a language other than his or her mother tongue” (27).  
Both Marilyn Chin and Theresa Cha can be read as exophonic writers in this 
sense. Neither Chin, a Chinese American poet who emigrated from Hong Kong to Seattle 
with her family at a young age, nor Theresa Cha, the Korean American poet and 
performance artist who left Busan, South Korea for Hawaii (and later California) spoke 
English as their “first” language, and the transpacific conditions of their immigrant status 
as linguistic “outsiders” – their “outside sound” – surface repeatedly in their poems. 
Rhapsody in Plain Yellow and Dictée, in particular, exemplify the kind of formal 
inventiveness these poets display in their works as they toggle between languages, 
interrogating the association of linguistic facility and mastery with belonging.  
At the same time, these texts offer poetics much more than simply a model for how to 
read works by poets writing in non-native languages. The category of the “exophonic,” as 
Wright and Perloff define it, depends on the demarcation of a “primary” or “mother” 
language in opposition to one or more “secondary” languages that is not “one’s own”. 
Yet this word’s own composition points us towards a broader set of possibilities, one 
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which leaves room for the poetic expression of other kinds of difference that accompany, 
but are not limited to, linguistic non-nativity.  
In an article for Poetry Foundation called “How Words Fail,” Cathy Park Hong 
weaves personal experience and critical analysis together as she reflects on the linguistic 
“anxiety” of navigating between Korean and English as a child. Citing Nabokov’s 
comment that English is “‘an artificial, stiffish’” thing, she specifies her interest in the 
sound of the marginalized,  
who severed syntax out of a sense of cultural or political displacement rather than for the 
sake of experimentation. History and circumstance alienated these poets from their own 
language, placed them in the margins of their cultures, where they were witness to 
language’s limits in articulating a cohesive voice. Through deliberate inarticulation, they 
managed to strain out a charged music from syntactic chaff, a music borne out of 
negation. (n.p.)  
 
For writers who Perloff and Wright would deem exophonic, whose work 
interrogates the concept of a facility or ease within “one’s own” or “primary” language 
particularly in poetry, showing that it is an “artificial, stiffish thing,” it’s not only that the 
act of writing in another language other than one's own is necessarily itself traumatic. 
Exophonic writing often bears the mark of the traumatic conditions of the writer's 
exophony, and more often than those traumatic conditions include the experience of 
racialization. For these writers, whose difference is doubly marked, “voice” in a text is 
often more complicated than can be expressed through an audible voice in an exophonic 
reading. It is the specific sonic manifestation of this linguistic non-nativity, their 
phonotextual recasting of the sensory experience of reading, that make the stakes of the 
endophone so significant for Asian American poetry at large.  
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Ironically, however, Hong invokes the exophonic in the sense of “outsider” in 
order to show why it is that actually the endophone, the “inside sound” whose freedom of 
unvoiced potential must be preserved, is able to express a “deliberate inarticulation”, a 
“charged music from syntactic chaff” in a way that the exophone cannot. Though Hong 
herself does not use the word “exophonic” in this essay, her description touches on the 
term’s politically-minded definition (as given by Perloff and Wright), while 
simultaneously raising the matter of the term’s sensory, and more literal, definition.  
As the etymological deconstruction of “exophonic” suggests, the word literally 
indicates an “outside sound”. In theories of reading, it is used to refer to vocally 
performed readings, in which the voice travels “outside” the body. cris cheek offers a 
closer analysis of a reading by Caroline Bergvall, noting that  
An exophonic reading, in which the sound voiced leaves the body, is also the 
subject of variables both on the part of the speaker and receiver. A reader reads 
with their sense of the sound, from their body with their particularities of 
pronunciation and their perception…The human voice is a site of extremely subtle 
embodiments of pitching, velocity and amplitude…Bergvall is making explicit 
points about standards of pronunciation and subversion of dominant meanings 
through articulatory slippage in particular in the context of colonialism. Her 
means are entirely appropriate to her intention, an extremely subtle yet fiercely 
achieved critique of colonial imposition. (“Reading and Writing: Sites of 
Performance”) 
 
What cheek is calling “exophonic reading” then is live performance (whether 
experienced live or through a recording) that bears the individualized vocal signature of 
the performer. An analysis of an exophonic reading might account for things like a 
performer’s particular emphasis on a word, or spacing of phrases, that yields a sense of 
the performer’s interpretation of a poem.  
 24 
Both vocalized and silent readings have their usefulness in understanding the 
sonic form of a poem, and it’s not my intention to discard one for the other. However, as 
I have noted in the introduction, analyses of audible reading performances are not the 
only means of close listening. Indeed, while Bergvall’s exophonic reading of the poem 
uses her voice to effect her critique of colonialism, pointing us to her inflected and 
explicit commentary running concurrently to the words of the poem, it also tends to close 
off other hearings of the poem in the moment of performance besides the particular one 
she has chosen to demonstrate.  
Endophonically Reading Asian American Poetry 
 In Jackdaw Jiving, Peter Middleton distinguishes the workings of an “inner 
voice” from the sounded voice of reading out loud, noting that:  
Actual vocalizing, unless it is vitiated by histrionics, can nourish the inner ear’s 
competence to pick up and assemble sequences. Yet the inner ear is capable of an 
auditory complexity which exceeds almost any audible vocalizing: the latter tends 
to be reductive, if not falsifying, also it may straighten out shocks and distortions 
which, to the inner ear, are part of the real thing that is the voice in the text and 
the delight of the text. (92) 
	  
Middleton coins the term “endophone” to describe this “inner voice,” describing it as “an 
imaginary voice, a voice that was launched by [the author’s], but one that has a life of its 
own in the contemporary air, while it retains his unmistakable, distinct imprint. That 
imaginary and unmistakable voice is a kind of endophone” (91). Middleton argues that 
the endophone, an “inner voice,” issues sounds in the process of reading poetry that are 
assembled by an “inner ear” (91). This “inner voice”, while rooted in the experience of 
vocality, is not actually sounded out.   
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Like Middleton, Garrett Stewart also differentiates between a reader’s experience 
of hearing sounds produced by a voice and a different kind of hearing sound that 
bypasses the sounding of the voice altogether. Stewart takes a slightly different 
understanding of authorial voice; where Middleton leaves space for the “imprint of the 
author’s voice”, Stewart excises it. Nevertheless, like Middleton, Stewart also stresses 
that the reader’s own silent voice lends itself to a kind of internal sounding through 
reading:  
Script has so often been mystified as transcribed voice, as encoded speech, in part 
because it seems to meet a speaking voice halfway. I don’t mean halfway between 
author and reader, the text as silent interface. The voice of the author has nothing 
to do with, or in, the textual circuit. Reading, rather, provides a tacit halving of the 
distance between someone else’s text, that someone long gone, and one’s own 
voice. (105) 
 
The endophone, as a sonic paradigm inflected by but other than the actual voice – 
contributes another layer of sensory information that can run athwart the lexical track of 
the text. Stewart defines this extra layer as the phonotext, “that dimension of the 
phenotext which is so regularly ignored in discussions of the phenomenality of 
reading…that articulatory stream which the interruption of script at lexical borders never 
quite renders silent, at least within a single syntactic period broken by no full pauses” 
(28). Stewart is interested in this phonotext’s “independence from the scriptive aspect of 
writing which allows for the kinetic wavering tensions of phonemic reading” (28). Noting 
that “[everything] here depends on silent pronunciation, on ‘endophony,’ even in the 
unspoken registration of a written text,” Stewart lobbies for a criticism that orients itself 
towards the semantic possibilities made fluid by the phonotext, with a particular 
emphasis on the phenomenon within evocalization that he calls “transegmental drift” 
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(essentially, gaps between words or segments, lexical spacings that can be 
heard/misheard or arise on “accident”).  
Given a history of Orientalist ocularcentrism and its application of theories of 
visual immediacy to both the face of the Asiatic other as well as East Asian art forms and 
systems of writing, it is not difficult to see why theorizing the relationship between the 
grapheme and the phonotext might be salient to the reading of Asian American poetry as 
it contends with, responds to, and reworks a surface-level, instantaneous visuality 
fetishized by the Imagists. Bernstein and others have emphasized the status of phonetic 
alphabets as sound technologies independent of any mechanical apparati, a status which 
has not historically been conferred on Chinese (as the main language of the Imagists’ 
focus). In fact, as Christopher Bush has pointed out, Chinese has tended to be likened to 
visual technologies such as that of the camera, with its “instantaneous” way of capturing 
and conveying an image (Ideographic Modernism 60).  
 Josephine Park suggests in Apparitions of Asia that “Asian American poets faced 
a uniquely perplexing legacy: they were heirs to an avant-garde shot through with 
Orientalism. Though they could and did forcibly decry fantasies of the Orient, their 
avant-garde poetics were themselves a part of an American revolutionary lineage” (95). 
The very modernist, Orientalist linguistic ideal that Chinese was perceived to embody – 
namely, that of an instantaneous relationship between image and meaning – is one that 
Chin and Cha contend with by, and one which an endophonically attuned reading of their 
poems’ phonotextual aspects works against, particularly to the end of destabilizing the 
representation of visual exoticism that Asian American poetry has always had to contend 
with.  
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The vocabulary provided by Middleton and Stewart describes the intersection of 
the structural aspects of language and the sensory constraints of the body in concrete 
terms, terms which are necessary because sound, as the site of intersection between the 
textual and visceral, is fundamental to reading Chin and Cha’s texts in this chapter. 
Certain texts which are marked with traces of the exophonic (in the first sense) contain 
elements in them which refuse to be completely contained by an exophonic reading (in 
the second sense). Endophonic reading helps to draw out instances in which formal 
experimentation that recuperates the role of sound (against the static visuality of 
modernist Orientalism) serves as a vehicle for the act of bearing witness to the cross-
linguistic trauma of non-belonging, the trauma of being an exophonic writer. Both 
Rhapsody in Plain Yellow and Dictée use sensory conventions that cannot be 
voiced/spoken; for Dictée, the “un-say-ability” of multimedia genres embodies the 
trauma, for Rhapsody in Plain Yellow, the unpronounceability of particular typographic 
conventions in the text that one can see but cannot speak is analogous to the act of 
bearing witness to trauma. Rhapsody in Yellow’s punctuation, and Dictée’s incorporation 
of photographs and charts, for instance, are but a few examples of the formal and 
thematic choices that might only be accounted for through the capaciousness of an 
endophonically attuned criticism. Asian American poetry in particular is an especially 
unique litmus case from which to begin fleshing out a theory of exophonic writing and 
reading because both the racialization of Asiatic otherness and the fetishization of 
Chinese and Japanese languages and art were so predominantly rooted in the visual. Chin 
and Cha’s sonic interventions in these texts vacillate between the unspeakability of 
certain formal conventions of genre/typography, as well as endophonic feats of aural 
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gestalt (trans-lingual homophonic puns, transegmental drift, etc), and shibboleth-like 
verbal challenges as a means of interrogating the terms of linguistic belonging 
(alliteration as means of proving assimilation). For this reason, my study attempts to 
model the application of a formally-oriented close listening to the particularities of a 
minority poetry that has had the constraints of particular sensory paradigms of criticism 
(in this case, visual ones). 
Sounding Against the Ideogram: Challenging Voicings in Rhapsody in Plain Yellow  
Reading Chin’s poetry phonotextually helps us understand why theories of 
exophonic writing and endophonic reading, which can seem to have nothing to do with 
identity, have significant implications for the reformation of categories of minority poetry 
and conversations around identity politic, and to recuperate sound, the sensory medium 
which most registers shifts of exophonic difference. Additionally, it is especially crucial 
because of a critical tendency to situate Chin’s work within a particular coterie of writers 
associated with the early stages of Asian American political activism because of her 
work’s recurring allusions to particular autobiographical details that carry thematic 
significance: Chin’s philandering father, who had given Chin her English name after 
Marilyn Monroe, symbols and legends from Chinese literature and folklore, forms of 
musical composition, etc.  
 Timothy Yu notes that “the image of Asian American poetry familiar to most 
readers is a product of the 1980’s” and bears the particular mark of the poetry workshop, 
the “‘MFA mainstream’…with its emphasis on personal voice, epiphanic insight, and 
loose verse form” (73). Yu goes on to describe how the work of this group of poets - in 
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which he situates Chin along with Li-Young Lee, Cathy Song, and David Mura - came to 
be read as formally uncomplicated:  
The understated, first-person lyrics of a poet like Cathy Song were consonant with 
the ‘workshop’ style coming to dominate American poetry, helping to secure an 
image of Asian American poetry as a body of work that diverged from 
mainstream writing only in its overt themes, not in its politics or style. (102)  
 
This grouping - while in and of itself not without reason - has obscured some of her more 
formally innovative experimentation with sound by continuing to emphasize her 
association with the conventions of lyric poetry without unpacking the way her poems 
reclaim “voice” from its representative burden. Steven Yao points out that scholarship on  
[Chin] continues to await proper acknowledgment from a wider audience that 
comprehends both the range of formal invention and the technical sophistication, as well 
as the attendant literary historical significance, of her achievement in verse, particularly 
in relation to the tradition of efforts at establishing a counter poetics of specifically 
Chinese difference that I have been tracing in this study. (189) 
 Though Chin’s poetry may often be grouped together with these other 
autobiographical writers of her period, Yao sees her work as perhaps signalling some 
similar features, but expressly departing from lyric testimony: “the ways in which she 
consistently pushes against the established norms and expectations for lyric testimony (as 
exemplified in the work of Li-Young Lee), which has been the most sanctioned mode of 
Asian American verse under the current regime of liberal multiculturalism” (189). 
Chin’s poems are infused with biographical narratives, and yet some quality of her verse 
prevents it from being neatly categorized as “lyric testimony.” John Yau’s comments on 
one of Chin’s more recent poems from her 2014 Hard Love Province could easily be 
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written of her approach towards the lyric in Rhapsody in Plain Yellow: “She doesn’t use 
the “I” as way to garner sympathy. For all their narrative drift, her poems are not 
anecdotes, little stories meant to call attention to the speaker’s suffering or privileged 
status” (“Marilyn Chin: Poet, Translator, Provocateur"). Though Yau does not explicitly 
say why this is, I argue that it is her formal experimentation with techniques of sonic 
representation which makes these poems not simply anecdotal narratives centered around 
the experience of the lyric “I” but sophisticated feats of exophonic writing which 
complicate conventional notions of “voice” as metaphor for either a recognizable, 
cohesive authorial style or a platform for raising political concerns of “visibility” or 
representation. What Chin does use the “I” towards, I argue, is towards a reconfiguring of 
the readers’ subjectivity through sound, a phonotextual counter to the silence of the 
ideogram. In Rhapsody in Plain Yellow, Chin recuperates the “voice” from its status as a 
stand-in for a reductive (and ultimately still visually determined) understanding of 
representation to a vehicle for engaging with a highly unstable, abstract lyric “I” – an “I” 
that I and others suggest exists more for the purposes of responding to, dialoguing with 
and perverting modernist poetry’s Orientalist visuality through sound than it does to 
convey autobiographical experience (though there are elements of that in her poem).  
 Her “Broken Chord” poems demonstrate an overt (though not strict) commitment 
to specific forms in the titles that evoke the disjointed (but rapidly succeeding) sequence 
of seeing. “Border Ghazals,” which consists of three sections of eight ghazals each, uses 
this form originating from Arabic, Persian, Turkish, and Urdu poetic traditions, a “short 
lyric poem written in couplets using a single rhyme (aa, ba, ca, da, etc), sometimes 
mentioning the poet’s name in the last couplet” (Oxford Dictionary). Each couplet is to 
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be “structurally, thematically, and emotionally autonomous”. Her use of the ghazal form 
in “Horse Horse Hyphen” is not only evocative of her contemporary Adrienne Rich, 
known for experimenting with the particularities of the form in English, but also engages 
with Fenollosa’s zoetrope-like succession of images. 
 Chin’s most specific response to the modernist rendering of the ideogram, 
however, comes in the form of homophonic substitution and punning. In “That Half Is 
Almost Gone,” the lines “I had forgotten the character/ for ‘love.’ I remember 
vaguely/the radical ‘heart’” evoke the ideogram 愛, which is strikingly absent from the 
poem (17). The transliteration of  ‘ai,’ which Chin informs the reader in the notes to the 
poem is an “exclamation homophonous with ai/love, punning love with pain,” shifts 
attention away from the ideogram’s visual properties to its potential exophonic 
resonances (105). Yao, referencing her work’s proximity to conventions of “lyric 
testimony,” observes that “Rhetorically and thematically, this work covers familiar 
territory…by employing the basic conceit of an individual minority subject giving 
affective voice to personal experience as a means for depicting the variety of losses that 
attend upon assimilation into dominant culture. At the level of formal technique, 
however, Chin explores new stylistic ground in “That Half Is Almost Gone,” successfully 
achieving greater expressive intensity by broadening the visual and sonic scope of her 
idiom. (217). Like Stalling’s Yingelishi, Rhapsody in Plain Yellow relies on aural gestalt 
as a mark of the exophonic; however, Chin uses homophonic sound as an interface that 
can establish a connection between different meanings in two languages, rather than as a 
way of highlighting the semantic gap between them. Irene Hsiao elaborates more 
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specifically on the ramifications of this aural gestalt of “I” and “ai” for Asian American 
poetic subjectivity:  
While the difficulty of voicing the I is a problem fundamental to the lyric, the 
tension between ai and I is specific to the border between English and Chinese, an 
aural answer to the Imagist appropriation of the ideogram…By staging an I and 
an ai specifically affiliated with writing, Marilyn Chin addresses what it means to 
be not only an Asian American speaker but also an Asian American writer, a 
problem particularly poignant in the writing of the lyric, the genre most marked 
for its predication on the individual. By insisting on the reincorporation of sound 
into an ideogram made silent both by modernists and Asian American activists, 
Chin stages another kind of recovery for the ideogram that refracts the Asian 
American into a specificity unacknowledged by conditions of the 1970s. Her 
reclamation develops another stance for the Chinese American poet that 
acknowledges and revises the interventions of the modernists and activates 
another relationship between the two languages. (189, 194-195) 
 
In other poems in Rhapsody in Plain Yellow, Chin does present the reader with 
actual ideograms; however, in each of these instances, they present the reader with a 
critique of the privileging of the visual over the aural. In “To Pursue the Limitless,” the 
chiastic repetition of “美言不信 信言不美” framed as a “Chinese paradox” is - with 
a tongue-and-cheek playfulness - translated for the reader as the Keatsian “Beautiful 
words are not truthful/The truth is not beautiful” (86). A few lines later the homophonic 
punning of the Chinese ideograms for two and five plays off Alexander Pope’s “Essay on 
Criticism”: “To (二) err is human/To (五) woo is woman”  (86). Chin’s sly linking of 
ideograms with these well-known phrases mocks the modernist exoticist approach 
towards visually “translating” these characters by connecting them not to ancient Chinese 
proverbs but to Western canonical aphorisms. In Thinking Its Presence: Form and 
Subjectivity in Asian American Literature, Dorothy Wang’s close reading of form in 
Chin’s poetry reveals how irony codes Chin’s political interventions, making them more 
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“palatable” to a wider audience than her more obvious forms of critique – even as it is a 
“structure [that] captures the rivenness of subjectivity wrought by immigration, diaspora, 
the violence of assimilation”, “rhetorical means to contend with the trauma of history,” 
and method of grappling with racial melancholia, for those in the audience who “get” her 
irony (118).  
 In “Rhapsody in Plain Yellow,” the eponymous poem of the collection, however, 
Chin’s use of the ideogram not only acts as a response to modernist silencing, it becomes 
a pointed challenge to the reader’s ability to fulfill the demands of her poems. The 
ideogram “Say: 言” opens the poem, an imperative command that Chin’s intended reader,  
I argue, would not necessarily be able to fulfill in terms of knowing or being able to read 
the character.8 And yet, Chin gives her readers a different way of fulfilling this command, 
as “言” is Chinese for “speech”. Where the “ai”/“I” homophony “hovers between English 
and Chinese, between writing and speaking,” Chin’s take on the ideogram here centers on 
the coincidence of naming the act of speech in writing even as the reader  is being 
compelled to speak (Hsiao 189).  
Such an opening conundrum is fitting for the rest of the poem that follows, 
loosely structured as a series of iterations of “Say:”, of which Dorothy Wang speculates: 
“Is the parodying here mimicry or slavish imitation, commanded by the imperative 
‘Say’? Or is Chin rebelling against the English poetic tradition and its imperatives? ‘Say’ 
can also mean ‘for example’ or can be used in American  slapstick to inject a tone of 
                                                
8 I suggest this because Chin includes a “Notes” section at the end of the text translating incorporated 
Chinese characters and explaining her adaptation of Chinese poetic forms, as well as explaining 
various East Asian cultural references: Chinese folk poetry, Chinese geographic locations, Japanese 
greetings, American Hawaiian slang, and Hindu religious tenets. Clearly, Chin does not assume or 
expect that the reader of Rhapsody in Plain Yellow knows or is familiar with these references. 
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sarcasm (‘Say!’ – as in the Three Stooges routines). ‘Say’ also appears famously in the 
‘The Star-Spangled Banner’: ‘Oh, say can you see…” (154). On top of all the 
possibilities which Wang suggests, I’d add the reader’s inhabiting of “Say:” through 
subevocalization to the list. Indeed, the poem demands a vocal participation from the 
reader through its imperative form, even as at the same time it poses different kinds of 
difficulties for readers which stand in the way of this very process of subevocalization. 
In the following lines from the poem, “I am the sentence which shall at last elude her” is 
literalized two lines later in the form of a blank (and the symmetry of the “Oh”s seem to 
suggest that it’s not merely a delay of the second line, but that the first line is 
conspicuously absent). The unspeakability of the spacing-out of the “sentence which shall 
at last elude her” is taken to a new level a few lines later with the line 
“####00000xxxxx!!!!”. The tension between the urgency and dynamic volume of 
expression which the “!!!!” confers on the symbols before it, which can only be named 
but not pronounced, frames the evocalizable lines here with an intensity of affect.   
Say: I am the sentence which shall at last elude her. 
     Oh, the hell of heaven’s girth, a low mound from here … 
Say:  
     Oh, a mother’s vision of the emerald hills draws down her brows. 
Say: a brush of jade, a jasper plow furrow. 
     Say: ####00000xxxxx!!!! (101) 
This play with the phonotext continues in the poem as Chin’s use of alliterative sound 
patterns and punctuation embodies the racialized linguistic particularities and tonal 
inflections of the non-native immigrant speaker:  
   We’ve studied their cadence carefully –  
Enrolled in a class to improve our accent.  
     Meanwhile, they hover over, waiting for us to stumble… 
to drop an article, mispronounce an R. 
     Say: softly, softly, the silent gunboats glide. 
O onerous sibilants, O onomatopoetic glibness. (102) 
 35 
Chin’s pointed line about “[dropping] an article” and mispronouncing the ‘r’ (the 
consonant which presents difficulty to native speakers of Mandarin attempting to learn 
English because of its similarity to ‘l’),  conveyed in perfect diction – brings to mind the 
line immediately before this excerpt: “The language of the masters is the language of the 
aggressors” (101). The repeated ‘r’s in those two lines – “hover over,” “drop,” “article,” 
“mispronounce” – serves as a kind of obstacle course to the mouth, a shibboleth issued as 
challenge to the non-native speaker. And indeed, Chin takes the reader through the paces 
of this linguistic mastery, responding to this “waiting” by reinventing this ‘aggression’ as 
the subversion of alliterative sibilants: “softly, softly, the silent gunboats glide” (and the 
‘r’ in ‘onerous’ serves as an demonstration of the difference between ‘l’s and ‘r’s).    
Al Filreis writes of Marjorie Perloff as exophonic refugee in Vienna Paradox: 
“She joins many immigrants for whom name change makes fresh identity, a turn back 
toward life, and a certain original forgetting enabled by a full shift in language” (n.p.). 
For the immigrants of Rhapsody in Plain Yellow, despite their ability to meet the 
challenges of these shibboleths, the visible fact of their racial difference is inescapable; 
such a “fresh identity,” which linguistic assimilation would seem to offer a way into, 
remains impossible. 
“But the Breath Falls Away”: Exilic Difficulties of Voicing in Dictée  
 It seems odd to characterize Theresa Cha’s Dictée as a perfect example of 
anything, given the text’s multi-genre, fragmented aesthetic, as well as the wide range of 
materials it includes; and yet it is the perfect example of a poetic text for which 
exophonic writing and endophonic reading are inextricably linked. Though initially the 
prose text received little critical attention from scholars in Asian American studies 
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“because a text with so many ‘experimental’ features could not be understood as Asian 
American in its concerns,” it had become a staple of the Asian American literary canon 
by the 1990’s, a surprising turn which Timothy Yu argues “…reveals the limits of our 
dominant paradigms of reading and forces us to return to the wider avant-garde contexts 
from which both Asian American and experimental writing emerge” (103). In “Asian 
American Poetry in the First Decade of the 2000s,” Yu includes Cha’s work with that of 
John Yau, Mei-mei Berssenbrugge, and Myung Mi Kim, grouping them all as “a more 
experimental strain [of Asian American poetry] focused on fragmentation, linguistic 
exploration, and cultural hybridity” which became consonant with academic and 
theoretical models towards the end of the 1990’s and consequently enjoyed more traction 
then (802).   
 Whereas Rhapsody in Plain Yellow lends itself to the notion of body as musical 
instrument, versatile enough to bring together various musical forms: “Blues on Yellow 
(African American musical form), “Blues on Yellow #2”, Chinese folk songs (from the 
Yuefu), “Summer Sonatina,” “Broken Chord Sequence” set of poems, which contain 
other musical references “Hospital Interlude,” “Song of the Giant Calabash,”  “Hong 
Kong Fathersong,” “Libations, Song 10”. “Blues on Yellow #3), Dictée explores the 
body as instrument of writing and sounding. it Both texts, however, highlight the 
relationship between generative instrument and the versatility of the forms it produces 
(Dictée’s handwritten personal letters, dictations, historical documents), and like 
Rhapsody in Yellow, Dictée straddles several different modes that make categorizing 
Cha’s work generically a daunting task.  
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 Certainly the fragmented and multimedia/multi-genre of the text, inflected by 
Cha’s work as a performance artist and film maker, conveys a formal sense of difficulty, 
or “inaccessibility” and “slipperiness” as L. Hyun Yi Kang writes (76). Yet as Kang as 
herself acknowledges, this seeming “inaccessibility” stems the from text’s concern with 
“the risks and possible pleasures of coming into an authorial voice,” a “[tension of 
writing] between the demands of social comprehensibility in language (communication) 
and the desire for some adequate representation of the subjective (enunciation)”. Though 
Kang builds her reading around the centrality of “voice” and “enunciation”, her interest 
in these concepts ultimately remains directed more towards the way they factor into 
representation, rather than their part in a sensory paradigm; nevertheless, my aim in my 
reading of Dictée is not necessarily to achieve more “accessibility” -  as I suspect Kang 
might also be wary of - but to uncover the stakes of the physical materiality of writing 
and reading speaking as the vehicle through which other difficulties of memory and 
origin are routed at the heart of this text. 
 Structurally, Dictée is broken down into nine sections, with each section named 
after one of the nine muses Cha names in a table at the beginning of the text.  
Though the section “THALIA  COMEDY” comes much later in the text, in 
a way it offers the perfect preface to the text’s preoccupations with the sensory mediation 
of (as well as the sensory mediation through) speech, with its illustration of a woman 
picking up a ringing telephone. This unnamed woman is presumably the figure of the 
diseuse, or female monologue speaker, who is introduced to the reader at the beginning of 
the text as the speaker of certain abstract passages. What Hsiao writes of the subjectivity 
in Chin’s poems could easily be written of Dictée and the anonymous, universalized 
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figure of the diseuse who haunts its pages.9 Here she is figured in the act of listening, 
which is depicted as a precondition to her (unactualized) speech:  
She decides to take the call. Takes it at once. Her voice is as if she holds this 
receiver for the very first time. This foreign instrument that carries the very 
sounds to the words. The very words…From when the call is announced to her to 
the moment she picks up the receiver she does not think. She hears the ringing 
and the call is announced. She walks to it, picks it up but she has not had the time 
to think. All had been prepared. All had been rehearsed beforehand. To the pause, 
over and over in her mind. The brief pause in the beginning before she would say 
yes. 
 
Cha’s description of the would-be speaker who must always be a listener first perfectly 
embodies the interpellated relationship to the other Avital Ronell portrays in the opening 
to her Telephone Book: (more on this in the listening chapter): 
……………And yet, you’re saying yes, almost automatically, suddenly, 
sometimes irreversibly. Your picking it up means the call has come through. It 
means more: you’re its beneficiary, rising to meet its demand, to pay a debt. You 
don’t know who’s calling or what you are going to be called upon to do, and still, 
you are lending your ear, giving something up, receiving an order. (1) 
 
Ronell’s use of the present participle reflects the incomplete, ongoing nature of this act; 
more importantly, it isolates the fact that “picking it up” means that the listener has 
always already “answered,” despite not having said anything yet. The hypothetical 
“would” remains, reminding readers that the diseuse’s imagining of her own voice 
remains an unspoken projection: “The voice would reach a crescendo, pause, begin again 
in a barely audible whisper with either coughing or choking at the throat. Rarely audible. 
Inaudible. Hardly audible at all. Reduced to a moan, a hum, staccato inhalation, and 
                                                
9 Hsiao writes, “Overflowing and empty, the I is everything but the private self; it carries a “burden of 
history” that extends beyond personal memory, perhaps past memory itself, but its layers are disrupted 
by the depth charge of the universal. The act of naming becomes problematic; to universalize means to 
unname (“I tried to universalize her by not naming her” [“Interview,” Bedient 8])—to reduce the 
particular and historical to pronouns that do not then have an antecedent. If “she” is unnamed, who or 
what am “I”? (202). 
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finally a wail” (Dictée 139). In “The Performing and the Performed: Performance 
Writing and Performative Reading”, Robert Sheppard writes of Levinas, “Saying is the 
call of, the call to, the other, and the fact of the need and obligation to respond to, and 
become responsible for, the other, in Levinas’ difficult thinking…It is the site and 
performance of ethics because of the obligation to respond. It is public, yet it doesn’t 
communicate anything but the desire to communicate…We cannot, as in his everyday 
example, but not reply (even with silence).” Sheppard applies this Levinasian ethics of 
“saying” towards a distinction between “the saying” and “the said,” one which in turn 
helps distinguish between externally voiced (exophonic) reading and endophonic reading 
while insisting on both kinds of reading as performance. In Dictée, the to and fro of 
address/interpellation, the “call of” and “call to” the other illustrated in the example of 
the telephone maps onto the reader-text relationship; in a sense to read endophonically is 
to “pick up,” and the voice which “would” show itself is the unrealized exophonic 
reading.  
 It has historically been more difficult to approach silence as a “mode of 
performative action”; particularly when it comes to political activism. The activism of the 
1970’s was rooted in visibility and voice, projected assertions of presence by 
marginalized and minoritized groups. And yet reimagining the sensory manifestation of 
agency is central to Cha’s works; in her performance piece, Aveugle Voix, she ties a white 
cloth with “VOIX” stenciled on it around her eyes, wrapping another white cloth 
stenciled with “AVEUGLE” around her mouth. Though no video footage exists of the 
performance, Cha can be seen in the process of binding herself with these cloths, 
unrolling a scroll that reads either “WORDS FAIL ME SANS MOT SANS VOIX 
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AVEUGLE” or those same words in reverse order, depending on the direction of the 
scroll. The sensory reversal of aligning “voix” with the eyes and “aveugle” with the 
mouth is echoed in the inverted syntax of both this scroll and the title. Trinh T. Minh-ha 
points out the homophonic logic of Aveugle Voix, noting that “[it] is not so much the 
designation and combination of Blind and Voice as the resonance of these words when 
they are taken in reverse order: Aveugle Voix, rather than the usual, grammatically 
correct, Voix Aveugle…The play on voix (voice) and voir (to see) is all the more 
significant for without seeing the written letters, Aveugle Voix and (l’) aveugle voit (the 
blind sees) sound the same” (46). Cha’s homophonic and syntactical punning draws on 
the ambiguous, fluid materiality of hearing sound - is it “voice” or “seeing”? - as a way of 
subverting the authoritative lexical specificity of writing.  
 Kang writes:  
The language of Dictée is multiple and ever-shifting - words and voices are 
decentered, recalled from the margins, exclusive, unclaimed, indecipherable and 
then viscerally clear. To reach towards that difficult but necessary and then again 
fleeting goal of a personally and collectively meaningful language, Cha has 
constructed her book as a process of mutually active collaboration. If language 
would always already be implicated, predetermined and expectant for both reader 
and writer, Cha’s strategy is to explicitly posit an active relationship between 
writer and reader as central to the challenging of the authorizing and alienating 
structures of language and literary transmission. (78) 
 
What Kang stops just short of pointing out, however, and what my reading of Cha seeks 
to extend from her argument, is that this “active relationship” is routed specifically 
through the unactualized aural demands the text makes on the reader in the process of 
reading that undermine, complicate, and add to Cha’s writing in such a way that the 
phonotextual experience mirrors different facets of the experience of exophonic 
identity/the exile.  
 41 
 In her analysis of corporeality and signification in Dictée, Elisabeth Frost suggests 
that  
…Dictée raises the possibility of a ‘bothness’ of word and flesh that might 
negotiate between the empirical body and the constructed body, transparency and 
opacity, original and translation. The tongue becomes a figure for such a border 
zone: forger of words, organ at the boundary of the body and the symbolic, the 
tongue retains a stubborn corporeality (more pronounced, for example, than that 
of eyes, figured as transcendent ‘soul’). (189)  
 
To Frost’s list I would add the suggestion that in reading Dictée the subvocalizing tongue 
and internal ear is also operative as border zone at the most fundamental level between 
reader and writing. Stewart’s concept of “transegmental drift”, for instance, in which 
gaps between words or segments, lexical spacings can be heard/misheard such that new 
words or phrases arise on “accident”, is exemplified by the fluidity of meaning that is 
Dictée’s aural answer to the authority of the determinate grapheme. In the following 
passage, the diseuse’s description of a husband-figure plays with this double sounding: 
“A stranger. Stranger to her. The one that she should espouse. Decided for her. Now she 
would be long to him” (Dictée 110). In addition to the twinned play of “stranger” the 
noun and “stranger” the adjective, the subtle but meaningful space breaking “be long” 
transforms this relation of intimacy and/or possession into a relation of distance and 
estrangement.  
 Similarly, if one were to convert the names of the punctuation in the text’s 
opening dictation back, the text would look something like this: “It was the first day. She 
had come from a far. tonight at dinner, the families would ask, “How was the first day?” 
at least to say the least of it possible, the answer would be “there is but one thing. There 
is someone. From a far.” (The capitalization is interesting because occasionally it lines up 
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with the punctuation’s demarcation between sentences while at other points in the 
passage it doesn’t.) Cha’s splitting of “afar” - “She had come from a far     period” and 
“There is someone     period     From     a far     period” - creates the expectation of 
naming of place or origin, an expectation that is deferred and disturbed by the inclusion 
of naming the punctuation meant to separate the words (“period”).)] What sutures epic 
and lyric together in Dictée is that language serves as the measure of distance from time 
and place: “Dear Mother, 4. 19. Four Nineteen, April 19th, eighteen years later. Nothing 
has changed, we are at a standstill. I speak in another tongue now, a second tongue a 
foreign tongue (80).” “I am here for the first time in eighteen years, Mother. We left here 
in this memory still fresh, still new. I speak another tongue, a second tongue. This is how 
distant I am. From then. From that time.” (85) The phrase “A Far”, then, takes on the 
quality of a place that is distant from everywhere and long-ago from any time, a vague 
foreignness that escapes the specifications of “What nationality/or what kindred and 
relation/what blood relation/what blood ties of blood/what ancestry/ what race 
generation/what house clan tribe stock strain/what lineage extraction/what breed sect 
gender denomination caste/what stray ejection misplaced” (20). It is precisely the mythic 
place and past of Epic that is this place of “a far” for the diseuse, in contrast to the 
historical specificity of the April Revolution and the fragmented narratives of personal 
memories.  
  Finally, in the section “ERATO LOVE POETRY,” Cha’s use of 
transegmental drift (“her body all the time de composes/eclipses to be come yours”) sets 
up a dichotomy between death/the reversal or undoing of writing (de composes) and 
orgasm/possession (the homonym of “come”/“cum” as this erotic death interrupting the 
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romantic phrase “be yours”, one which depicts both dyads as incomplete processes (118). 
This evokes a kind of generative eco-eroticism that for Cha is tied to writing: 
“Composition of the body, taking into consideration from conception, the soil, seed, 
amount of light and water necessary, the geneaology” (58).  
 Cha’s phonotextual play on the theme of aural interruptions and disruptions of the 
written continues to unfold in the structure of the text. Appropriately enough for the title 
Dictée, the first numbered page of the text (after the first few pages, which contain a 
dedication “To my mother to my father,” a quote from Sappho, and a list of the Nine 
Muses that replaces Euterpe with Elitere10) is a record of the same dictation in both 
French and English. Rather than notating the punctuation of the dictation with their 
appropriate symbols, these dictations translate the names of the punctuation marks and 
include them written out alongside the text of the “actual” dictation, marking the 
“original” spoken medium of the phantom voice dictating, as if the one notating did not 
understand either the nature of a dictation or what the dictation was saying (If there is a 
kind of punctuation or lexical separation here it is instead in the extended spaces which 
bookend the names of punctuation marks.) 
 Not only does the act of dictation necessitate that the speaker and writer are not 
the same person, it also entails a particular power dynamic between them, as evidenced 
by the imperative moods of “open paragraph” and “close quotation marks”. (The 
hierarchical dynamic between between speech and writing becomes a way of embodying 
                                                
10 In Feminist Measures: Soundings in Poetry and Theory, Shelley Sunn Wong speculates on the 
significance of Cha’s substitution. She writes, “The installation of Elite (an invented name deriving 
from neither Greek nor Latin) signals the text’s intention to disorganize the construction of notions of 
the common, constructions that make possible totalizing identifications on the basis of seemingly 
definitive categories such as woman, American, or writer…With its resonant play on elite and literary, 
Elite emerges to critique the privileged place of epic as high literature” (51). 
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and linking the trauma imposed by different authoritative dichotomies throughout the rest 
of the text: between Catholic nun as teacher and student, husband and wife, the state and 
civilians in revolt).  
 These dictations in particular deal with this question of translation, both in 
between the sonic medium of the voice/writing (for instance, the accidental 
“transliteration” of punctuation marks in the dictation) and in between languages. In fact, 
translation and dictation are inextricably intertwined in Dictée’s dictations. The 
instructions are in French: “Ecrivez en francais:” “Traduire e francais” “Completez les 
phrases suivantes:”  The translation exercises in Dictée masquerade as utilitarian 
language (language meant to serve simply as material for the practice of translation), but 
the repeated iterations of “speak” in the guise of conjugating verb forms inevitably 
conveys a narrative that suggests some power dynamic: “I want you to speak.” “I wanted 
him to speak.” “I shall want you to speak.” “Are you afraid he will speak?” “Were you 
afraid they would speak?” Additionally, Dictée’s figuring of the relationship between 
English and French also manifests as homophonic punning across languages - for 
instance, the French “diseuse,” or female speaker, paired with the English “disuse” 
(“Dead words. Dead tongue. From disuse. Buried in/Time’s memory. Unemployed. 
Unspoken. History./Past. Let the one who is diseuse, one who is mother/who waits nine 
days and nine nights be found”) (133). 
 This pairing of French and English happens again halfway through the text as a 
poem in the “URANIA ASTRONOMY” section. Park reads the poem alongside 
Baudelaire’s “Le Cygne” “as a recollection of Baudelaire’s meditation on exile, but in her 
hands the poem has remembered the swan’s cry for rain as rain itself” (139). Park points 
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out through the homophonic punning of “cygne” and “signe” in French and “pidgeon” ’s 
evoked but unnamed homonym “pidgin” in English that  “…broken English creates a 
flexibility within the language which had previously been lost in the movement between 
French and English” (141). Dictée (sometimes seamlessly, sometimes with a violent 
abruptness) navigates between French, English and Korean/Chinese, evoking Perloff’s 
definition of exophonic writing as writing in a language other than one’s own - even as its 
calls the very idea of “one’s own language” into question in several ways. Is the “own” 
language of the disease French/English/Korean? Is one’s own language lexical, pictorial, 
sonic?  
 At the same time, Dictée is a spin on the exophonic and endophonic reading, in 
that it tarries with the notion of sound becoming “outside” and voiced, but situates itself 
at the impossible threshold of sound-within attempting to become actualized-without, the 
saying about to become the said. Park notes that  “…Cha complicates even the possibility 
of speech for the exile. Indeed, the whole of the text demonstrates that speaking is itself 
the most difficult aspect of the exilic condition” (139). Hsiao writes of the lost language 
of the emigre in Chin’s “How I Got That Name”: “The poet as seer and maker is only 
half the story: what loss or distance moves the self to compensatory utterance? For the 
writer as migrant, the self is defined by its distance from home, from the impossibility of 
returning intact or the same, perhaps even divided from the desire to return at all” (202). 
This notion of “compensatory utterance” in response to a condition of permanent 
displacement through immigration could easily also apply to the exile of Dictée. 
Passages such as the following demonstrate how the text takes the alienation of the 
exophonic even further by aligning the unactualized sound of endophonic reading with 
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the inexpressible trauma that is the absolute asymptote of exophonic writing, suggesting 
that perhaps one can be made a stranger to all language through trauma, that at times 
words fail to convey the “suffering” woven in the text’s haunting glimpses of personal 
and national memory:  
“Inside is the pain of speech the pain to say. Larger still. Greater than is the pain not to 
say. To not say. Says nothing against the pain to speak. Must break. Must void” (3). 
She mimicks the speaking. That might resemble speech. (Anything at all.) Bared noise, 
groan, bits torn from words. Since she hesitates to measure the accuracy, she resorts to 
mimicking gestures with the mouth. The entire lower lip would lift upwards then sink 
back to its original place. She would then gather both lips and protrude them in a pout 
taking in the breath that might utter some thing. (One thing. Just one.) But the breath falls 
away. (3)  
The focus here is on the great difficulty of the physical act of speaking, not of thinking of 
what to say (“Anything at all.”). The difficulty (really, the impossibility) of actualizing 
speech for the diseuse evokes Hong’s observation that for poets like Celan and Taggart, 
“the disassociation of voice from language is not just a philosophical choice. It is also 
political. The voice is not always a freeing form of self-expression. It can prove to be a 
difficult transaction, a construction of fragments, as much conflicted demurral as actual 
communication, as much about what is unspeakable as about what is speakable” (n.p.). 
Despite the juxtaposition of the dictations’ fluid lack of punctuation and the extremely 
broken and choppy description of the diseuse’s attempts to speak, this is a resonance 
shared by both passages. Indeed, the messianic potentiality embodied by this “one thing” 
(similar) infuses the whole text with the anticipation of a completion, but the completion 
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is always deferred - always “the breath falls away” at the threshold of saying crossing 
into the said. Shelley Sunn Wong points out that Sappho frames the text as a potential 
tenth muse (52); the text toys throughout with the possibility of nine becoming ten (the 
Nine Muses, nine concentric circles of hell, nine days of Demeter waiting for Persephone 
to return from Hades, the nine days of the Eleusinian Mysteries, the Daoist chart of 
numerical and cosmological pairings) 154, 173, 175.) Indeed, the whole text is infused 
with the yearning for yet deferral of completion/arrival, the saying caught in the process 
of becoming the said. 
Home, epic, and the arrival of the said is aligned with this mythic place of Epic.11 
And yet, as Kang observes, the fact that the possibility of a home for the diseuse in an 
epic history is aligned with a “said” that is never realized does not necessarily entail a 
failure of agency:“The impulse of expression and the efforts of representation need not be 
crippled by the alienating despair of repeated failures. Rather, these near misses can 
provoke creative and more effective strategies for counter-hegemonic enunciation” (97). 
Though I disagree that the text aims to actualize any kind of “counter-hegemonic 
enunciation,” I agree with Kang’s reading that the diseuse’s repeated efforts to speak 
need not be read as failure - only where Kang sees success as eventual enunciation and 
strategization, I argue that it is precisely the text’s hovering at the moment of the 
enunciation which is always about to arrive that makes the text’s figuring of the 
relationship between speech and text a way of “[awakening] a more responsive and 
                                                
11  Park notes: “Further, if the cry is no longer distinguishable from the rain or a dream, I would like to 
suggest that this is a nuanced version of the ‘désir sans trêve’ of the exile: she realizes that the idea of 
home is a dream, a fantasy, and a running, constant sound like rain” (Apparitions 139). 
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responsible audience…[and making] the reader aware of our bodily and ideological 
presence and distance in relation to the text before us” (92). 
Conclusion 
Reading Chin and Cha’s engagement with the physical mechanisms of speaking 
in their poems reveals nuances of meaning that would otherwise remain inaccessible. 
Where Rhapsody in Plain Yellow concerns itself more explicitly with the difference of 
the immigrant and with responding to the implications of modernist Orientalism for 
Asian American poetry, Dictée concerns itself more with the loss of the exile’s language 
and place. Nonetheless, both texts frustrate readers’ ability to perform exophonic 
readings of their texts in a straightforward fashion by drawing on phonotextual qualities 
that fall outside the realm of exophonic reading. For Rhapsody in Plain Yellow, these 
qualities manifest themselves in the form of transegmental drift, homophonic punning, 
transliteration, typographical spacing, use of unpronounceable punctuation, and written 
characters from other languages. Dictée draws on many of these techniques as well, 
particularly with regard to the potentiality of breath, transegmental drift, and incorporates 
multiple genres (for instance, how would one read the photographs of Yu Guan Soon or 
of the narrator’s mother out loud? or charts of the human body?) and partially through its 
incorporation of English, French, Korean, and Chinese characters (although its 
differentiation between Chinese characters (54, 55, 154) and Chinese pinyin (173) seems 
to place Chinese characters in the category of maps/charts etc) (24).  
Both Dictée and Rhapsody in Plain Yellow, while loosely tied to autobiographical 
experience, also defy the constraints of the label “lyric poetry”. Their shared thematic 
preoccupations involve attempts to recuperate maternal histories, histories which bear the 
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weighty marks of political and gendered systems of oppression, and are poignantly 
infused with personal loss and the violent memories of trauma. Without a study of their 
formal commitments to sonic experimentation, their works might be simply read within 
the limits of preexisting generic constraints, in the case of Chin’s frequent categorization 
within lyric testimony, or in Cha’s case, without a sense of the way sound coheres the 
themes of her work.  
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CHAPTER 2 – SOUNDING ANIMAL AND CYBORG OTHERS: RACE AND 
ALTERNATE ALTERITIES IN CATHY PARK HONG’S TRANSLATING MO’UM 
AND JOHN YAU’S ING GRISH, MY SYMPTOMS AND BORROWED LOVE POEMS 
 
This chapter traces how the poems of Cathy Park Hong and John Yau experiment 
with sound as a means of critiquing the humanness which is only conferred on the 
racialized other through the normative, dominant language of cultural assimilation. I 
demonstrate how voice - metaphorized as a means for political activism – gave the field 
of Asian American poetry its coalitional start even as its association with the cohesive 
identity of the lyric “I” fell out of consonance with postmodern theoretical models of 
subjectivity. For this reason, the recuperation of voice as more than metaphor continues 
to matter tremendously for Asian American poetry. This recuperation, however, is also 
particularly significant because the sonic conditions of voice’s manifestation within and 
apart from language also act as a limit case of the human. I argue that it is the question of 
humanness, as it is confirmed or negated through the way voice functions in relation to 
language, that underpins these poets’ depictions of racial alterity.  
Reading Cathy Park Hong’s poems alongside those of John Yau reveals a great 
deal of shared ground in terms of their formal investments and political commitments. 
Hong, whose three collections of poetry – Translating Mo’um, Dance Dance Revolution, 
and Engine Empire – were all published in the last two decades, has not received nearly 
as much critical attention as John Yau has, who has been publishing since the 1970’s and 
is known for an extensive bibliography that includes Paradiso Diaspora, Ing Grish, 
Borrowed Love Poems, Forbiddn Entries, Edificio Sayonara, and most recently Future 
Adventures in Monochrome, in addition to his art criticism. Nonetheless, a careful 
reading of their work together – as I will show – draws out their shared interests in 
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experimenting with the literal, guttural sounding of voice in primitivist and Orientalist 
tropes, in keeping with their contention that the subject position of the cannot be 
occluded and their commitments to recuperating voice from being deployed 
metaphorically or autobiographically as a vehicle for representation.   
Both poets have also contributed to the conversation around each others’ work. 
Yau, who writes in a piece called “At Play in the Fields of Language” on Hong’s body of 
poetry, analogizes Hong’s unique deformative and transformative approach towards 
English to the figure of “an inflicted and vulnerable body undergoing rapid 
change…[parts of which] are blossoming while other parts are dying”, a comparison 
invoking the Bahktinian grotesque that I will take up and explore further in my close 
reading of Translating Mo’um. Citing her interests in marginalized and alternative forms 
of language like pidgin and dialect, which span all three of her published works, Yau 
situates Hong’s poems at the juncture of a rapidly deteriorating opposition between the 
voice of the “lyric self” and normative expectations of how that voice ought to register 
within the poem:  
The argument between lyric poetry (that is poetry that arises from the poet’s voice 
(the “I”) or what Robert Grenier characterized as “SPEECH”) and text (the 
primacy of the written or printed word) is becoming an increasingly obsolete 
opposition. Globalism and immigration (or migration) – in the form of pidgin, 
mispronunciation, graffiti, and encoded signs – have overrun the various 
geographical boundaries as well as upended the rules defining areas of fixed 
vocabulary, grammar and spelling. 
 
Likewise, as Hong points out, Yau’s poetry does not deal in simple stable oppositions, 
but situates itself at the ever-shifting delination between what appears to be a given and 
what is unexpected. Yau’s use of sound responds to a history of American Orientalism, to 
a particular mode of visually representing the Asiatic other, one that plays off fears and 
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tropes of the other as alternately “inscrutable” menace or bumbling subservient. The 
Genghis Chan: Private Eye series, which take on Pound’s claims about the ideogram, as 
well as his Peter Lorre and Boris Karloff poems, are a few examples of the cutting wit of 
his parody in response to these representations.  
In “Two Poems by John Yau,” Hong describes the work of Yau’s “Opinion 
Sonnet” poems as  
… provocative and utterly disconcerting, satirizing racist typologies that we 
unconsciously absorb into our psyche. The voice in these sonnets opines that 'the 
Chinaman is indistinguishable, mute, a faceless assembler, 'a curious prop' in the 
'silver screen.' But while the speaker is presented as some authoritative 
anthropologist, his English reads like badly translated Berlitz: the narration is 
absurdly flat-footed and the tone feels as bland as clip art, highlighting the 
horrifying banality of these stereotypes. These poems will get under your skin.  
 
As Hong points out, Yau’s poems juxtapose the matter-of-fact specificity of 
quotidian language, which he aligns with conventions of the lyric voice, with these 
nonchalantly wild and evocative turns of familiar phrases and forms, which defamiliarize 
both normative understandings of voice as well as stereotypical presuppositions about 
identity. 
Through a close listening of these poets’ work which spans several texts – Hong’s 
Translating Mo’um and her more recent Dance Dance Revolution, as well as Yau’s 
Borrowed Love Poems and Ing Grish - I explore the conditions of language under - or 
through -  which a voice registers as exclusively human. On the one hand, these poems 
index a kind of primitivism wherein grotesque bodies and their screams, mutters, and the 
seemingly non-lexical soundings of other languages signal an animalistic abjectness 
aligned with the racialized immigrant’s failure to communicate within a normalized 
English. This animalistic manifestation of the grotesque is tied to fears within “yellow 
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peril” discourse about unbridled sexuality and savageness. On the other end of the 
spectrum, highly structured poetic forms suggest a different kind of mechanical 
relationship to language, an unreasoning utterance that is divorced from the expressions 
of an authorial self. These other machine-like poems, their meaning seemingly divested 
of authorial intent, evoke techno-Orientalist tropes of the cyborg/automaton/piece-meal 
body.  
What can the kinds of formal interventions made by these contemporary Asian 
American experimental poets reveal about the sonic phenomenon of voice as it pushes at 
the edges of language and its historical relationship to bodily representations of Asian 
American alterity? In America’s Asia, Colleen Lye asks, “How is the unrepresentable to 
be visualized?” (20). This question not only emphasizes the privileging of sight as the 
primary medium through which difference is reified, but in turn begs another question for 
my dissertation: “How is the unrepresentable to be sounded?” Can listening to the way 
certain kinds of sounds index normative humanness and differentiate it from the 
otherwise lead to new readings of alterity?  
 This question is one that Cathy Park Hong and John Yau explore in their poetry 
through the sonically attuned formal experimentation which accompanies their figuring 
of the grotesque body and its animal and cyborg-like manifestations. I argue that the 
unrepresentable figure of the Asiatic sounds itself in the grotesque and (only seemingly) 
contradictory Orientalist tropes of the animal and the cyborg, and that these tropes are co-
opted by these Asian American poets as a means of critiquing the impossible fantasy of 
the postracial.  
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Voice as Metaphor, Identity, and the Avant-Garde 
One needs only to turn to the articles Yau and Hong have written addressing the 
precarious relation between poetry that talks about identity and the formal concerns of the 
literary avant-garde to see that these poets soundly reject the fantasy of post-racial 
formations within poetics. In his article for Boston Review, "‘Purity’ and the ‘Avant-
Garde’”, Yau makes his contempt for these titularly-cited formations explicit:   
I am sick of the term “avant-garde,” a European invention that has been presided 
over and refined by white critics since the French banker, mathematician, and 
social reformer Olinde Rodrigues first used the term in 1825. Contemporary 
discussions about the artistic avant-garde seldom address race because the term 
has come to be a force for maintaining pedigree, establishing lineage and 
bloodlines—bloodlines largely presided over by supervisors and administrators: 
those individuals who control access to the descriptor “avant-garde,” and 
determine the reception of poetic works through publication, reviewing, and 
public readings…Most recently, the ideal of avant-garde poetry has become 
tangled up with another term: post-identity writing. 
 
Citing Conceptual poet Kenneth Goldsmith’s remark that “‘Uncreative writing is a 
postidentity literature,’ Yau points out that this dismissal of race does not negate the 
struggles that writers of color have faced in their marginalization by a mostly white 
avant-garde, and in fact only further exemplifies the racism that enables this 
marginalization to take place. 
Dorothy Wang puts pressure on the tendency to read the work of more explicitly 
experimental poets’ work like Yau, who do not thematize or provide proof of ethnicity, as 
either playing “the race card” at the poet’s convenience or somehow “post-race,” “a 
retreat to the idea of a universal subject” which Wang rejects (Thinking its Presence 280). 
Indeed, for Wang, the questions of how linguistic mastery or credibility is signaled is 
intimately related to notions of aesthetic “difficulty,” particularly as it intersects with 
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classifications of “mainstream” or “avant-garde.” Yau’s use of parody as well as the 
vexing of lyric subjectivity in his Genghis Chan poems makes, for Wang, the “erasure of 
the subject [register] as a generic postmodern move.” While I contend that it is not Yau’s 
erasure of the subject that registers as “postmodern” but his opting out of metaphorical, 
established conventions of the “lyric voice” (in fact, as I suggest through my readings, 
Yau does not erase the racialized subject at all), the alignment of his formal 
experimentation with an American and European avant-garde tradition, as Wang notes, 
often leaves little room for discussing how form relates to the politics of “ethnic self-
identification” (181).  
 Cathy Park Hong has similarly critical words for this post-racial and post-
identitarian approach which fails to acknowledge its problematic erasure of otherness. In 
an article for the poetry journal Lana Turner titled “Delusions of Whiteness in the Avant-
Garde,” Hong points out that the seeming radicalness of “the specious belief that 
renouncing subject and voice is anti-authoritarian” is actually “clueless [to the fact] that 
the disenfranchised need such bourgeois niceties like voice to alter conditions forged in 
history”. 
 Hong’s description of voice as a “bourgeois nicety” accomplishes two things. It 
recuperates the precarious stakes of the concept of “voice,” pointing out that dismissing 
the “voice” of the subject itself is a privileged move that dismisses the need for strategies 
to contend with these “conditions [of racism] forged in history.” At the same time, 
however, Hong’s description also raises the problem of the terms of “voice” within 
poetry - that it is perceived as theoretically unfashionable because of its association with 
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autobiographical narrative in an individual’s recognizable style – and points towards the 
possibility of rethinking it.  
Within criticism, sonic processes like listening or speaking (and even musical and 
instrumental performance) become metaphorized and abstracted in relation to reading and 
writing all too easily.12 A metaphorical sense of voice, conscripted for the purposes of 
political representation, underlines at least part of the problem of the “ethnic/aesthetic 
divide”.13 
Notions of “voice” as a metaphorical vehicle for representing identity have 
consonances with the political appeal Joseph Jeon ascribes to visibility in Racial Things, 
Racial Forms when he notes that “In the wake of the civil rights movement, axiomatic in 
                                                
12 Take, for instance, Lesley Wheeler’s acknowledgements to Voicing American Poetry, in which she 
thanks several colleagues that “sang feminist back-up through years of composition” and another 
colleague “whose fine ear helped me regulate my pitch,” finally concluding, “I owe my whole 
orchestra and its first tuning to the wonderfully clashing accents” of other colleagues (viiii-x). It’s 
clear that Wheeler isn’t referring to an actual orchestra, nor to any actual choral performance, and that 
she’s using these paradigms of sounding as metaphors for the process of writing. This tendency also 
happens in criticism, particularly with regard to voice; Wheeler herself distinguishes between “textual 
voice,” which she uses to describe “voice as a metaphor employed by poets and critics in and about 
works in print,” and “voiced texts,” which include “poems recited, read aloud, performed by authors, 
actors, students, and others” (1-2). Wheeler is aware of the differences between the metaphorical and 
the literal, even as she leans towards the metaphorical in her writing.  
This is a clear (though minor) example of the kind of problems metaphorizing sound has raised for the 
study of poetry, and especially for the study of Asian American poetry. 
 
13 The phrase is coined by Christina Mar in an essay in Literary Gestures: The Aesthetic in Asian 
American Writing – and indeed the title of the collection attests to a need to point out where the 
“aesthetic” might be in “Asian American” writing and a sense that it needs to be “proved” that the two 
are compatible (. Joseph Jeon, Timothy Yu, and Dorothy Wang all engage with this problem (namely, 
the sense that less legibly experimental Asian American poetry is read for “content” – ethnic 
signifiers, narratives of experiences of racialization – while other kinds of poetry are read for “formal 
innovation” – though Wang is critical of the way “many white experimental poets and poetry critics, 
while embracing Yau’s style, tend to ignore poems such as those in the Genghis Chan series” because 
of  subject matter that deals with racialization (232)). Yu notes that “Asian American writers needed 
to draw on a wide range of artifices to construct a witing that was somehow distinctively Asian 
American” (Race and the Avant-Garde 80), while Wang’s advocates for a reading of “the work of 
minority poets…with respect and full attention to its formal properties and when the work of ‘racially 
unmarked’ poets will be read with an eye to its social and ideological formations and contexts,” an 
inversion that she hopes will balance out the lopsided tendencies of both groups (305).  
 57 
contemporary American racial politics was the belief that greater visibility yielded 
greater political power” (xxxi).  This coalitional sense of voice comes through in Lawson 
Fusao Inada’s description in the section “Performance” from Legends from Camp: “The 
Sixties hit with a flash. Energy. Consciousness. Awareness. Empowerment and access. 
Groups grouped, movements moved. Flourished, nourished. Voices voiced.” (147). 
The earlier work of Asian American poets, such as Li-Young Lee, in which “voice” emits 
from the self of a lyric “I,” fits into what Steven Yao calls “lyric testimony,” the “existing 
hegemonic mode in the production of Asian American verse” (Foreign Accents 14). In 
“lyric testimony,” according to Yao, “…the minority subject typically relates events from 
a personalized history that exemplify racial/ethnic identity as a traumatic condition of 
either problematic difference from mainstream society or debilitating cultural loss that 
necessitates an act of recuperation, usually undertaken by means of the poem itself” (14).  
 The straightforward nature of the narratives that these events are commonly 
conveyed through, as well as the simplistic autobiographical subjectivity that often 
underwrites these narratives, eventually spurred a poetic turn away towards more 
fragmented modes of expression that did not correlate so closely with first-person 
experiences of identity. Yet unlike their white counterparts, formally experimental Asian 
American poets like Yau and Hong are not able to eschew the position of a “self.” Hong 
muses that this inability to ignore the fact of race may be 
…why historically the minority poets’ entrance into the avant-garde’s arcane little 
clubs has so often been occluded. We can never laugh it off, take it all in as one 
sick joke, and truly escape the taint of subjectivity and history. But even in their 
best efforts in erasure, in complete transcription, in total paratactic scrambling, 
there is always a subject—and beyond that, the specter of the author’s visage—
and that specter is never, no matter how vigorous the erasure, raceless. 
(“Delusions of Whiteness”) 
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Yau describes the dilemma that a post-identitarian notion of self poses for the minoritized 
subject when he writes: 
 
I do not believe in the lyric I – the single modulating voice that names itself and 
others in an easily consumable narrative – writing in a language that is 
transparent, a window overlooking a world we all have in common…At the same 
time, I do not subscribe to the death of the author, the postmodern belief that there 
is no self writing. That seems another way to silence the Other, to keep them from 
speaking and writing. I believe there is a self made up of many selves, incomplete 
and fragmented. None of them knows the whole story, not even the one who is 
speaking, the one who is in this sentence. I – the I writes – will not be spoken 
for.” (“Between the Forest and the Trees” 40) 
 
Despite or because of their inability to deny the position of the subject, poets like 
Yau and Hong have in fact found inventive sonic ways of foregrounding the experience 
of being racialized subjects, particularly with regard to language, through their 
recuperation of “voice” from metaphor. I suggest that equating voice with literary style - 
or using it metaphorically in any other sense - dilutes the critical potential it has to shift 
practices of close reading to more formally attuned practices of close listening, a move 
which would afford a more balanced discussion of experimentation without occluding the 
significance of identity in the works of minority writers. Essentially, I argue, reading 
“voice” in this metaphorical sense as a strategy of political representation positions the 
work of Asian American poets on the “ethnic” side and can occlude the concurrent 
“aesthetic” innovative/experimental engagement with sound, often through formal 
techniques that have to do with the very mechanics of voice entering into language, 
particularly with regard to breath and enunciation. A return to the physical mechanics of 
voicing as a paradigm of sound, and to the physical experience of sounding and listening, 
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I hope, might recuperate other sonic aspects of voice that can be politically efficacious 
without bearing the burden of representation of “voice-as-metaphor.”   
Racial Alterity and The Language-less Abjection of Animals 
In order to see how Hong and Yau’s poems do the work of recovering literal 
qualities of “voice” as a sonic phenomenon, it is necessary to to explore the conditions 
under which a voice registers as “human”. The connections between the primitivist 
thinking of the 20th century, a history of gendered and racialized violence and the 
animalistic connotations of the voice divested of language, can be silhouetted by turning 
to two screams, one from Fred Moten’s In the Break, the other from an Orientalist 
cinematic tradition. The discourse on objectification and speech in the former, I suggest, 
will help us read the latter and hear it doubly as both the racist narrative resolution of the 
problem of the “yellow peril” and a cry that redoubles its own speechlessness as a mode 
of resistance and critique.  
 In the Break, a study of the relationship between the sounds of a black avant-
garde aesthetic tradition and the politics of 1950’s black nationalism, begins with 
Moten’s inquiry into Frederick Douglass’s recounting of his enslaved Aunt Hester’s 
scream upon being beaten by her master. Moten points out a hole in Marx’s claim that 
“…the truth about the value of the commodity is tied precisely to the impossibility of its 
speaking, for if the commodity could speak it would have intrinsic value, it would be 
infused with a certain spirit…”, arguing that Marx’s theory of exchange-value is founded 
on his belief that the commodity does not and cannot speak, a condition which assumes 
the commodity to be an inanimate object (9). This oversight further emphasizes the 
treatment of objectified, enslaved black bodies as such objects without agency. Moten 
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reads Aunt Hester’s scream as a critical moment in which the object does something an 
object is not supposed to do: the object objects.14  
 “Aiiieeeee”, on the other hand, was the common cry of Asian actors as their 
characters died in movies, a nonsensical screech that came to signify the inevitable 
riddance of the Asiatic figure in Hollywood (but also other cultural) narratives of the 
time. Kent Ono’s reading of the 1899 cartoon “The Yellow Terror in All His Glory,” 
which depicts a crazed Chinese man wearing a queue and straddling the body of a white 
women he had just raped and killed, shows how the gendered threat of miscegenation 
ultimately necessitated the narrative death of the Asian American male.  
 
Here, yellow peril, embodied in the figure off the Chinese man, who phallically 
wields a smoking gun and simultaneously sports a lengthy, curvy, fraying queue 
(which along with his apparel and distorted facial features demonstrates his 
absolute alterity, represents a mortal threat to white women, and thus to all she 
represents for the nation. Absent in the image is a figure of a white male, 
ostensibly the reader to whom the image is directed and from whom 
compensatory action is sought, and the Asian or Asian American woman, a 
character apparently not relevant to a narrative of an alien, masculine threat to the 
nation. To complete the reasoning of the image, in order to protect white women 
and the nation from further trespass and violation from animalistic and violent 
Chinese aggression, white men must act and potentially eliminate the lawless 
Chinese aggressor. (29-30) 
 
In particular, “Aiiieeeee!” coincides with the death of the Asiatic figure (particularly but 
not always a male one), a crucial element of film narratives which either sensationally 
                                                
14 This is not to say that the scream cannot be generative; in fact, it is generative by the simple fact 
that it is an affective response to an unspeakable violence. Moten reads this scream as an integral part 
in the African American sonic avant-garde tradition that has been reappropriated through 
performance, linking it to the jazz scream of Abbey Lincoln. He argues that “The speaking commodity 
thus cuts Marx; but the shrieking commodity cuts Saussure, thereby cutting Marx doubly: this by way 
of an irruption of phonic substance that cuts and augments meaning with a phonographic, 
rematerializing inscription” (13-14). 
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amplified the dangerous sexuality of the Asiatic figure or reassured viewers by disposing 
of him or her altogether. 
 In attempt to reappropriate the expression, CARP adopted it as the title for their 
1974 anthology of Asian American literature, one which indexed the various concerns 
and attendant problems of this emerging political activism.15 Specifically because of 
these historical connotations carried by “Aiiieeeee!”, the group called the Combined 
Asian Resources Project (CARP) felt that it could be redeployed as a rallying cry for 
solidarity (albeit a solidarity that remained narrowly defined): 
Chinese and Japanese Americans, American-born and -raised, who got their 
China and Japan from the radio, off the silver screen, from television, out of 
comic books, from the pushers of white American tulle that pictured the yellow 
man as something that when wounded, sad, or angry, or wondering, whined, 
shouted, or screamed, ‘Aiiieeeee!’ Asian America, so long ignored and forcibly 
excluded from creative participation in American culture, is wounded, sad, angry, 
swearing, and wondering, and this is his AIIIEEEEE!!!! It is more than a whine, 
shout, or scream. It is fifty years of our whole voice. (xi)  
 
In reading Marilyn Chin’s poem “That Half is Already Gone,” Irene Hsiao ties 
this cry to the sounds of the Chinese characters for love and distress (“ai”) and the lyric 
“I” via Chin’s punning sonic homophony. Hsiao identifies a kind of sonic excess in the 
cry, noting that 
“Aiiieeeee!” is overwritten: it is more vowels than can be sonically depicted; its 
line of increasing vowels makes up for the long silence of its contributing voices 
by being hypervisible but unreadable, alien, and wrong. “Aiiieeeee!” has no 
                                                
15 The collection, curated by authors like Frank Chin, Jeffery Paul Chan, Lawson Fusao Inada, and 
Shawn Wong, had a lasting effect in defining the field for decades to come, both in rejecting particular 
stereotypes of the period but also in emphasizing their authors’ ideas of cultural “authenticity”. As the 
first of its kind, it was tasked with the challenge of being the first to respond through a selection of 
literature to the marginalization of Asian Americans, and as the following decades would show, such a 
response was not without its criticisms (particularly in objection to the editors’ critiquing of “real” or 
“fake” Asian American writing and their masculinist stance regarding the work of female authors like 
Maxine Hong Kingston). Despite the contentious wake of this anthology, however, the authors’ 
decision to title this text “Aiiieeeee!,” I argue, still remains a generative one for my discussion here of 
the scream. 
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pretensions toward translatability; it is before and beyond its originating tongues, 
and its primitive and hyperbolic expressivity underscores its fulfillment of a 
specific market demand. (190) 
 
Hsiao’s reading of “Aiiieeeee” is not only an analysis of the cry’s function within its 
specific historical moment it but an inquiry into the incommensurability between the cry 
and its modes of representation. Her reading implicitly analogizes the sound of 
“Aiiieeeee!” and racial difference, an analogy which reveals that there are politics to the 
way the relationship between speech and writing is figured, not least because of a history 
of modernist linguistic appropriation16.  
 There are some key differences between the scream of “Aiiieeeee!” and Aunt 
Hester’s scream. The scream of “Aiiieeeee!” is a diegetic canned response, one whose 
pathos is not necessarily the cry itself but in its narrative predictability and its 
reinforcement of racial othering through performance, whereas Aunt Hester’s scream is 
the record of a literal sounding of violent trauma.  
 What these screams have in common, however, is that they link a history of 
primitivist othering to the animalization of the voice in the pain of either subordination or 
elimination. What these screams also have in common is the way that they have been 
critically repurposed as a way of interrogating the exclusive conditions of language that 
qualify a voice as human. In both instances of the scream, the object fails to specify the 
terms of its objection in speech, remaining at the level of the primal scream. This failure 
                                                
16 Hsiao gestures to the influence of Pound and his contemporaries on the reception of Asian 
American poets’ works when she writes: “While the difficulty of voicing the I is a problem 
fundamental to the lyric, the tension between ai and I is specific to the border between English and 
Chinese, an aural answer to the Imagist appropriation of the ideogram. The displacement of metaphor 
to the border between Chinese and English, like the I existing on the border between Chinese and 
English, articulates and obscures the ghosted manifestation of the diasporic subject.” (189) 
 63 
to speak has been integral to a whole tradition of philosophical discourse that privileges 
the human over the animal. 
 Most famously, Aristotle and Descartes have both invoked the capacity for speech 
in their theories of the human. Mladen Dolar summarizes Aristotle’s distinction between 
“mere voice” and “speech” as a distinction between a primal expression of feeling and an 
assertion that acts as the foundation of ethics:  
 
To follow Aristotle, mere voice is what animals and men have in common, it is 
the animal part of man. It can only indicate pleasure and pain, experience shared 
by both animals and humans. But speech, logos, doesn’t merely indicate, it 
manifests the advantageous (useful) and the harmful, and consequently the just 
and the unjust, the good and the evil. If one receives a blow, one may well 
scream, emit a voice to vent one’s pain, and that is what a horse or a dog would 
also do. But at the same time one can say “I have been wronged” and thereby the 
speech introduces the measure of just and unjust. It doesn’t just give outlet to 
feelings, it introduces a standard of judgement. (“His Master’s Voice”) 
 
According to this formulation, Aunt Hester and the performing, diegetically-
doomed Asiatic figure attain only to a kind of animality through the scream, which at 
once both attests to the historical brutalization of the other as well as the seemingly 
limited alterity conferred on language-less voices. Listening critically to these screams 
reveals how a sensory exploration of voice as the human expression of sonic material 
through breath - distinct from its more common understandings as metaphor for political 
agency or the particular literary style of an individual author - plays into discourses on 
race and humanism.  
 Pat Gehrke summarizes a whole history of Western philosophical thought when 
he writes simply that “Humanness itself, the capacity to be a person, was predicated on a 
prior imposition of language that would give one the capacity to think and to say ‘I’” 
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(The Ethics and Politics of Speech 94). Within this discourse, animals and machines are 
compared on the basis of their inferiority as well as the way their radical dissimilarity to 
humans entails an otherness that comes with a different set of ethical obligations. Samuel 
Edger writes in his 1884 text The Problem of Life Considered that “When the French 
philosophers first announced to men their heartless theory, that the speechless animals 
had no conscious sensation, but were pieces of automatic machinery; the result upon the 
people was that, regarding the outcry of a tortured animal as having no more meaning 
than the grating of a door on rusty hinges, the little restraint upon innate cruelty that had 
existed gave way, and men sank some degrees in the scale of moral nobility” (395). 
Edger’s analysis links the erasure of a sense of ethical responsibility to an absolute 
otherness, critiquing the notion that only an identification of the other as human 
warranted humane treatment.  
 Like Aristotle, Edger also traces the question of human-identifying criteria, in 
particular, back to speech (or rather animals’ lack thereof). However, it is Descartes’ 
Discourse on Method that is most well-known for asserting speech as the basic minimum 
threshold of the human. Descartes, who takes great care to police the sonic proximity 
between human language and animal noises, notes that “We must not confuse speech 
with the natural movements which express passions and which can be imitated by 
machines as well as by animals.” This shared sonic materiality of expressive sounding 
suggests a kind of hybridity that threatens to radically undermine the privileging of the 
human by contaminating the language that defines it. 
Descartes is quick to disavow the possibility that language exists beyond human 
comprehension with a kind of circular, anthropocentric logic: that “it [must not] be 
 65 
thought…that the brutes speak, although we do not understand their language. For if such 
were the case, since they are endowed with many organs analogous to ours, they could as 
easily communicate their thoughts to us as to their fellows”. The very matter of 
comparing animal abilities to human abilities, whether in speech or in some other 
“circumstance that they do better than we”, is never one which opens up in his writing. In 
fact, it depends on the fundamental opposition of “Reason” and “Nature,” and on 
“[proving] that they are destitute of Reason, and that it is Nature which acts in them 
according to the disposition of their organs.” 
 R.W. Serjeantson reads the repudiation of this possibility as the result of  
 
…[a] basic assumption about the nature of signification that informed discussions 
of animal expression and communication…that animals express themselves 
naturally and humans conventionally. This assumption helps explain the almost 
universal reluctance to attribute human-like language to animals, even speaking 
animals like parrots. (443)  
 
 For Descartes, the fact that animals have the organs for speech but do not 
instinctively communicate with people in terms of human language - merely sounds of 
grunts and cries - shows that they do not have “Reason,” which functions interchangeably 
in his formulation with speech as the basic distinguishing trait of the human:  
this proves not only that the brutes have less Reason than man, but that they have 
none at all: for we see that very little is required to enable a person to speak; and 
since a certain inequality of capacity is observable among animals of the same 
species, as well as among men, and since some are more capable of being 
instructed than others, it is incredible that the most perfect ape or parrot of its 
species, should not in this be equal to the most stupid infant of its kind, or at least 
to one that was crack-brained, unless the soul of brutes were of a nature wholly 
different from ours. (n.p.) 
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Techno-Orientalism and The Iteration of the Cyborg 
 Where an animal otherness projected onto racialized others casts them as 
primitive and thereby less human, machinic otherness appears to turn them into a 
different kind of threatening figure, one which falls on the other end of the spectrum. 
However, the logic distancing these two seemingly oppositional poles of alterity from 
normative perceptions of the human remains largely the same. According to Descartes’ 
formulation, as noted above, animals and machines are comparable in their lack of 
autonomy and reason. Rather than departing from earlier and more primitivist tropes of 
Orientalism, techno-Orientalism, as Stephen Sohn suggests, is merely another form in 
which the same dehumanization of the Asiatic other manifests itself:  
In traditional Orientalism, the East often is configured as backwards, anti-
progressive, and primitive. In this respect, techno-Orientalism might suggest a 
different conception of the East, except for the fact that the very inhuman qualities 
projected onto Asian bodies create a dissonance with these alternative 
temporalities. Even as these Alien/Asians conduct themselves with superb 
technological efficiency and capitalist expertise, their affectual absence resonates 
as an undeveloped or, worse still, a retrograde humanism. (8) 
 
Margo Machida, who also traces the historical formulation of Orientalism, adds 
that “[All] such convictions, moreover, were accompanied by a nation that - unlike 
Westerners, who were multiform, differentiated and complex individuals - Asians were 
all of a piece, homogeneous, and therefore fundamentally alike, both in body and mind. 
(Unsettled Visions 59). While the “yellow terror” that characterized anti-Chinese 
sentiment in the 19th century was founded partially in the fear of a primitivist sexuality 
attributed to the Asiatic other, another dimension of it was linked to the economic fear 
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that immigration would undercut American labor.17 This fear, consonant with 
descriptions of China and Japan in ethnographic writings on East Asia and buoyed by 
stories like Jack London’s 1906 “The Unparalleled Invasion”, led to the trope of being 
overpowered numerically by the multiplied sameness of Asiatic others en masse. 
Colleen Lye describes this economic aspect of the fear of the “yellow peril”:   
The American identification of the Asiatic as the sign of globalization was not 
arbitrary; it was rooted in the material history of U.S. relations with East Asia. 
The antinomies of Asiatic racial form reflect the pattern of a modernizing China 
and Japan changing places as U.S. friend and enemy. At any given point in this 
history, their opposite status was necessary to the maintenance of U.S. 
security…the incipient ‘yellow peril’ refers to a particular combinatory kind of 
anticolonial nationalism, in which the union of Japanese technological advance 
and Chinese numerical mass confronts Western civilization with a potentially 
unbeatable force. (America’s Asia 10) 
 
David Morley and Kevin Robins also point out that  
 
[Within] the political and cultural unconscious of the West, Japan has come to 
exist as the figure of empty and dehumanized technological power. It represents 
the alienated and dystopian image of capitalist progress. This provokes both 
resentment and envy. The Japanese are unfeeling aliens; they are cyborgs and 
replicants. (Spaces of Identity 170)   
 
Not only does the lack of affect attributed to the Orient consonant with a depiction 
of Asiatic others as without morals or ethics (evident in the deceitfulness of Bret Harte’s 
Ah Sin and in depictions of Sax Roehmer’s Fu Manchu), I argue that it is also intimately 
connected to other claims about the aesthetics of the “Far East” that are ultimately about 
a lack of autonomy and ability to reason for oneself. These claims, which range from the 
lack of imagination (Percival Lowell’s 1888 ethnographic study of China The Soul of the 
Far East) to the lack of authorial intent ascribed to the I Ching as a kind of compositional 
                                                
17 As I argued earlier, presenting the Asiatic figure as duplicitous and a sexual threat in Hollywood 
narratives confirmed white American audiences’ anxieties about both the economic and political 
advance of the “Far East” and fears of miscegenation; conversely, its termination with a single 
“Aiiieeeee!” within those narratives were a means of allaying those anxieties.   
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machine by John Cage18, redouble Descartes’ privileging of the human over the animal 
onto a moral privileging of the human over the alien or the cyborg.  
 Eschewing intentionality in aesthetic production has also been a central tenet of 
other poetic groups in the twentieth century that did not route through the Orient in this 
way in order to surrender authorial agency, such as Oulipo and Surrealism. In particular, 
Yau’s invocation of these movements recuperates this intent-less writing, and his very 
repurposing of these highly structured poetic forms evokes the cyborg, figure whose very 
alterity in its parallel to the racialized other makes its mechanicity of voice meaningful.  
 In Voice: Vocal Aesthetics in Digital Arts and Media, Brandon Labelle observes 
that  
…for sound poetry, the sonic itself, not only language, carries an array of 
signifying substance according to the phonological features of voicing - that is to 
say, one does not leave behind signification simply by speaking nonsense, or by 
turning the mouth into a noise machine. (150)  
 
I’d like to modify LaBelle’s claim, suggesting that for the machine/cyborg, it’s not that 
the voice signifies despite linguistic nonsense or “noise,” it’s that the very iterative form 
which limits its ability to make “sense” itself indicates its own mechanicity. 
 LaBelle’s distinction between signification and language is crucial. As I have 
argued, Descartes’ distinction between animal and human voices on the basis of speech 
                                                
18 The approach Cage took towards the I Ching in composing works like Music of Changes involved a 
question-answer format, designed to engage this technology in a dialogic exchange with a traditional 
sense of the composer figure. Such an approach privileges the responses of that technology as equal to 
the level of authorial intent and able to produce a work of art for which the taint of the ego’s intentions 
would be effaced. Cage spends three pages of intricate explanations detailing, first, the exact coin 
tossing procedures of the I Ching for foretelling the future and then the specific correspondences with 
sound and silence he adapted its results to Imaginary Landscape No. 4 as well as Music of Changes, 
and yet at the end of the section Cage comments that “A ‘mistake’ is beside the point, for anything 
that happens, for once anything happens it authentically is.” (Silence 59). Cage approaches the I Ching 
as a technology whose origins in an essence of otherness enable it to serve as a ventriloquists’ 
mannequin, a technology whose masking of the intent of his artist-ego is predicated on its escape from 
his body by way of an Asiatic primitivism. 
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was so necessary to his categorization of the human because the human voice divested of 
language and the cries of animals share a fundamental sonic materiality, and the shared 
continuum of their voices is grotesque. Likewise, LaBelle also recognizes the potential 
sonic overlap between voices of sensible speech and other voices. Citing Roman 
Jakobson’s work on the different significations of phonemes, LaBelle notes that “Sound 
poetry attempts to recuperate the embedded phonological sonorous matter inherent to 
voicing by unmarking from the coding of a social linguistics,” a social linguistics in 
which, I argue, the inability to speak normatively entails an absolute alterity. LaBelle 
concludes by asking “Might sound poetry’s obsession with the voice then signal a further 
iteration of the (technological) reworking of the body spanning modern history?” (152). 
 Where the abjectness of animals is related to their inability to speak, the 
threatening otherness of machines as it manifests in language is not so much an inability 
to speak, but an inability to control and know what they are saying. The speech of 
machines is programmable, but because it is programmable, it is restrained and ultimately 
repetitive. E.T.A. Hoffman’s famous 1817 short story “The Sandman” is a cautionary tale 
that illustrates the consequences of not being able to distinguish between machine and 
human. The tale follows a university student named Nathaniel haunted by the connection 
between his father’s death and a figure known as the Sandman. As he descends into 
madness, Nathaniel falls in love with a woman named Olimpia, rejecting his long-time 
love Clara who he calls a “lifeless automaton” in favor of his idealized love, who in 
reality is the actual “automaton”, a wooden doll constructed by a scheming professor. 
Within this tale, as in Descartes’ definition of the differences between human and animal, 
the distinguishing criteria that separates a real human from its mechanical imitation is the 
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ability to produce “original speech.” Olimpia’s speech is limited to “Oh! Oh! Oh!!”, a 
clue that alerts those around Nathaniel to her true nature but which Nathaniel misses in 
his self-absorption (Horror Stories 25). 
 Nathaniel’s description of Olimpia’s mechanical responses approximates the 
sublime, and yet it is the ironic oppositionality of his misreading that makes the story so 
horrifying: “she doesn’t engage in trivial chit-chat, like other banal minds. She utters few 
words, certainly; but these few words are true hieroglyphs, disclosing an inner world 
filled with love and lofty awareness of the spiritual life led in contemplation of the 
everlasting Beyond” (27). Upon the discovery that Olympia is in fact an automaton, the 
story narrates that others began to authenticate the humanness of their lovers by insisting 
“above all” that they speak: 
The story of the automaton had struck deep root into their souls and, in fact, a 
pernicious mistrust of human figures in general had begun to creep in. Many 
lovers, to be quite convinced that they were not enamoured of wooden dolls, 
would request their mistresses to sing and dance a little out of time, to embroider 
and knit, and play with their lapdogs, while listening to reading, etc., and, above 
all, not merely to listen, but also sometimes to talk, in such a manner as 
presupposed actual thought and feeling. (31) 
 
This last phrase - “in such a manner as presupposed actual thought and feeling” - 
implicitly suggests Olimpia’s repetitive and limited speech is insufficiently indicative of 
a real subjectivity. In this example, it is only speech that represents the opposite of hers - 
varied, responsive, and non-repetitive - that instead indicates true personhood. 
Originality, as expressed through language, is taken as a sign of agency and intention.  
The Grotesqueness of Hybrid Animal-Cyborg Forms  
 In Rabelais and His World, Mikhail Bahktin remarks that “The combination of 
human and animal traits, is, as we know, one of the most ancient grotesque forms” (316). 
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Following Bahktin, I argue that within this schema animal sounds are not grotesque 
necessarily because they come from non-human bodies, but that they only become 
grotesque when the sonic material of their cries is heard on a continuum with the human 
voice in instances in which it is divested of language through trauma or other 
circumstance. Likewise, the sounds of the alien/cyborg/machine also become grotesque 
through their mechanical approximations of human language, which only demonstrate 
their lack of cognition and authorial intentionality. Far from being sublime, Olimpia’s 
“speech” is revealed to be grotesque because it imitates - and to the extent that Nathaniel 
is duped, successfully hybridizes with - the speech of real humans.  
In Hong and Yau’s works, these animalistic and cyborg-like soundings, aligned 
with the "grotesque" languages and bodies of racialized others attempting to assimilate - 
foreground the undeniable difference of the other. Invoking the animal and cyborg as 
oppositional but related poles of alterity forces readers to confront the “repulsiveness” 
that racialized others and their hybridized speech are associated with. Within Hong and 
Yau’s poems, this undeniable cross-species otherness functions as a means of conveying 
the idea that even within the categorization of the human, there is a more exclusive 
categorization of humanness that is indexed by normative bodies and modes of speech. In 
the following close readings of selected poems from their work, I show that tropes of the 
animal-voice (the scream/guttural) and the cyborg-voice (repetitive and completely form-
driven) are both different manifestations of the linguistic difficulties imposed upon the 
racialized subject.  
Listening to Voice in Hong’s Translating Mo’um 
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 Translating Mo’um, Hong’s first collection of poems, explores the grotesque body 
as a means of capturing the historical reality of the spectacle of “freak” bodies and 
presenting the reader with a paradigm of race in which race functions as another non-
normative characteristic of the body, alongside other “abnormal” physical features. Hong 
begins the book by signalling her deliberate engagement with the grotesque; the book 
opens by situating itself between two epigraphs, one from Bakhtin’s own description of 
the grotesque and one from Theresa Hak Kyung Cha’s experimental short novel Dictee. 
Bakhtin’s claim that “The grotesque body…is a body in the act of becoming. It is never 
finished, never completed; it is continually built, created, and builds and creates another 
body” emphasizes the fluidity of shifting life forms fundamental to his theories of the 
carnivalesque (Rabelais 317). In Bakhtin’s well-known formulation, the grotesque body’s 
exaggeration of corporeal reality, the body in the process of exceeding itself through 
natural processes, flies in the face of abstract metaphysical ideals of the aesthetic 
sublime. As a generative site of constant transmutation, the grotesque body functions in 
Translating Mo’um as the embodiment of what happens to language. “Mo’um,” the 
transliterated Korean word for body, is properly Romanized as “Mom,” as Hong informs 
the reader in the notes at the back of the book (74). The text overtly plays off a resonance 
made possible by the encounter between Korean and English, the blurring of “body” with 
“mother” as both female maternal figure and native tongue. Consequently, the task of 
“Translating Mo’um,” then, issues the challenge of not only how to translate the 
difference of these bodies but the even more fundamental question of what sensory 
lexicon to translate these bodies into (if there is one at all). The grotesque body in Hong’s 
poems literalizes the mutually deforming encounter between one’s mother tongue and 
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one’s language of assimilation, the cross contamination of each with the other in sonic 
resonances that proliferate possible meanings within the text.  
 The line from Cha (“She mimics the speaking. That might resemble speech.”) 
captures the process of learning a new language by way of its sonic contours and not by 
way of semantic meaning, a process all too familiar to the non-native speaker. Hong’s 
citation of Cha’s distinction between language and the materiality of the voice itself 
opens up a new space for this question: What is the latter without the former, and who 
does it belong to if the former belongs to/indexes humanness? Who is excluded from 
normative expressions of language?  
 Indeed, Yau’s description of Hong’s poetry makes the link between the language 
of assimilation and Bakhtin’s grotesque body even more explicit. In a three part essay on 
Hong’s three books of poetry, Yau notes:  
The English language – particularly in America — is a field in which decay and 
replenishment are ongoing, unpredictable ruptures. No one is sure what will 
happen next, what transformation some part of it will inevitably undergo. It is an 
inflicted and vulnerable body undergoing rapid change. Parts of it are blossoming 
while other parts are dying. It is this often volatile state of change and instability, 
slipperiness and unlikelihood, which Cathy Park Hong explores in her poetry. 
(“At Play in the Fields of Language”) 
 
In Hong’s poetry, the animalistic primitiveness and the cyborg function as extremes 
which bound the grotesque human body, absolute asymptotes that it approaches but 
which it never fully becomes. Within the schema of Translating Mo’um, the most 
grotesque thing that can happen to the human body - the most extreme possible result of 
its deformance - is not a total transmutation into either an animal or cyborg altogether but 
its hybridity or shared qualities with these other forms. 
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 A quick overview of Translating Mo’um reveals a catalogue of various grotesque 
figures: Chang and Eng, the conjoined Thai-American twins, the Hottentot Venus, Toto 
Maria, a body builder, and a hermaphrodite, among others. Hong explicitly frames these 
figures within the scientific language of nineteenth century essentialist and primitivist 
approaches towards the body while intertwining them with the narrative first-person 
experiences of an immigrant daughter figure. 
 This daughter figure - grounded throughout the text by a “Mother” and “Father” - 
alternately fulfills, navigates and defies different tropes of perceived Asian American 
female identity: hyper-sexualized, submissive, and a model minority in conforming to 
socioeconomically “virtuous” patterns (frugal, studious, part of a nuclear family, etc). In 
“Rite of Passage,” for instance, the daughter’s allusion to a failed marriage and her 
“indecisivness” as a “chink” is what groups her in with “Fragments of freaks: the 
Hottentot’s ass,/the Siamese twins’ toupee, the indecisive chink/who said I do. Later, no 
forget it, I do not.” (18)  The following passage from “On Splitting,” which presents 
various adolescent interests of the daughter figure, also encapsulates the text’s 
preoccupation with the parataxis of racial difference and the conventions of its signifiers: 
“Adolescent obsessions: Greek mythology, heavy metal rock stars, documentation of 
freaks (Mexican midget, triplets, albino sword swallowers), iron-on T-shirts, breasts, he 
who gave you your first bong hit and kiss” (41). A bourgeois familiarity with epic is 
juxtaposed with pop culture; the model minority daughter-figure is juxtaposed with illicit 
activities, a cultural incommensurability that mirrors the bodily difference of these (both 
racialized and sexualized) grotesque “freaks”. 
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 Throughout the text, the link between a primitivist sexual deviance, bodies that 
are physically grotesque (whether because of racial difference or other physical “freak” 
qualities), and a corporeally-rooted, animalistic inability to speak coherently becomes 
ever more clear. The sensational spectacle of the female body’s “shameful” sexuality and 
the shaming of the immigrant daughter who cannot (or refuses to) speak English is most 
explicitly intertwined in Hong’s poem “The Shameful Show of Tono Maria.” The poem 
is organized as a series of stanzas, each of which is presented as an exhibit ordered “a-p”, 
and switches between the experience of Tono Maria’s scarred body19 and the first person 
narrative of this daughter figure.. The poem’s historical references to Tono Maria’s actual 
display in 1810 frame the daughter’s self-conscious recollections of her inability to speak 
correctly and link the racial and sexual “deviance” of these two figures together through 
the process of physically producing language. In “Exhibit c,” the broken speech of the 
daughter is analogized to the flailings of a goldfish: “My mouth opened and closed/like a 
guppy. Verbs were lost, ellipses trailed off like dregs”.  
“Exhibit e” continues the narrative “I” position introduced in “Exhibit c” and situates the 
speaker with a group of others with disabilities and disorders, suggesting that her 
linguistic inadequacies place her in the same category: “Still mute, I was sent to Special 
Ed/with autistics, paraplegics, and a boy who only ate dirt.” A later stanza, “Exhibit j”, 
alludes to the shame of an act of oral sex; however, this allusion also doubles as a 
reference to the daughter’s shame-laden act of speaking: “I pinched my throat’s skin to 
remember/last night’s act. Guilt as throat as torso.” (33) 
                                                
19 Tono Maria was the indigenous Brazilian woman exhibited in London for the many scars on her 
body (Atwater 17). 
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 The poem which follows - “During Bath” - continues the association between 
sexual experience and (in)facility of language. The following stanzas presents readers 
with the physical mechanics of uttering a grunt or non-verbal sound:  
 
The tongue to mid-palate. Coiled to the back of your teeth, 
tighten your throat muscle. Utter a low pitch, exhale. 
 
There is no room to exhale. 
 
My parents did not moan or even breathe for fear 
of waking their children. (35) 
 
At first glance, the description of the first two stanzas presented here appears to be 
delineating an act of speaking. The following stanza, however, reveals it to be a 
suppressed vocalizing of orgasm, doubling the physicality of the mouth and the throat 
onto both language and sexual acts or expressions. The poem continues in this vein: 
Palpitation, cyst, polyp: skin licked, 
tongue pioneers along topographic pulp. (35) 
 
The alliterative voiced plosives of “p,” produced by the fleshly pressing of lips together, 
is interwoven with the tongue-curling “l” in a sensuous oral evocation of bodily 
irregularities. 
 The pairing of language and sexuality Hong sets up throughout Translating 
Mo’um also appears at the conclusion of “To Collage a Beginning”: 
No one could not remember my first word, 
it could have been oma, appa, bap, uyu or 
 
home, friend, it could have been sex, the first 
English word I taught my immigrant cousin 
 
which he repeated over and over like a child (45) 
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Hong notably does not italicize “sex” the way she italicizes the other words, which 
deemphasizes its status as the remembering of a specific word and gives weight to the 
meaning of sex itself. The cousin’s instinctive, child-like repetition of “sex,” reminiscent 
of Freud’s repetition compulsion, evokes a sense of helpless surrender to primal urges 
even as it also conveys a contrasting sense of mechanical and uncomprehending 
repetition as futile attempt to break through into another unfamiliar language.  
 Hong links the difficulty of speaking to a body whose mechanistic qualities mark 
it as grotesque, even as this portrayal of speech is also firmly rooted in “natural” human 
circulatory and respiratory processes:  
 
A stutter inflated and reddened the face 
eyes bulged and lips gaped to form, 
 
a fortune cookie cracked and a tongue rolled out.  
Wagged the Morse code but no one knew it. 
 
While the abjection suggested by the tail-like “wagging” of the tongue, coupled with the 
gesture-based signification of Morse code, lends an animalistic sense of linguistic 
helplessness to the image, this corporeality figures speaking as a kind of bodily straining 
towards excretion, it paratactically invokes a Frankensteinian cyborg body ).“I felt oddly 
collaged: elbow to nose, shin to eye, /neck to breast, brow to toe”). Additionally, the 
comparison of the mouth to the “fortune cookie” as inanimate object serves as flattened 
signifier of ethnic difference.  
 As the first poem in the book, “Zoo,” demonstrates, this transgressive blurring of 
the distinction between human and “other” mirrors the “contamination” of the 
assimilating immigrant’s language. Grouped together, the monophonic and monosyllablic 
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“Ga”, “Na” and “Da” evokes a sense of childlike (and potentially even animal-like) 
nonsense; the italicization signals this “nonsense” as a foreign language, one which 
would purportedly be translated by the phrases on the right. And yet these translations 
reveal nothing of these words’ meanings, remaining instead at the level of describing the 
words’ linguistic function and their attendant associations.  
 
Ga The fishy consonant. 
Na     The monkey vowel. 
 
Da     The immigrant’s tongue 
 
Words with an atavistic tail. History’s thorax considerably 
cracked. The Hottentot click called undeveloped.  
 
The association of “cracking” with bodily organs necessary for speech reappears, and a 
sense of speech as the product of a machine or instrument emerges, as it also did “in 
“Rite of Passage”. “Cracking” evokes not the soft flesh of the mouth, tongue, or vocal 
cords, nor the breath of the voice, but a kind of violence done to an inanimate object, a 
hard breaking which can be figured as both the loss of a kind of functionality but also as 
an opening up, the space and sound of objection that Moten describes in his reading of 
Aunt Hester’s scream. Yet this invocation of the (broken) machine veers away once again 
in the next few stanzas back towards the primitive, grounding the phonemic contours of 
English in the soft fleshiness of the mouth: 
Labial bs and palatal ts:  
 
La the word 
Ma speaks 
Ba without you 
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 The specific and authoritative singularity of “the word” highlights the 
exclusionary nature of a language that has wrested itself away from the speaker’s 
attempts to master it through this translation-like framing. In contrast with the syntactic 
coherence of “the word/speaks/without you,” which appears to formally retains the 
syntactic impartiality of individually translated words but delivers this pointed message 
instead, the poem’s monosyllabic gestures at Korean remain fragmented and primitive 
sounds of nonsense (“Overture of my voice like the flash of bats./The hyena babble and 
apish libretto”). 
Listening to Voice in John Yau’s Borrowed Love Poems, My Symptoms and Ing Grish 
 Yau, like Hong, also draws upon the animalistic grotesque as a means of 
manifesting the extreme abjection of the racialized other in his poems. “In the Words of 
Sax Rohmer” captures the repulsive sexual threat associated with its titular actor’s most 
famous turn as Fu Manchu: “The repellant nails of a cultured tigress/the delicious nails of 
a long domination/The square nails of an unforgettable hand/The delicately repellant 
thumb” (Ing Grish 7). Yau’s linking of the opposable thumb, the trait which supposedly 
distinguishes the human from the ape, with the sexualized “nail” which is both 
“repellant” and “delicious,” references Orientalist fantasies and fears about the Asiatic 
other in animalistic terms.  
 However, while Yau’s use of the animalistic grotesque, like Hong’s, aligns with 
language insofar as it pertains to sexuality, Yau’s invocation of grotesque animalistic 
sounds specifically have more to do with the construction of an artificial lineage. Yau’s 
“Biography of an Amphibian” from Ing Grish echoes the autobiographical form of early 
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Asian American poetry but subverts its grounding in experiential narrative by placing the 
speaker’s questionable account of genealogy in animalistic terms: 
I was probably born yesterday 
shortly after a warthog managed to drop me 
 
beneath the effigy of a photograph (16)  
 
The qualification of “probably” introduces an element of uncertainty that contrasts with 
the temporal specificity of “yesterday” and “shortly after”, which strengthens the 
passage’s imitation of recollection. (Additionally, being “born yesterday” also plays off 
the phrase “I wasn’t born yesterday,” attributing a kind of naivete to the speaker.) This 
technique continues throughout the rest of the poem:  
Recently most of my limbs have had to be recalibrated 
I was invented in the mouth of a receding phantom 
 
which is why my hair is the color of an extinguished wish (16) 
 
Here, not only does the speaker’s origin account echo the “invented ‘i’” of Yau’s “storied 
fibs piled high,” it blurs the body of the speaker together with the suggestion of a made-
up language, framing phenotypical traits as the result of this linguistic “birth”. 
Additionally, the language which the speaker both embodies and possesses, as the 
following passage shows, is a stunted one:  
Harnessed moon enchanting nostalgic armadilloes 
Clipped tongue erased ornaments flooded sky (16). 
 
 Yau’s 1998 “Eleven Things We Need to Know About Ourselves” also 
demonstrates this preoccupation with genealogical lineage, surnames, and grotesque 
animalistic sounds. Like “Biography of an Amphibian”, the poem, broadened to first 
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person plural, also gestures towards the form of an autobiographical narrative while 
substituting the specifics of personal experience for an animalistic alterity grounded in 
the foreignness of unpronounceable last names.  
5.  
Since we have never been classified, and none of us have ever been informed as to how 
long we would have to inhabit this shifting purgatory, we have stayed strange, even to 
ourselves. (170)  
 
 The irony of this statement, which depicts the continued plight of a hybridized 
identity - one which is grotesque in its unfinished process of becoming - for Asian 
Americans, is that they have been classified, as some of the next stanzas show:  
6. 
We are the men who eat pigeons, turtles, ducks, dogs, and cats, whatever runs through the 
park at night. Squirrel is high on our list, as are the feet and ears of certain small 
animals….. 
 
9.  
No one knows how to address us because our names - single syllables strung together like 
pearls - sound like a cross between a puppy’s growl and a cat’s yelp. Maybe that’s why 
we began sneaking into the park at night, a dozen nylon bags folded neatly in our freshly 
laundered knapsacks. We wanted to get closer to our ancestors, the ones who walk on all 
fours or fly short distances in the dark.  My Symptoms, 170 
 
 The sixth stanza, framed by the ninth stanza, only serves to heighten this sense of 
primitive and grotesque bestiality. Not only is the difference of the racialized speakers 
accentuated by this trope of Chinese people consuming animals not typically eaten within 
a Western diet, it goes as far as to suggest a kind of cannibalism in that the speakers who 
eat these creatures are themselves figured as the descendants of animalistic “ancestors,” 
“the ones who walk on all fours or fly short distances in the dark.” Throughout the poem, 
Yau does not explicitly invoke Asianness; nevertheless, the tropes he invokes - 
“impassive” expressions, barbaric consumption of animals not included in a Western diet, 
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names consisting of “single syllables” - make the “We” of the poem unmistakably clear. 
The revulsion this juxtaposition evokes, coupled with the non-lexical framing of these 
“single syllable” names as the cries of animals, establishes the interchangeability of 
bestiality and racial otherness that Yau sets up in these poems in order to critique it.  
 Not only do Yau’s poems play off the grotesque, primitive sounds of East Asian 
surnames, they also invoke the mechanical constraints of the cyborg/automaton as both 
compositional practice and placeholder for the figure of the racialized other. Like 
Translating Mo’um, Ing Grish also begins with an epigraph that gestures towards the 
book’s engagement with the grotesque. Yau opens with a quote by Guy Davenport: 
“English is well advanced into its inevitable process of becoming pidgin. Inevitable, 
because when a speaker of English is unaware of the components of words he must speak 
by formula, rote, and custom, deaf to the historical nuance and blind to the structure of 
the word.” Davenport’s words capture a seeming paradox: that “[speaking] by formula, 
rote, and custom” actually makes the pidginization of English “inevitable”. However, in 
the case of Yau’s poetry, the figure of the cyborg/automaton actually operates as another 
complementary figure of alterity that also stands in for the immigrant other, learning and 
speaking a language by the handrails of its perceived rules precisely because such rules 
serve as a means of sonically navigating a syntax one does not fully understand.  
 Throughout his works of poetry, Yau exhibits a continued engagement with 
Oulipo and Surrealist writings. In Yau’s poems, as in Hong’s, both language and the 
body are presented as grotesque entities whose forms are permeable and are continually 
being renewed and/or exceeding themselves. The strain of Surrealism that runs 
throughout Yau’s work comes with a framework for understanding this very linking of 
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language and corporeality. The compositional practice of “exquisite corpse,” popular 
among Surrealist circles around the early 20th century, refers to a technique in which a 
group of collaborators all contributed to a piece of writing or art (initially with regard to 
drawing parts of a body) while having the previous collaborators’ work hidden from 
them, the end result being a non-cohesive and often nonsensical piece.  
 In terms of identifying and then critiquing perceptions of the physical appearance 
of the racialized other as grotesque, Yau does literally invoke an assembled, man-made 
corpse in Borrowed Love Poems using the figure of Frankenstein (31-16). In Section 9 of 
the poem, “Movies as a Form of Reincarnation: Boris Karloff Remembers Being Chinese 
on More Than One Occasion” (Boris Karloff being the actor famous for portraying 
Frankenstein), Yau writes: 
In each life I lived, the mask I wore was my own face. It resembled your dreams 
of how such a face should look when peering through a torn curtain, a fogged-
over windshield, a martini glass filled with blood. It was a face you knew because 
you knew the outcome. This was how I was able to become Chinese so often, 
more times than anyone else who set out from a town or village, toward the paved 
driveways and marble bathrooms of Pacific Palisades (34-35).  
 
The composite and grotesque nature of Frankenstein’s body as a vehicle for analogizing 
the violent constructedness of the racialized body is further fictionalized and rendered 
performative by Yau’s foregrounding of the actor rather than the role. The poem’s 
subtitle – “Boris Karloff Remembers Being Chinese On More than One Occasion,” in 
conjunction with this explanation of “[becoming] Chinese so often,” implies a formulaic 
ability to “become” and then “not-become” Chinese that ironizes the lack of agency in 
being racialized through one’s physical appearance at the same time that it critiques 
biological or essentialist formations of race. 
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And if, for the next few hours, you sit before the flickering screen, waiting for my 
face to finally be uncovered, so that at last you can see my jutting jaw and sallow 
cheeks, my high, unforgettable forehead and large ears, all the while reveling in 
my thick-tongued speech bordering on a hideous lisp, it is so you can get up and 
walk away, open the refrigerator or look in the mirror, glad that you have been 
right all along. (35) 
 
For the “you” who is the subject of Yau’s critique, to “look in the mirror” to confirm the 
fact that the self is indeed different than the sensationally grotesque face just presented on 
the screen is a process of racialization as everyday and ordinary as “[opening] the 
refrigerator”.  
 Hong writes that “The avant-garde’s “delusion of whiteness” is the luxurious 
opinion that anyone can be “post-identity” and can casually slip in and out of identities 
like a video game avatar, when there are those who are consistently harassed, surveilled, 
profiled, or deported for whom they are” (“Delusions of Whiteness”). It is precisely the 
non-option of switching identities, the inflexibility of being a racialized subject, that Yau 
enacts in his commitment to the use of restrictive forms. The compositional restraints or 
prescriptions of lipogrammatic writing associated with Oulipo become a vehicle for 
Yau’s description of the sense which manages to emerge despite the impositions of order 
of his chosen poetic form. 
 Borrowed Love Poems’ “Fourth Metabolic Isthmus Sestina” and “Fifth Metabolic 
Isthmus Sestina” are dedicated to the German Oulipo poet Oskar Pastior, whose 2011 
work Many Glove Compartments Yau translated. Though not univocalic, these poems are 
lipogrammatic in both the sense that they adhere strictly to the original sestina, a form 
which by definition is highly restrictive.20 
                                                
20 The entry for “sestina” given by the Academy of American Poets’ page specifies the following 
conditions of its form:  
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 In his 2002 review of Pastior’s Many Glove Compartments for Jacket magazine, 
Andrew Johnson observes that “[arbitrary] forms such as the anagram, lipogram, 
pantoum, and sestina, to mention a few favorite Oulipean exercises, tend to encourage 
mechanical utterances”. Johnson’s list of forms reads like a checklist of forms Yau has 
experimented with in his work; making Yau’s interest in compositional constraints 
explicit. Johnson’s comment additionally foregrounds the “mechanical” effect of such 
tightly controlled forms, one in which the repetition of words or phrases in a numerically 
determined order often results in nonsensical grammar or syntax and only sometimes 
results in comprehensible meaning. The logic of these forms, which quickly becomes 
evident after a few iterations, seems to have overthrown the privileging of a lexical 
system of signification. If the meaning-driven poem and a sense of authorial agency are 
inextricably linked, the structural determinacy of these poems would seem to suggest 
utterance without either intention, speech that is not able to listen to itself and 
comprehend its own proximity to ridiculousness.  
                                                                                                                                            
 
Sestina form consists of six stanzas of six lines each, followed by a three line envoi.  
 
The sestina follows a strict pattern of the repetition of the initial six end-words of the first stanza 
through the remaining five six-line stanzas, culminating in a three-line envoi. The lines may be of any 
length, though in its initial incarnation, the sestina followed a syllabic restriction. The form is as 
follows, where each numeral indicates the stanza position and the letters represent end-words: 
 
1. ABCDEF 
2. FAEBDC 
3. CFDABE 
4. ECBFAD 
5. DEACFB 
6. BDFECA 
7. (envoi) ECA or ACE 
 
The envoi, sometimes known as the tornada, must also include the remaining three end-words, BDF, 
in the course of the three lines so that all six recurring words appear in the final three lines. In place of 
a rhyme scheme, the sestina relies on end-word repetition to effect a sort of rhyme. (“Sestina”) 
 86 
 Yet Yau’s use of these forms is perversely and precisely intentional in its embrace 
of lexical chaos. Johnson provides the following autobiographical reading in his review 
of Pastior: 
We are told that, as a German-speaking Romanian, Pastior was summarily 
interred by occupying Soviet forces after the end of the Second World War. From 
this we might conclude that Pastior voluntarily imposes constraints on his work in 
order to find imaginative solutions to historical and personal circumstances. 
However, while this formative experience is said to have marked out the struggle 
between freedom and constraint as a predominant theme for the poet, his habit is 
to deny any overtly political or autobiographical material. One of the interludes 
dividing the five sections of the book, called ‘Autobiographical Text,’ undermines 
any attempt to find a substantial connection between the life and the poems: ‘what 
I can say about myself will later (when scrutinized for meaning) turn out to be 
artificial, i.e. composed,’ he writes.21 
 
What Johnson perceives to be a “denial” turns out instead to be the very pretext for Yau’s 
modelling of Asian American identity. Pastor’s self-disclosure that apparent self-
disclosure always reveals itself to be unfaithful to some “original” version, as well as his 
equation of “artificial” and “composed,” finds re-expression in Yau’s work, which makes 
particular use of iterative or serial structure as vehicle for an anti-essentialist approach to 
the search for identity. The titling of “Fourth Metabolic Isthmus Sestina” and “Fifth 
Metabolic Isthmus Sestina” misleadingly suggests that the poems belong to part of a 
series in which presumably the “First”, “Second”, and “Third Metabolic Isthmus 
Sestinas” precede this pair, an illusory framing of continuity which itself characterizes 
Yau’s approach to iterative logic as a metaphor for origin narratives/narratives of 
personal history. The framing as a series also casts this titular string of words as 
                                                
21 Johnson’s narrative of Pastior’s life does not mention –  but must inevitably be framed by – the fact 
that Pastior was a police informant for seven years (during which he published his first collection of 
poems) (cite). While this knowledge may invalidate Johnson’s claims about Pastior and necessarily 
complicates his reading, I invoke it nonetheless for its assertion of a relationship between constraint-
based forms and autobiography, one which plays a part in Yau’s retention of the subject outside the 
norms of lyric expression.   
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indicating an altogether new kind of form, a highly specific kind of sestina in whose 
constraints anyone might write. “Metabolic” suggests the bodily processes of 
decomposing food in order to create energy for life, an odd description for a poem which 
never deviates from its formal commitments (but an apt illustration for the degeneration 
of one kind of meaning that gives rise to another), while “isthmus,” the narrow strip of 
land between two larger bodies of land, evokes the tenuous liminality of Asian American 
identity in Yau’s work.  
 Yau’s “Vowel Sonatas,” inspired by Ernst Jandl, are univocalic poems (in which 
each word must contain the prescribed letter). The series goes through the vowels a, e, i, 
o, u, and y and are formatted as longer poems with no stanzas, no periods or commas, and 
relatively short lines. The resulting effect is that of a seeming “seamlessness,” in which 
syntax appears to supersede the form of a complete sentence or clause with beginning and 
end and flow on.  
The poems are rife with fantastic imaginings and characters in a semi-narrative 
that - partially because of the aforementioned syntactical continuity and partially because 
of the absurdity of the narrative - seems totally nonsensical: “then several armed (some 
men) dangle celery before children/dressed like donkeys (possible sacrifice?)/then the 
donkeys (maybe they are children)/shed their purple capes/before fleeing their haunted 
parents” (101).  
 Yet to read these poems as merely constraint-based would be to miss the moments 
when meaning explicitly emerges. In fact, it is actually these moments’ framing by solely 
sonically driven material that sharpens the irony of its claims about language and race. It 
is no accident that the univocal poem based around “i” is so explicitly about identity; 
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while its logical progression in the sequence of English vowels casts it as merely one 
letter in a series, Yau singles “i” out in particular. The poem, in keeping with Yau’s (and 
Pastior’s) emphasis on the fabricated nature of self-disclosure, is aptly titled “storied fibs 
piled high.” It begins with a few flippant lines: 
omigosh 
tiny smidgin 
containing pidgin 
strained english 
stir fry   (110) 
 
The comic irony of these lines lies in the trivial banality of “omigosh” (spelled 
with the abbreviation of a teenager’s slang), an exclamation of significance applied to 
lines whose simplistic sonic pairing of “smidgin” and “pidgin” evokes a childish nursery 
rhyme. “Stir fry” serves as an additional gratuitous ethnic signifier whose obvious non-
relation to the other subject material (besides being a random token of “Asianness”) only 
enhances the silliness of these italicized lines. The seeming frivolity of these lines stands 
in sharp contrast to the subject material - that the English language is being pidginized or 
contaminated by small doses of foreign nonsense. And yet Yau follows this stanza up by 
reverting back to the nonsensical semi-narrative that characterizes most of the other 
“vowel sonatas”:   
mistakenly 
interred in  
chicken pie 
while sixteen 
artificial lions 
(hairy pride) 
vanish into noise  
 
Yau’s embedding of these moments within the poem acts almost as a kind of test 
for his readers. The poem gives off the appearance of meaninglessness in that the words 
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seem to be chosen solely for the purposes of fulfilling the vowel requirements of a 
univocalic poem, and this framing disguises Yau’s comments on identity as more of the 
same happenstance diction, whose meaning need not be taken too seriously or read too 
closely. And yet a closer listening to this seemingly impartial selection of words which 
are strung together because they happen to contain the letter “I” reveals that these 
comments on identity are perhaps not so easily glossed over after all. The following lines 
explicitly suggest a “writing machine” whose mechanical generation of syntax and 
grammar winds up having affective valences after all, a figure consonant with the figure 
of the “cyborg” who chooses not what it speaks:  
sufficient ink 
slivers 
remain in 
tantric potential 
while writing 
machine 
with grammatical fire 
with olive infected 
diction generating 
emotional swindles (110)  
 
A few lines later, Yau’s use of mechanic cyborg as a placeholder for the identity of the 
racialized other surfaces again: 
Invented ‘i’ invents 
multiple resistance 
machine oiled  
identities against 
prophetic insects  
 
The layering of an “Invented ‘i’” “[inventing]” suggests an absolute fictionality of 
subjectivity, one which operates impartially according to the principles of its 
construction, as the technological sense of “invention” might suggest. “Machine oiled 
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identities” evokes a smooth ease to the performance of these multiple identities, which 
have no singular authorial beginning rooted in an “inventor” but which nonetheless are 
understood to be artificially generated at the same time.   
 The poem concludes as it began, with another seemingly silly play on words: 
idiots 
in seville 
begin singing 
in idiolect 
while dieticians 
in nile city 
idaho 
memorize their river’s  
cosmetic dialect (114) 
 
The false equation of “idiots” and “idiolect,” “dieticians” and “dialect” references the 
kind of humorous sonic logic which begins the poem - “pidgin” and “smidgin” - but also 
exposes its treachery, in that the kinds of semantic connections in English that sound 
suggests cannot be trusted. The individuality of “idiolect”, pointedly associated with 
“idiots,” mirrors the linguistic plight of the racialized other, on whom the joke is played, 
in contrast to the speech of group-based “dialect.”  
Conclusion 
 Reading the invocation of post human voices and non-normative bodies in the 
poems of Cathy Park Hong and John Yau reveals the ways in which works like 
Translating Mo’um make space for the identity of the racialized subject without resorting 
to the representative, metaphorical use of voice typically associated with the lyric. Not 
only does this practice show readers that posthuman categories of the animal and the 
cyborg align with grotesque tropes of primitivism and techno-Orientalism, tropes which 
 91 
these authors repurpose in their poems in order to call them into question, it helps readers 
resist the oppressive fantasy of post-racial approaches towards minority poetries. 
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CHAPTER 3 – NANCIAN HEARING, TOUCH, AND RESONANCE IN MEI-MEI 
BERSSENBRUGGE’S EC(H)OPOETICS OF SELF AND OTHER 
 
In this chapter I suggest that Berssenbrugge states the significance of her 
experience as a racialized subject to her work, but she does not, for the most part, 
thematize it in her poems; instead, she directs her recuperation of alterity at the very 
sensory terms by which the subject distinguishes itself from its surroundings, the natural 
world as ultimate other. Berssenbrugge’s poems, in fact, take sound and touch as new 
sensory paradigms that converge in the paradigm of resonance, leading towards the 
possibility of what I call an “ec(h)opoetic subjectivity.” This ec(h)opoetic subjectivity 
engages with – and problematizes – distinctions between the self as the bodily-delimited, 
interiorized dwelling of the unconscious/conscious and an external environment.  
What is Ec(h)opoetics?  
Matthew Cooperman broadly defines ecopoetics as the “theorizing [of] the 
relationship between poetry and the environment...[placing] the human in the context of 
the natural world such that binaries between nature /culture, civilized/wild, local/global, 
etc. become, if not irrelevant, highly questionable (189). Jonathan Skinner contemplates 
its multiple possible definitions more explicitly, asking 
What is ecopoetics? The term is used more than it is discussed. For some readers, 
ecopoetics is the making and study of pastoral poetry, or poetry of wilderness and 
deep ecology. Or poetry that explores the human capacity for becoming animal, as 
well as humanity’s ethically challenged relation to other animals. For others, it is 
poetry that confronts disasters and environmental injustices, including the 
difficulties and opportunities of urban environments. For yet others, ecopoetics is 
not a matter of theme, but of how certain poetic methods model ecological 
processes like complexity, non-linearity, feedback loops, and recycling. (n.p) 
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In sketching such broad possibilities for the category of the “ecopoetic”, 
Cooperman and Skinner both attempt to move the term away from being simplistically 
reduced to merely “nature poetry”. While “nature poetry”, as evidenced by the first 
possible definition Skinner gives, can indeed fall under the umbrella of ecopoetics, 
“traditional Nature poetry, a la the human-subject meditating upon a natural object-
landscape-animal as a doorway into meaning of the human subject’s life, is now highly 
problematic”, as Marcella Durand points out in her essay “The Ecology of Poetry” (59).  
 One of the implications of Cooperman and Skinner’s capacious definitions of 
ecopoetics is that an ecopoem can – and often does – attain its status as ecopoetic through 
formal experimentation in addition to the thematic treatment of issues or conceptions of 
the natural world. Christopher Arigo takes note of this tendency, observing that “…much 
of the ecopoetry being written seems to take place more in the realm of the innovative, as 
opposed to more mainstream poetries” (n.p.). For Arigo, this trend is not coincidental, 
and he proposes a few reasons why that is:     
Perhaps this is because innovative poetries are loci of resistance to mainstream 
poetic practices (and values) which presumably reflect larger social paradigms. 
Thus innovative practices and ecological thinking/being/feeling combine to 
produce a site of resistance, of politics, of political resistance. Perhaps, given the 
postmodern world in which we live, a world in which we are fully aware of the 
interdependence of the body upon its world for its health, a world that is now 
inextricable from the body, an ecopoetics is an inevitable outcome or byproduct: 
perhaps poetry as a practice is the best means of directly addressing an 
environment in crisis. And perhaps this is why it is so difficult to pin down what 
makes a poem or poet “eco”—because the concern insinuates itself into so many 
elements of the writing…Or maybe it is because the poem itself is an ecology: a 
microcosmic ecosystem in which itself dwells. 
 
The reasons Arigo offers are not mutually exclusive, and they compel us to a study of 
form as the means by which ecopoetry moves towards these objectives. Arigo’s 
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identification of the link between poetic form and the subversive aims of ecological 
thinking also help us understand the stakes of Berssenbrugge’s poems for Asian 
American alterity.  
 
Shared Formal Investments of Ecopoetry and Asian American Poetry 
 
A quick overview of Berssenbrugge’s work, even by the casual reader, readily 
reveals her poems’ thematic engagement with nature; Berssenbrugge herself has 
referenced her own investment in the landscape of New Mexico, where she lives (Hinton 
“Three Conversations with Mei-mei Berssenbrugge”). For Berssenbrugge, the 
environmental inflection of New Mexico acts as a theme, one which bridges her work to 
a tradition of Chinese poetry, which Berssenbrugge sees as offering a phenomenological 
way of accounting for non-oppositional difference.  
In an interview with Michele Gerber Klein, Berssenbrugge asserts this 
connection: 
 
MB: I fell in love with New Mexico when I was 18, and went there to live in my 
twenties. Then, it was about the mysticism and beauty of light on the land. I lived 
in a rural village. Georgia O’Keeffe lived nearby. There’s a kind of 
phenomenology in my writing of that period. I used light to talk about philosophic 
issues or issues about relations with people and how a person is connected to the 
world. I find a correlation with themes in Chinese poetry. 
 
MK: What is the correlation? 
  
MB: Chinese poets also used personal observation of the landscape to reflect 
larger questions about life. After our daughter was born and we built our house on 
the mesa, I expanded into thinking about the world more holistically, in context. I 
began to explore how there could be traces of many things at the same time that 
are not oppositional. When we came to New York, I tried to keep that scale of the 
landscape. 
 
 
95 
However, while Berssenbrugge’s poems are ecopoetic in this thematic sense, 
there is another way in which they are also ecopoetic in demonstrating “how certain 
poetic methods model ecological processes like complexity, non-linearity, feedback 
loops, and recycling”, as Skinner describes. This ecopoetic formal quality, I suggest, 
could be better thought of as her “echopoetics”.  
Marthe Reed’s reading of one of Berssenbrugge’s earlier works, Heat Bird (1983), shows 
this particular relation between the “eco” and “echo” in her poetics:  
Articulating experience and understanding through language and its imagery, 
Berssenbrugge creates associative links between ideas or moments that rest 
alongside one another, almost in the manner of words written first in Chinese and 
then translated into English: "An interval can be a place, that ricochets off water / 
or shines off the pink nickel barrel of your purse gun" {Heat Bird 48). “In another 
passage, we understand a hill, cloud, car, and forehead as equivalents, each and all 
signaling to us the muted tones of distance. The big hill is solid in dim light. A lit 
cloud rolls down behind it. She was standing in the dirt yard trying to decide 
between them. Even as a forehead the hill only glowed beige. It was the same 
color as the '54 Buick parked at the washed out bridge.” {Heat Bird 49)… Such 
images are set in relation to one another as correlatives or correspondences. Each 
echoes within and extends the others. In this way, the speaker becomes no more 
or less than an element of place, one of many participants in a dialogue that 
constitutes a particular place-moment. (258)  
 
“Echo,” as Reed points out, acts as an associative paradigm, one which is analogized to 
the traversing of linguistic frameworks and which has the effect of relating the speaker to 
her surroundings contextually.  
Within the context of the poem, Charles Bernstein defines “echopoetics” in Pitch 
of Poetry as “the nonlinear resonance of one motif bouncing off another within an 
aesthetics of constellation. Even more, it’s the sensation of allusion in the absence of 
allusion. In other words, the echo I’m after is a blank: a shadow of an absent source” (x).  
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It is vital to begin my reading of the echo of resonance in Mei-mei Berssenbrugge’s 
ec(h)opoetics by recuperating the often occluded fact that Berssenbrugge is an Asian 
American poet who experiments with paradigms of sound in her work. It is necessary to 
address this fact in order to see her contributions to an ecopoetics and an echopoetics that 
resonate with each other, an ec(h)opoetics, or as Charles Bernstein calls it, the “exploring 
[of] a reciprocal relation between the human and nonhuman, world and earth, as well as a 
practice of mimicry and repetition within and across human cultures and languages” 
(298).  
My study of Berssenbrugge in this chapter presents me with a valuable 
opportunity precisely because her poems address racial difference the least explicitly – 
according to conventional signifying markers – of all the poets I canvas in these four 
chapters. As Dorothy Wang argues in her survey of Asian American poetry, Thinking its 
Presence (the title of which comes from a line in Berssenbrugge’s poem “Nest”), critical 
reception of their work has embodied an example of “[the failure] to recognize how racial 
subjectivity can make itself felt in and as language and in what is not said or said 
obliquely” (248).  
Berssenbrugge herself has asserted the centrality of being a racially marked 
subject to her work quite explicitly, a claim that a closer listening to the sonic paradigm 
of resonance in her poems bears out. The entry on Mei-mei Berssenbrugge in Asian-
American Poets: A Bio-bibliographical Critical Sourcebook gives a cursory overview of 
her life: born in Beijing in 1947 to Chinese and Dutch parents, Berssenbrugge grew up in 
Massachusetts, and went on to study at Reed College and Columbia University. In 1974, 
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the year she began publishing the first of several collections of her poems, she also 
moved to New Mexico, where she now resides with Richard Tuttle and their daughter 
(45). Alongside these facts about her, the entry also states, “Mei-mei Berssenbrugge is 
known as an experimental or postmodern poet,” noting that “Unlike many Asian 
American writers, Berssenbrugge does not comment directly on issues such as ethnic 
identity, the American dream, and social and cultural conflict. Her poetry lacks overt 
social engagement, comment, or protest” (45).  
 It is true that Berssenbrugge is not commonly classified as one of the defining 
Asian American poets of the 1970s (though she was already writing prolifically then), 
though some of her early poems, such as “Chronicle,” “Tan Tien,” and “Chinese Space,” 
do explicitly reference her ties to China. As such, the ways in which her work is 
commonly situated is of especial significance to Wang’s argument that Asian American 
poems that deal with race and identity explicitly are often read as less formally 
sophisticated, while poems that make no mention of identity are more easily embraced as 
“experimental” by the avant-garde. Wang critiques the 2006 MLA convention - “the first 
to coalesce around a theme – in this case, poetry, particularly avant-garde poetry” – for 
not including any minority poets in their keynote sessions” (247). The idea, Wang argues, 
is that  
...while it might initially seem that critics of avant-garde poetry offer a more 
‘liberating’ approach to the experimental work of someone like Berssenbrugge – 
by choosing to focus on form and not solely autobiographical or ethnographic 
content, as some critics of more traditional lyric minority poetry are wont to do – 
these two groups of critics on opposite ends of the aesthetic spectrum, in fact, 
occupy two sides of the same problematic coin. (248) 
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Wang does not specify here that the MLA convention’s theme that year was not 
merely on “avant-garde poetry” but more specifically Marjorie Perloff’s proposed theme 
- “The Sound of Poetry, the Poetry of Sound.” Her omission, however, only further 
underscores the stakes of listening more closely for and to paradigms of sound at work 
within Berssenbrugge’s poems. As I have suggested in my first chapter (and discussed at 
more length with regard to readings of Marilyn Chin), the perception of an artificial 
opposition between ethnographic content and formal innovation is largely to do with the 
association between the lyric voice and an autobiographical, singularly cohesive 
representation of identity.  The metaphorical conscription of the lyric voice in the name 
of political representation, I argue, pulls sonic paradigms away from their materiality and 
diverts critical attention from the ways in Asian American poets’ very experimentation 
with sound is itself a form of wrestling with being racially marked subjects.  
In her reading of Berssenbrugge’s poetics, Wang attempts the difficult task of 
both reading Berssenbrugge’s few poems that do explicitly thematize her Chinese-
Americanness while making the case that Asian American poets need not write about 
identity in a particular way for their experiences as a racialized subject to be considered 
relevant to their work. It is necessary to attend to Berssenbrugge’s fairly straightforward 
references to China (as Wang has already done), a China she finds echoed in the 
landscape of her New Mexico, and make space for the particularities of her experience 
borne through in her writing as a racialized subject. It is also equally necessary to 
recognize that in the instances of her other poems that may “…[appear] abstract and 
largely devoid of racial markers…[they] nonetheless strongly bear the impress of social 
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and historical contexts, including processes of racialization and the influence of her first 
language—Chinese—which shaped and continue to shape her subjectivity as both an 
Asian American and a poet” (45).  
There is a clear parallel between the formal investments of an ecopoetry that does 
not thematize the natural world and the formal investments of Asian American poetry 
that does not thematize race. Both, I suggest, are interested in resisting dominant castings 
of subjectivity and alterity, particularly where ideas about the other intersect with the 
privileging of a humanistic framework.  
Joan Retallack, meditating on the terms and conditions of an ecopoetic relation to 
the other of nature, suggests a kind of “reciprocal alterity” in her 2007 essay for Jacket2 
“What is Experimental Poetry and Why Do We Need it?”: 
The human imagination has always done a brilliant job of occupying the “empty 
spaces” of alterity. When alterity has no opportunity to speak back how can there 
be anything but a monodirectional dynamic of voluble us and silent them. But 
what about a reciprocal alterity? Our shared peril on a degraded planet turns us all 
into potentially fatally estranged subjects—those whose lives most depend on 
forces least within their control. (n.p.) 
 
Retallack asks, “What does a poetics of reciprocal alterity look like? Is it by necessity 
experimental?” Yet it is apparent that while the former remains an open question, the 
latter is one that her work and that of other ecopoetics scholars like Cooperman and 
Skinner have already answered affirmatively.  
Retallack identifies a close-knit relationship between formal choices and an 
ecological sensibility (or sensitivity) that recuperates the alterity of the non-human 
surrounding world:  
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Looking through issues of ecopoetics, one can see that a good deal of the work 
coming out of the cluster of concerns and questions that pack the term 
“ecopoetics” with urgent meaning is enacting an experimental attitude. Perhaps, 
for instance, the previously inactive reciprocal alterity of metaphor-imbued nature 
poetry is approached through some of the visual poetics that appear frequently in 
the journal. If the aim is life-furthering interest and respect, correctives to 
“nature” narratives of segregation, dominance and nostalgia—failure to 
acknowledge “them” as inextricably intertwined with “us”—are imperative. The 
question is how can poetries do that.  
 
The stakes of exploring how poetic form resists “narratives of segregation, dominance 
and nostalgia – failure to acknowledge ‘them’ as inextricably intertwined with ‘us’” 
matter not only to the aim of making room for a “reciprocal alterity” between the human 
and the natural world as non-human other but between the assumed subject within an 
experimental poem and the non-humanity of the racialized other, which I have touched 
upon in my second chapter on the animal and cyborg. It is for this reason that I turn to the 
intersection of sensory paradigms like hearing, touch, and resonance with a Nancian 
deconstructive modelling of bodily self within Berssenbrugge’s work.  
Nancian Theory of the Body 
 
In Corpus, Nancy deconstructs different ontologies based in a soul-body dualism 
(Platonic, Christian and Cartesian – to name a few) by turning towards the role of the 
senses in defining self as other (rather than self and other). Nancy asserts that “The 
ontological body has yet to be thought” and that the corpus is “coming,” identifying two 
versions of this “coming,” which are also necessarily tied to two different manifestations 
of the body. Nancy defines one version of this “coming” as “incarnation,” aligned with a 
metaphysical-based notion of touch in which language presents the body as signifier 
(“hoc est enim displays the body proper, makes it present to the touch, serves it up as a 
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meal”) (64-65, 5). Language’s attempt to make the body “present” by conferring 
signification on the body (“hoc est”) as well as (“enim”), however, “only [expels] the 
thing we desired. The anxiety, the desire to see, touch, and eat the body of God, to be that 
body and be nothing but that, forms the principle of Western (un) reason. That’s why the 
body, bodily, never happens, least of all when it’s named and convoked” (5). 
 Nancy defines another version of the corpus, however, as the “plastic material of 
spacing” which is “neither before, nor after…[but] is the taking-place of sense, 
absolutely” (63, 64, 119). Nancy associates the “coming” of this corpus with not the 
aforementioned “presenting” through the signification of language but a “coming to 
presence” as an event whose finite conclusion is endlessly deferred: “What is coming 
happens to a presence that hasn’t taken place, and won’t take elsewhere, and is neither 
present, nor representable, outside of what is coming. Thus, the coming itself never ends” 
(64).  
In At the Limits of Presentation, Martta Heikkilä asserts that for Nancy, “The 
exterior is nothing else but the exposition of the other to which one is exposed”, and that 
this exposure, which enables community with others,  
 
doesn't mean that intimacy is extracted from its withdrawal, and carried outside, put on 
display. Because then the body would be an exposition of the "self," in the sense 
of a translation, an interpretation, or a staging. "Exposition," on the contrary, 
means that expression itself is an intimacy and a withdrawal…The body is this 
departure of self to self. (Heikkilä 165, Nancy Corpus 33)  
 
 Given that the always-happening temporality of the Nancian body’s “coming” is 
rooted in the “taking-place” of sense, it becomes clear that in his formulation, there is no 
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pre-existing self for the body to become aware of; rather, the physical auto-affection of a 
subject’s body represents the very moment that the subject is comprised (69).  
The following passage from Corpus articulates Nancy’s theory of sensory self-
constitution: 
A body is sensing, but sensing such that there’s no sensing that wouldn’t be a 
‘sensing one’s self’. To sense, we have to sense ourselves sensing…Body means 
very precisely the soul that feels it’s a body. Or: the soul is the name of the 
sensing of the body…We could say it by using all the figures of the self’s 
interiority facing exteriority: time, which is sensed as space; necessity, which is 
felt as contingency; sex, which is felt as another sex. The formula that sums up 
this thought would be: the inside, which senses it is outside. (Corpus 131) 
 
This rejection of a priori notions of the body (prior to the act of sensing) finds expression 
in Berssenbrugge’s poem “Matter”, from Hello, the Roses: “We may seek a body prior to 
discord, to ground dependency, but bodies are founded on feeling, including depression, 
helplessness, futility in the face of another’s aggression, who put her animus first and was 
overpowered, so we seem unconstructed now.” (20) The doubled potential meaning of 
“feeling” as both a self-constituting physical “sensing” as well as subjective “emotion” 
performs Nancy’s “inside [which] senses it is outside”. 
I return to Retallack here, borrowing her theorizing of binaries in The Poethical 
Wager order to illustrate the paradoxical corporeality that Nancy is positing here:  
One way to think of them is in terms of Buckminster Fuller’s elegantly minimalist 
definition of structure. Each term in these contesting binaries is the outside of the 
other’s inside: each an alternative and/or complementary and/or argumentative 
and/or critical and/or destructive logic in relation to the other. The problem this 
poses for ordinary discourse is that we have the same kind of trouble seeing an 
inside and an outside simultaneously that we have seeing both vase and profiles in 
Edgar Rubin’s famous ambiguous figure. This means we habitually feel we must 
rank or choose between the terms of a binary. (Which is figure, which ground? If 
both are figure, which is dominant?) But in fact, these terms (as terms) describe 
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only the most easily identifiable limits at either end of a sinuous, moving range of 
nuanced possibilities. (99) 
 
The opening poem of Berssenbrugge’s poetic sequence from Heat Bird, “Farolita,” also 
asks the reader to contemplate such a paradoxical structuring of subjectivity by figuring a 
Mobius strip as paradigm for relationality:  
Take a strip of white paper, turn 
the top of the strip in your right hand so 
it faces the floor, then glue the ends together 
If you go along on the outside, it seems 
I am not connected to you. I’m trying 
To think now if it has to be white paper 
Can it show some light through? (33) 
 
The Mobius strip embodies a surface on which, as its famously associated 
illustration goes, an ant could begin traversing on either side and wind up on the opposite 
one without ever crossing an edge. What Berssenbrugge chooses to emphasize in this 
passage, however, is not the idea that this continuity gives access to the side of the other; 
rather, it is about that very disconnection (“If you go along on the outside, it seems I am 
not connected to you”). The Mobius strip, in this sense, has an artificial boundary (in the 
sense that it runs along two sides that are indistinct) and no orientation, which makes it 
uniquely suited as a conceptual model of subjectivity for Berssenbrugge’s poetics. It is 
this blurring of an interiorized self who is always already located “here” and “inside” 
against an exterior other(ing) “over there”/”outside” that Berssenbrugge plays with in 
engaging with models of subjectivity.  
In her “Honeymoon” from Empathy, Berssenbrugge offers another example of an 
ec(h)opoetic bodily paradigm twisted and inverted upon itself. The poem, like many of 
her other works, sinuously interlaces the specific language of causality and semiotic 
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theory in the form of long complete sentences, with irruptions of allusions to personal 
relationships, interspersed throughout: 
Though relations with oneself and with other people seem negotiated in terms 
secretly confirmed by representation, her idea of the person’s visibility was not 
susceptible representation. No matter how emphatically a person will control his 
demeanor, there will be perspectives she cannot foresee or direct, because there is 
no assignable end to the depth of us to which representation can reach, the way 
part of a circle can be just the memory of a depth. The surface inside its contour, 
like the inside of a body, emits more feeling than its surroundings, as if the 
volume or capacity of relations would only refer to something inside I can’t see, 
that the other person and I keep getting in the way of, or things in the landscape 
while they are driving, instead of the capacity being of your person. (68) 
 
Berssenbrugge’s language here takes on the aura of scientific authority (“surface,” 
“contour,” “volume”), and its clauses tempts the reader towards deductive inferences that 
nonetheless somehow elude crystallization into any kind of conventional concrete logic. 
The poem gestures towards a kind of specific factual quantification – “more feeling than 
its surroundings,” even as the reader becomes disoriented at the site of the body as 
boundary (“the surface inside its contour, like the inside of a body”, emits more feeling 
than its surroundings”). 
Berssenbrugge takes this Nancian auto-affective touch of the skin as as a 
precondition to understanding the relationality between self and other and extrapolates 
from it an ecopoetic dissolution of the discrete boundary between self and environment as 
other: “And memory doesn’t end where my skin ends, but diffuses into my surroundings, 
leaving fragments of itself I may notice as ‘red rock’, ‘friable cliff,’ reminding me” 
(Hello the Roses “Winter Whites” 27). 
By making the status of bodily parameters as boundary between a “private” self 
and external world ambiguous, Berssenbrugge calls the alignment of interiority and 
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invisibility, exteriority and visibility into question. In a later section of “Honeymoon”, 
Berssenbrugge continues to engage with the attribution of “privacy,” “hiddenness,” and 
“secrecy” to the body’s supposed containment of the self:    
Whenever or wherever it is possible to speak of recognition, there was a prior 
hiddenness or border of the circle…I call it color, if the way the texture of skin on 
his hand changes in moonlight were a color, instead of a fantasy, so that the 
physical idea of his privacy is not made clearer by the idea of his secrecy. 
(Empathy 61) 
  
In an essay on Empathy, Charles Altieri suggests through his invocation of Lacan 
that Berssenbrugge is invested in how visibility/invisibility shapes the subject’s process 
of self-constitution and relationship to others: 
Lacan offers for this critique of representation his mirror stage and his brilliant 
analysis of how and why we project imaginary versions of ourselves as subjects. 
Berssenbrugge adds to that mix an insistence that we examine how the ideal of 
visibility forms and deforms the logics of distribution shaping what we invest in 
as subjective identities. How we conceive visibility as emotionally charged will 
will also shape how we characterize the invisible as well as how we establish 
links between the two…Like Lacan, Berssenbrugge wants to challenge the 
essentially visual, pictorial ways that we now take as central to imagining 
closeness with other people. For her the visual confines feelings to an essentially 
‘mystical’ mode in which we are constantly drawing inferences from particulars 
(38). (58)  
 
Altieri does not expound on the figuring of sound and touch in Berssenbrugge’s poems, 
which I suggest are the primary means through which she issues this challenge. However, 
in linking her work to Lacan, he actually does makes the opposition between a Cartesian 
and Nancian paradigm of bodily subjectivity more evident: 
And suppose that our desires are severly distorted by the same visual imperatives 
because they project an outside and an inside, with the outside then somehow 
having to express or symbolize what cannot be seen but can apparently be given a 
definitive psychological space to inhabit. Ideals of representation foreclose what 
counts as depth and block possible perspectives that might give access to the traits 
most profoundly characterizing us as persons. 
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We want to be knowable in almost the same way that we feel we have confident 
grasps of what objects are and we understand using these objects to perform 
various tasks. Correlatively, we want this visibility supplemented by something 
invisible, something hidden that confers on us a depth and a mystery making us 
different from objects. Then our humanity consists largely in our efforts to bring 
this depth to the surface by making visible or expressing in a world of objects 
what makes us subjects. (58-59) 
  
Berssenbrugge’s poems expose the artificiality of this opposition, I suggest, by 
identifying conventional ideas of how the self is delineated in order to call them into 
question. Altieri notes that Berssenbrugge “[evades] the two obvious poles for gathering 
lyrical energy – the rendering of subjective need and the articulating of how the world 
rewards what language can make of our efforts to pay attention to objects,” suggesting 
that she privileges instead “the need to identify with a condition of possibility between 
the ego and the world that I am going to call a distinctive ‘imaginative site’…the 
articulation of dispositions toward the world which allows us to identify fully with the 
speaking presence of the text” (56). 22 
Observing that Berssenbrugge’s poetry is interested in theorizing (in)visibility for 
the purposes of moving away from it, Altieri connects that imperative to a modelling of 
alterity (of which he is critical) in which psychological interiority distinguishes “subject” 
(meaning human) from “object” (meaning animal, thing, nature).  
                                                
22 Retallack’s “reciprocal alterity” comes to mind again here. In her theorizing of the “essay as 
wager,” Retallack situates her critical writing “in the intermediate zone between self and world, in the 
distancing act of play. The distance engendered by a poethical recognition of reciprocal alterity 
stimulates curiosity and exploration” (Poethical Wager 7). I do not delve specifically into the term 
“poethical” here, as I have attempted to build it into my delineation of the “ecopoetic”; however, I see 
my aims in this chapter as fundamentally aligned with Retallack’s sense of the “poethical”.  
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If personal memory and the psyche are a few of the ways that “psychological 
space” is marked off as individual and interior, Berssenbrugge rejects their 
individualization and status as signifiers of an exclusive humanism, as the following 
examples from “Winter Whites” show:  
“A collective unconscious of all experience underlies events along an electron’s 
path, because space is a psychological property” (Hello the Roses 30). 
 
“I see light around a corner, combinations of others’ memories adjacent to mine 
and polyvalent” (30).  
“My memory travels into the memory of another with increasing energy, and an 
event clarifies as ‘winter’ for example.” (31) 
 
“Where dark sky fills with breezes, currents, moisture, dust particles and so forth, 
a parallel vault moves (as clouds merge and fuse) to form our psychological 
climate, a growth medium, like creativity in a dream rummaging through nights in 
the future for data.” (40) 
 
While Berssenbrugge’s definition of “environment” is not necessarily limited to 
the natural world, her poems show a strong initiative towards recuperating relationality 
and community with non-human others (whether animal, plant, element/aspect of nature 
or man-made object) in a way that retains their absolute alterity. She does this by 
ascribing an independent agency conventionally associated only with human interiority to 
these others, as these lines from her poem “Turquoise Shade” show: “I try to set up an 
environment of objects: my return flight, ambition, an apple green Sung vase, poem about 
antelope; then these interact and give themselves to other situations.” (75)  
Berssenbrugge comments in a dialogue with Bernstein that  
A self encompassing or embodying what it interacts with was more articulate than 
trying to speak for myself. This is the literal situation of our bodies which are 
porous and continuous with the world. Tom White told me, after a few days in the 
Sierras one's internal flora has more in common with the surrounding pine trees 
than with people back in Berkeley. (n.p.) 
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In “Pure Immanence”, Berssenbrugge opens the Cartesian subjectivity of the lyric 
“I” out onto such others: “I dream all plants and animals communicate. Energies of the 
environment and of inhabitants merge in a kind of horizon of one dream to another” 
(Hello, the Roses 23). The extension of “wishes”, a signifier of human desire, to the 
“environment”, attributes an emotional subjectivity to the “I”’s surroundings: “My 
wishes aren’t separate from the environment, which is a portion of connectivity, with new 
species emerging all the time. (25) The poem concludes with a depiction of the speaker’s 
oversoul-like communion with a natural world that exhibits the simultaneous sensory and 
emotional meanings of “feeling” normally reserved for the category of the human: “The 
tree exemplifies nature as it relates with humans, feeling around the edges of our 
concepts, sensing openings in our awareness and forming alliances./It enjoys contributing 
to our life, though there’s no individual consciousness, per se.” (26) Her poem “Glitter” 
also attempts to dismantle the Cartesian limitations around (and privileging of) human 
consciousness: “You could say our identities reach out to encompass the forest 
environment, like telepathy: a moment opens space by rendering it transparent in 
intensified consciousness.” (“Glitter,” Hello the Roses, 47). This consciousness, along 
with an intentionality of communication, allows the natural world to synthesize as a 
community: “Thoughts are sent out by one rock informing other rocks as to the nature of 
its changing environment, the angle of sun and temperatures cooling as night falls and 
even its (loosely called) emotional tone changes, the appearance of a person walking, 
who’s not appropriately empathic.”  
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Berssenbrugge’s Hearing & Nancian Listening  
 
Skinner notes of Berssenbrugg’s “Pollen”, “If we are to speak of “ecopoetics” 
here, it is as a species of boundary work, rather than exploration of (communication 
about, imitation of) a given environment” (“Boundary Work”). To further contextualize 
what Skinner means by “boundary work,” I turn to his citation of Andrew McMurry, 
Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela’s work on autopoesis: 
McMurry works with cognitive scientists Maturana and Varela’s notion of 
subjectivity as “the self-description of a closed unity structurally open to the 
environment,” to redirect ecocritical focus from observations of “environments” 
to observations of the observations, from ontology to epistemology (163, 222). In 
Maturana and Varela’s theory of autopoesis, life is constituted by organizationally 
closed yet structurally open systems, defined by “their circular, self-referential 
organization, or autonomy; and their continual creation (poesis) of the 
components that structure and sustain that autonomy. (Skinner “Boundary Work” 
74) 
 
“Boundary work,” as Skinner defines it in relation to Berssenbrugge’s poetry, seems to 
be explicitly directed at this contradiction, destabilizing the demarcation between the 
“interior” of such a “closed unity” and its simultaneous “openness”. In his analysis of 
“Pollen”, Skinner notes that  
…it is hard to say which is inner and which outer: conventionally, the book itself 
would be the rim, anchored in body and environment, the “small theatre” of 
poetic composition the innermost lamination. But the lack of symmetry in the 
mirroring frames, each line reflecting yet failing to recuperate the last, boggles 
any spatial illusion: “An orange cliff holds the light, concave / and convex from 
wind, as between alive and not alive, the boundary of a person touching you” 
(44). Just as Berssenbrugge’s composition departs from a theatrical staging of 
“inner” drama, she confounds distinctions between “inner” engrossment and 
“outer” reality, between natural and social frames. “ 
 
Nancy’s “listening” subject helps us read how poems like Berssenbrugge’s “Hearing” – 
and Berssenbrugge’s investments in sound throughout the rest of her work –  confound 
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the distinctions between self and world.  The poem, from her 2003 collection Nest, opens 
with the speaker’s account of hearing another voice, one which does not issue from any 
lyric identity: “A voice with no one speaking, like the sea, merges with my listening, as if 
imagining her thinking about me makes me real’ (53).  
One might wonder why Berssenbrugge begins a poem called “Hearing” with an 
invocation of “listening”, and I suggest that an investigation of the key difference 
between “ecouter” and “entendre” in Nancy’s Listening is key to answering that 
question, as well as to understanding how the difference between the two qualifies 
Berssenbrugge’s work as ecopoetic.  
Charles Bernstein has usefully traced the general thinking in cognitive linguistics 
on this distinction in Close Listening, and I draw from his summary of Reuven Tsur, 
whose argument in What Makes Sound Patterns Expressive asserts that “there is a 
marked cognitive difference in the way a listener hears a material sound –say a flapping 
flag or the pouring rain – and the way she or he hears human speech. Speech triggers a 
specific cognitive mode of interpretation in a way that material sound does not” (18). 
Barthes, whom Bernstein also references, distinguishes between the two on somewhat 
separate grounds; for Barthes, hearing is a more physiological act, whereas listening is a 
more psychological one (Bernstein 18).  
I now examine Berssenbrugge and Nancy’s respective distinctions between 
“listening” and “hearing”. In her dialogue with Bernstein, Berssenbrugge shares her 
definition of the difference between hearing and listening: “Now I realize I think of 
hearing as encompassing and receptive, while listening which I didn't really address 
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would be a more focused, directed perception” (n.p.). Here I turn to Nancy’s figuring of 
the listening subject:  
To listen is to enter that spatiality by which, at the same time, I am penetrated, for 
it opens up in me as well as around me, and from me as well as toward me: it 
opens me inside me as well as outside, and it is through such a double, quadruple, 
or sextuple opening that a ‘self’ can take place. To be listening is to be at the 
same time outside and inside, to be open from without and from within, hence 
from one to the other and from one in the other. (Listening 14)  
 
Berssenbrugge’s invocation and extension of this listening subject through “hearing” 
allows for a subjectivity that doesn’t distinguish between human and environmental 
consciousness, even as it posits an aurally-inflected touch as a mode of relating to the 
other that doesn’t collapse its absolute alterity.   
Nancy writes in Listening of ecouter that “To listen is tender l’oreille – literally, 
to stretch the ear – an expression that evokes a singular mobility, among the sensory 
apparatuses, of the pinna of the ear – it is an intensification and a concern, a curiosity or 
an anxiety” (5). Nancy opposes ecouter to another kind of listening, “hearing” that he 
aligns with entendre:  
Entendre, ‘to hear,’ also means comprendre, ‘to understand,’ as if ‘hearing’ were 
above all ‘hearing say’ (rather than ‘hearing sound’), or rather, as if in all 
‘hearing’ there had to be a ‘hearing’ there had to be a ‘hearing say,’ regardless of 
whether the sound perceived was a word or not…If ‘to hear’ is to understand the 
sense (either in the so-called figurative sense, or in the so-called proper sense: to 
hear a siren, a bird, or a drum is already each time to understand at least the rough 
outline of a situation, a context if not a text), to listen is to be straining toward a 
possible meaning, and consequently one that is not immediately accessible. (6)  
 
Technically speaking, Nancy’s distinction between ecouter and comprender mirrors 
Berssenbrugge’s description of the distinction between listening and hearing, in that 
Nancy similarly distinguishes between one as more intentionally selective and one as 
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more open-ended. However, I suggest that Nancy and Berssenbrugge’s terminologies for 
these concepts are actually reversed, in that Nancy’s “listening” as ecouter, I suggest, 
aligns with Berssenbrugge’s encompassing/receptive “hearing”, essentially an 
intentionality/straining towards the environment that doesn’t need to slot it into human 
sense. I suggest here that Berssenbrugge’s hearing is what Nancy’s listening would look 
like manifested (is Nancy’s listening but with a human oriented intentionality expanded 
open towards the natural non-human), and that this hearing in Berssenbrugge’s poetics 
structures relationality – and even community – between subjects by assessing the 
untouchable alterity between them: “Hear hesitations between words as this space in a 
design’s overall, natural workability.” (9) “Between any experiences, memories, objects 
are silent rhythms and intervals.” (29)  
In a dialogue with Bernstein, Berssenbrugge characterizes hearing as inherently a 
fragmentary experience: "Hearing" moves to the wider arena of compassion, transcendent 
and particular giving expressed by hearing, as a source of power. There's a synapse 
between hearing a cry and understanding its meaning, a synapse where all fragments 
occur. This is explicitly a feminine, if not feminist power” (“A Dialogue”). This emphasis 
on a discontinuous hearing and suspension of coherent meaning resurfaces more 
explicitly in her poem “Hearing”: “Hearing is the fractality of fragments occurring (as 
they disintegrate)” (Nest 56). Michael Gallope summarizes the difference between the 
two most clearly when he writes: “Where entendre implies the closure of understanding 
and truth, ecouter implies the openness of negotiation, uncertainty, and exposure” (158). 
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Touch  
 
Berssenbrugg’s description of “hearing” as a “feminist power” because of its 
open, fragmentary nature dovetails with Nancy’s paradigm of a self that is constituted 
through touch. Nancy emphasizes the significance of auto-affective touch in folding a 
sense of self as other into the subject’s self-constitution: ““A body touches on the outside, 
but at the same time (and this is more than a correlation, it’s a co-appurtenance), it 
touches itself as outside…The phenomenological analyses of ‘self-touching’ always 
return to a primary interiority. Which is impossible. To begin with, I have to be in 
exteriority in order to touch myself. And what I touch remains on the outside. I am 
exposed to myself touching myself” (Corpus 128-129). 
Nancy is well aware how difficult it is to talk about skin without falling back into 
claims about the interiority of the subject, and takes care to clarify that “…we only gain 
access to ourselves from outside. I am an outside for myself…This is what skin is. It’s 
through my skin that I touch myself. And I touch myself from outside, I don’t touch 
myself from inside” (128).  
Nancy subscribes to 
…an ontology where the body = the place of existence, or local existence. (Here 
‘local’ shouldn’t be taken as a piece of ground, a province or a reservation. It 
should be taken, rather, in the pictorial sense of local color: the vibration and 
singular intensity – itself changing, mobile, multiple – of a skin-event or of skin 
as the place for an event of existence.)  
 
Nancy’s figuring of skin as both an exposing and an event frames skin as the auto-
affective sensory experience through which the self is constituted, and which redoubles 
otherness back into the self. Nancy’s response to his own question “what is a subject that 
 
 
114 
is thus constituted in listening…?” is to turn to the self-referral of “ex(peau)sition,” the 
outward orientation of skin folded back on itself. He writes:  
 
The phenomenological analyses of ‘self-touching’ always return to a primary 
interiority. Which is impossible. To begin with, I have to be in exteriority in order 
to touch myself. And what I touch remains on the outside. I am exposed to myself 
touching myself.” (Corpus 128-129) 
 
While sensory auto-affection – the touch of self – is necessary in Nancy’s 
formulation for one to understand relationality with others (because it confirms self as 
exterior), neither he nor Berssenbrugge are interested in an alterity experienced through 
directly touching others, for fear of a collapsing substitutive touch that Derrida and 
Nancy critique. To put it simply, in Derrida and Nancy’s schema of touching, one 
touches self as other but cannot touch other as self. In keeping with this axiom, 
Berssenbrugge’s touch is a contactless, phenomenological encounter between the 
subject’s thought/emotion and other, a touch inflected by the Nancian listening she calls 
“hearing”. 
Here I turn to Laura Marks’ definition of the haptic, one which is implicitly 
founded on an opposition between touchable surface and untouchable depth, an 
opposition which underpins her figuring of self as shell-center, and which 
Berssenbrugge’s ecopoetic poems continually seek to undo. Indeed, Marks herself admits 
that in her outlining of the relationship between haptics and erotics “[she] fought against 
[theories of Lacanian psychoanalysis], which [are] ever anxious about a subject that it 
assumes to be a void, ever trying to break through its thin shell, but could not extricate 
[herself] from it,” and that upon reading Vivian Sobchack’s The Address of the Eye she 
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“began to believe in a subject that does have a center, even one that is constantly being 
transformed by its encounters with the world” (Touch xix). 
This figuring of “shell” and “center” which Marks cannot seem to do away with 
suggests a contained sense of in-dwelling that Nancy resists when he writes, “Bodies 
aren't some kind of fullness or filled space (space is filled everywhere): they are open 
space, implying, in some sense, a space more properly spacious than spatial, what could 
also be called a place” (Corpus 15). This bodily paradigm of subjectivity, inflected by a 
Cartesian humanism, is underpinned by theories of touch, and it is one that Marks implies 
when she defines “haptic criticism” as: 
…a kind of criticism that assumes a tactile relation to one’s object – touching, 
more than looking. The notion of the haptic is sometimes used in art to refer to a 
lack of visual depth, so that the eye travels on the surface of an object rather than 
moves into illusionistic depth. I prefer to describe haptic visuality as a kind of 
seeing that uses the eye like an organ of touch. Pre-Socratic philosophers thought 
of perception in terms of a contact between the perceived object and the person 
perceiving. Hence the haptic: looking, we touch the object with our eyes. This 
image might be a rather painful one, calling up raw, bruised eyeballs scraping 
against the brute stuff of the world. But I mean it to call up a way of seeing that 
does not posit a violent distance between the seer and the object, and hence cause 
pain when the two are brought together. In haptic visuality the contact can be as 
gentle as a caress.  (Laura Marks, “Haptic Visuality: Touching with the Eyes”) 
 
However, for Marks, this immediate touch upon the object is predicated on an 
empathetic transubstantiation, which she defines as “a form of representation based on 
getting close enough to the other thing to become it”, in which touch enables one to 
“[press] up to the object and takes its shape.” Similarly, the purpose of her haptic 
criticism, Marks notes, is to achieve some transfer of embodied knowledge: “My writing 
will be successful if you, the reader, can reconstitute in your own body the experience I 
had” ( xiii).  
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Marks, who fails to see the problem with assuming some knowledge of the other 
based on one’s own experience of touch, embraces this “immediate access to the other” 
when she writes:  
I don’t believe in the alterity or ultimate unknowability of other things, people, 
and times. We all live on the same surface, the same skin. If others are unfathomable, it is 
because it takes an infinite number of folds to really reach them. Part of materialism, 
then, is celebrating the uniqueness of the other, (xii) 
 
The implication here is that it is the separation of not-touching entailed by “an 
infinitude number of folds” that renders the other “unfathomable”; were one to somehow 
traverse that infinite continuity of skin and make contact with or touch the other, the 
other’s “unfathomability” would diminish as its difference (one may even conceivably 
substitute “distance”) was collapsed in the moment of contact or comprehension.  
Not only is this transfer of experience an impossibility, based in the simple fact 
that any attempted reconstitution of the bodily experience had by another is always-
already different, it is presupposed on the same “intuitionism of immediate access to the 
other” for which Derrida critiques Merleau-Ponty in On Touching Jean-Luc Nancy (190). 
23 
                                                
23 Cathy Hong Park offers a useful illustration of the impossibilitiy of accessing this alterity 
eloquently in an essay for Poetry Magazine titled “Against Witness”. Park, who reflects on the work 
of remembering and witness in Paul Celan and Doris Salcedo’s poems, notes: 
The actual presence of I, the viewer, is required to truly apprehend the absence of you, the 
Other…I cannot sit in your chair, eat at your table. I cannot open your dresser and touch your 
shirts that will trigger eidetic memories of a dance or late night walk. The proximity between 
you and me is infinite. (And what kind of proximity do I need to write as witness? Should I 
have experienced the event myself? If I watched the video, can I write about it? Do I have to 
be related to the victim? And what do you mean by relation?) I can never metabolize what 
you went through yet I cannot escape your disquieting sadness, the burden of your solitude. 
How it unfolds even when I leave this space. What has become of you? What could have 
gone through your mind? (_).  
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Derrida accuses Merleau-Ponty of misinterpreting Husserl when Merleau-Ponty 
writes, “The reason why I have evidence of the other man's being-there when I shake his 
hand is that his hand is substituted for my left hand as allowing one to infer the touch of 
the other from simply seeing” (Merleau-Ponty Signs 186, Derrida 190). Derrida, who 
sees Husserl as being particularly insistent on the un-knowability of the other, similarly 
stresses that “It is necessary to watch over the other's alterity: it will always remain 
inaccessible to an originally presentive intuition, an immediate and direct presentation of 
the here,” critiquing the substitutive touch that enables one to “know” the other’s 
experience which underpins Marks’ claims for haptic criticism as well as her formulation 
of skin (Derrida 191).  
In “Animal Voices,” Berssenbrugge takes care to distinguish the Nancian hearing 
she models, associated with the resonance of “vibrations” and “frequencies", from a 
literal – and potentially substitutive – “touching”: “Days begin to skew slightly; we open 
to accident, though touching an animal differs from feeling vibrations of its spirit or 
thinking of it” (Hello, the Roses 3). As the following excerpt shows, Berssenbrugge is 
interested in a kind of “contact” that nevertheless averts the substitutive touch directly on 
the skin of the other, the kind other-accessing touch that Berssenbrugge’s “Honeymoon” 
invokes in order to critique: “The touch of coyote skin would sufficiently turn him into a 
mangy coyote, whereas if an animal dies and decays, he would be present as a scavenger” 
(Empathy 71). 
In “Naturalism”, Berssenbrugge’s speaker invokes the touch of the hand as a 
metaphor for the reconnoitering of the speaker’s surroundings, a move which once again 
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plays with the dual notions of “feeling” as externally oriented sensory intake and 
“feeling” as psychological, affective interiority. The physical extension of the hands 
outwards becomes a way of accounting for both the otherness of the environment even as 
it hearkens back towards “personal experience”: 
A feeling moves like a hand across the blue and white mountain range in bright 
sun, after/a plain of little white clouds breaks up. The agitation of personal 
experience was thought to becloud its intellectual content, when the mode of an 
act could be taken care of simply by the demands of the feeling-at-hand’s effort to 
unify the meaning of discontinuous affections, formally allusive to plains for 
unity… (38) 
 
Berssenbrugge sets up an interesting parallel between these two prepositions – 
feeling “like a hand” and “feeling-at-hand”. If “feeling” is “like a hand” even as it is 
simultaneously “at hand” then what the poem seeks to draw near to is a kind of imminent 
auto-affection, the hand within reach of itself. Here, the move “to unify the meaning of 
discontinuous affections” again evokes the “resonance” of relational disjunction between 
“the part in common” and “what you mean” in “Dressing Up Our Pets”.  
Similarly, her poem “The Doll” begins: “Discourse on death contains a rhetoric of 
borders. Shape delimits your right of absolute property, existence, tracing your traits as 
the border of what belongs to you” (I Love Artists 88). These lines do not exhort the 
Cartesian limitation of the body as border so much as they present this limitation as 
predicament for the subject:  
You don’t have to touch the border to know how it feels, whether a napkin or a rose petal 
feels softer, the border between you, or the end of her life. 
Compare these in your mind, without locating the border or experiencing death, using a 
subtler sense of contact, subtlety that’s part of a thing. (88) 
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 The poem’s call for a “subtler sense of contact” points towards a different mode 
of relating to the other, one that locates subjectivity at a temporal surface of simultaneity: 
“She fades to the origin of the senses, variations of a person who both inhabits a ghost 
and co-habits with it, temporarily.” (91)  In fact, it is the direct, other-accessing 
substitutive touch itself that reifies this “rhetoric of borders”, as she writes later in the 
poem: “We’re the other for this boundary. It occurs through physical contact, like a part 
detailed as the whole, as if a series of frames were the same as movement.” (90) 
In “Honeymoon”, Berssenbrugge associates this “contact” with an encounter 
between “feeling” (as either “sensing” or “emotion”) and “thought”: 
She is not the name of a person, nor there of a place, but they are connected with 
names. There is a way of traveling by rotating an orientation, while she remains 
within herself. He moves his hand across the shadow, and it tints delicate skin on 
the back of his hand. He has a doll in his mind on which he can predict what she 
will be feeling, as if he would not touch the doll, until her actual feeling would 
make contact with the object of his thought. (Empathy 61) 
 
The significance of touch, thus situated by Berssenbrugge’s movement between thought 
and “feeling”, now becomes easier to identify throughout her poem “Hearing”, 
particularly with respect to the way it defines places and spaces. The poem continues on 
from my earlier reading: “The loved one’s face radiates a secret the lover touches and 
distributes to all the places of a stone, bruised foot, barrier for an insect, dirt occupied by 
its shadow, like a cut ornament.” The “touch” of the lover – not on the “face” of of the 
“loved one” but upon the “secret” it radiates - is echoed in the stone’s various touch-
defined encounters and roles, which themselves are equated to “places” –“bruised foot," 
“barrier for an insect, dirt occupied by its shadow”. This “touch” is “a condition of 
composition”, a prerequisite for the proliferation and fluidity of “possible forms;” it is 
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also a way of extending the haptic experience of intimacy between lover and beloved to 
the relationality between other objects in the world. This kind of touch is invoked once 
more in her poem “Kisses from the Moon”: “My hearing touches limit on all sides, a 
community exposed…“Now, I know better; community’s not meant to protect me; it’s 
exposure to others, a window” (I Love Artists 111).  
Resonance 
For both Nancy and Berssenbrugge, resonance recuperates both the auto-affective 
sensing of touch and sound as the self’s encountering of its own difference (an 
encountering always in the middle of happening and not a static moment of self-
actualization). For Nancy, the following definition of resonance is actually essential to – 
and intimately intertwined with – his theorizing of skin in Corpus: “…skin stretched over 
its own sonorous cavity…is not a ‘figure’ for rhythmic timbre, but it is its very pace, it is 
my body beaten by its sense of body, what we used to call its soul” (44).  
The “contained” hollowness which this description suggests at first read could 
easily be taken for the shell of the Cartesian subject, divested of its kernel of presence. 
While Nancy’s language of containment here (“skin stretched” and “cavity”) does appear 
to suggest a physical modelling which opposes the exterior of the skin to an interiorized 
self, a closer reading of this description, however, reveals that he invokes it in order to 
dispel that very modelling.  
Resonance, then, for Nancy, is the epidermal as “skin-event,” the self-constitution 
through sensing that he perceives as fundamental to the participatory “spacing” out of 
community (15). Nancy re-thinks skin and resonance together – not as discrete enclosure 
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of self, a representative of the body in turn representing the soul’s indwelling, but as 
temporal unfolding – gesturing towards the advent of a body that “opens up and closes at 
the same time”, “in which the noise of its sharing (with itself, with others) resounds,” 
whose absolute opening onto the world “arranges itself and exposes itself with others” 
(Listening 41).  
The scientific definition of resonance in physics is “a sound or vibration 
produced in one object that is caused by the sound or vibration produced in 
another” (Merriam-Webster). Berssenbrugge’s poems invoke – yet do not remain 
confined to – this scientific dimension of “resonance”, repurposing it as a mode capable 
of accounting for the quantification of sensory experience as well the “frequencies” of 
emotions towards the different “system” of the other.  
David Wills explains that “…there exists in scientific terms a type of sensorial 
indistinction, at least between hearing and touch, once it comes down to the molecular 
level. Both are responses to types of force; both are quantifiable by means of the same 
physical parameter that measures force, namely the dyne” (75). While they do not 
specifically invoke the dyne, Berssenbrugge’s poem demonstrate a similar concern with 
the shared scientific qualities of hearing and touch through their references to vibrations 
and frequencies, and which they synthesize into the figure of “resonance”.  
In her interview with Klein, Berssenbrugge reflects:  
 
I try to expand a field by dissolving polarities or dissolving the borders between 
one thing and another. Sometimes I think it’s because I’m from one culture—I 
was born in Beijing—and grew up in another. I’ve tried to feminize scientific 
language, to make continua between emotion and thought, between the concrete 
and abstract. Lately, my interest is in quantum physics and in vibrational energy, 
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where matter can be seen as condensed light. Looking back, I see that all my 
poems are written with an intimate voice that’s also an instrument for dissolving 
borders. 
 
Berssenbrugge expands this figuring of resonance as a theoretically useful mode of 
accounting for the difference (disjunction) between self and other – even between self 
and non-human other or between the non-human others or environment of the natural 
world. In “Glitter”, for example, the incommensurability of “person” and “violet” causes 
“resonance”: “Person and violet with so little in common my voice reveals as a resonance 
of unmanifest identity” (Hello, the Roses 47). In “Green,” the difference is between two 
natural elements – “blue mountain” and “yellow air” – but also evokes “the resonance of 
disjunction”: “I’m interested in the resonance of disjunction, of one thing next to another, 
blue mountain at sunset and yellow air” (45).  
This “resonance of disjunction” is associated with an auto-affective touching in 
“Dressing Up Our Pets,” In her poem “Dressing Up Our Pets”, in which the speaker 
analogizes relationality to the experience of self-touch: “So, you think his song caused 
your sad feeling, like your hand touching your hand” (104), and again, “If I stay here and 
you mean something, the part in common is disjunct from what you mean, like my hands 
touching.” (105) The “part in common”, presumably referring to some kind of overlap 
between the presence of the “I” and the communication meant by the “you,” is 
immediately contrasted to a “[disjunction]” between “the part in common” and “what you 
mean.”   
In “Her Calendar,” Berssenbrugge echoes this association of emotional, intimate 
“feeling” and the physical act of sensing by way of resonance: “Here on the mesa, feeling 
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became a resonating frequency in my body waking me at night, as if through a series of 
vibrating lenses.” (65) “Glitter” continues to flesh out the role of “vibration” in 
structuring relationality: “What you call feeling, like connective tissue or vibrating lines 
between us, represents this vitality./And I prefer the term vitality to time.” (50) Her poem 
“Slow Down, Now” is even more explicit about the link between vibrations/frequencies 
and encounters with others: “When my fluctuating electromagnetic field touches that of 
another person, plant or entity, emotion is my perception of data encoded in that field”, 
and again, “High frequency animal noise is presence; discontinuity of hearing and future 
alternates across gaps as variations in cone purples formerly thought of as gradual from 
tadpole or imago” (54, 39). Resonance, in Berssenbrugge’s ec(h)opoetics, makes the 
“presence” of the world as other and “discontinuity” compatible.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In my previous chapter, I suggested that Hong and Yau’s use of animal and 
robotic/cyborg voices indict the use of normative speech as an exclusive signifier of the 
human, particularly with regard to the racialization of the Asiatic body. This chapter 
extends and reconfigures the previous chapter’s interest in othering and the non-human 
by interrogating the alignment of surface with body as exterior, in which the body 
functions as a border containing the human “subject” as soul and separating it from an 
environment of others (which, Berssenbrugge’s poems insist, includes self and 
environment as other).  
By rethinking touch and hearing as moments of resonant encounters in which the 
self is constituted, Berssenbrugge rejects the privileged perspective of the human, 
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opening the lyric “I” of her poems onto other and environment. I argue that 
Berssenbrugge’s performance of an ecopoetic subjectivity in her poems opens up the 
possibility of deconstructing a Cartesian bodily paradigm by manifesting an alterity that 
can account for – and preserve – radical otherness, human and otherwise. This irresolute 
aporia between a human interiority and an environmental exteriority has significant 
implications for theories of alterity when the body is understood as being precisely the 
“closed unity structurally open to the environment” that Skinner describes. My use of the 
term “ec(h)opoetics” to apply to Berssenbrugge’s work is meant to denote the way her 
poems vacillate between a thematic ecopoetics and a theoretical and formal echopoetics, 
embodying a resonance that de-interiorizes the subjects represented in their poems and 
delimits the body as boundary between human and nature, the ultimate other. This 
recuperation of the ultimate otherness of the natural world offers us a reworking of 
alterity, one that has significant stakes for and beyond the theorizing of racial difference. 
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CHAPTER 4 – AMBIENCE AND THE AUNT: MUZAK, SIMULATING 
ASSIMILATION AND THEORIZING THE TV IN TAN LIN’S INSOMNIA AND 
THE AUNT 
 
In this chapter I explore how an understanding of ambient music’s aims can help 
us read Lin’s Insomnia and the Aunt. I attempt to show how the mediating form of the 
TV screen brings the visual stakes of racial othering to the fore and reveals the 
characters’ assimilation into an “Americanness” as a kind of hyperreal simulation. 
Finally, I suggest that boredom, distraction, and relaxation are not only modes of 
encountering the reproduced links of identity and kinship through the TV but are 
themselves the very manifestations of an ambient racial melancholia, one which Lin’s 
poetics reworks not so much by grappling with “lost” ideals of whiteness but by feigning 
an “authenticity” that he tempts the reader towards even as he exposes it as overtly 
“fake”.  
History and Definitions of Ambient Music 
In the early 1920’s, George Owen Squier found a way to transmit music over 
electrical lines. He received several patents for his discoveries in 1934 and officially 
founded the company Muzak, which provided background music to spaces in commercial 
business, such as waiting areas for doctor’s offices, various means of transit, factories, 
and retail stores,. Initially, Muzak sourced its offerings by commissioning original 
recordings from the top artists of the decade. With the company’s acquisition by Warner 
Brothers in 1937, however, came a different strategy. Under Warner Brothers, Muzak 
began implementing a technique called “Stimulus Progression” in its curation and 
modification of its music. “Stimulus Progression” took an overtly functional approach 
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towards structuring its music, recording with its own orchestra so as to control the 
instrumentation and rhythm and strategically alternating the music with silence in order 
to reduce listener fatigue. These manipulations were meant to achieve particular desired 
effects on its listeners, whether that was one of “relaxation” or “productivity”. However, 
these manipulations were not meant to draw attention to themselves. As an employee of 
Muzak noted, “If a song grabs your attention or in any way offends – for example ‘Jesus 
Christ Superstar’ – we are not doing our job. We want people to hear but not to listen” 
(Murphy 1). “A popular tune is selected – say the theme for ‘The Godfather’ – rewritten 
to Muzak’s specifications, filtering out highs and lows or anything that might catch 
people’s attention, and recorded in studios in Los Angeles, New York and Germany. The 
bland, middle of the road (M-O-R) music, which is jazzy but not jazz, and which tamely 
rocks but is not rock, is somewhere to the right of Andy Williams – the king of M-O-R” 
(1). 
 Muzak retained its popularity through the 1960’s, becoming so famous for its 
product that its company brand name, like others such as the “Band-Aid,” “Kleenex,” and 
“White-Out”, became the catch-all name that referred to all like products, such as 
“elevator music” (which, somewhat ironically, Muzak never produced). For a company 
whose music was meant to be as unobtrusive as possible, however, it certainly raised its 
fair share of public suspicion, particularly with regard to its claim of sending 
subconscious messages, which led to accusations of “brainwashing”. An 1974 newspaper 
article in the Milwaukee Journal titled “Muzak makers hope you don’t hear the 
manipulating” provides the following quote from Bob Willard, Muzak’s marketing vice 
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president: “So on Friday we play tunes to slow people down because they are wound up. 
On Mondays we want to pick them up because they are down. We are playing games 
with people. That’s really what we are doing. I hate to use the expression, but we are 
human engineers. Gee that wouldn’t look good in print” (Murphy 1). 
 Eventually, however, it could be argued that people found its canned, bland 
quality even more objectionable than any charges of brainwashing. Rocker Ted Nugent 
went so far as to make a public $10 million bid in 1986 to purchase Muzak so he could 
shut it down. Beyond individual musicians’ disdain for Muzak, the company suffered a 
decline in the general popularity of its services over the course of the 1970’s, a decline 
that was reflected in its increasing debt and lagging sales, culminating in its filing for 
bankruptcy in 2009. (The company has since been acquired by Mood Media in 2011.)  
Even as Muzak had already ascended past popularity and was falling out of fashion, 
however, composer and theorist Brian Eno was repurposing its functionality in a different 
way. Eno, while not technically its pioneer, is arguably the most prominent ambient 
music visionary to date.24 Eno first began exploring ambient music after an accident left 
him bedridden and unable to get out of bed to change the volume of a harp piece that was 
playing in his hospital room25. The following liner notes from Eno’s Music for Airports, 
which I have reproduced, show his attempts to distinguish his work from Muzak:  
The concept of music designed specifically as a background feature in the 
environment was pioneered by Muzak Inc. in the fifties, and has since come to be 
known generically by the term Muzak. The connotations that this term carries are 
                                                
24 While “ambient music” did not originate with Eno – he was preceded by other groups like Popol 
Vuh – his work on ambience is most widely known, quite likely as a result of the broad range of 
musical genres and pop groups he has had contact with as a producer. (cite) 
25 (http://pitchfork.com/reviews/albums/11731-discreet-musicambient-1-music-for-airportsambient-2-
the-plateaux-of-mirror-with-harold-buddambient-4-on-land/) 
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those particularly associated with the kind of material that Muzak Inc. produces - 
familiar tunes arranged and orchestrated in a lightweight and derivative manner. 
Understandably, this has led most discerning listeners (and most composers) to 
dismiss entirely the concept of environmental music as an idea worthy of 
attention. 
 
Over the past three years, I have become interested in the use of music as ambience, and 
have come to believe that it is possible to produce material that can be used thus without 
being in any way compromised. To create a distinction between my own experiments in 
this area and the products of the various purveyors of canned music, I have begun using 
the term Ambient Music. (n.p.) 
Though Muzak was created with more commercial aspirations in mind while Eno 
took a more avant-garde approach to his experiments, both Muzak and Eno’s definitions 
of “ambient music” are predicated on the same particular understanding of “ambience”. 
As Thomas Rickert notes, ambience derives from the Latin ambientem, the present 
participle of the verb ambire, and in its most common usage, refers to “what is lying 
around, surrounding, encircling, encompassing, or environing” (5). Eno echoes this 
general definition of “ambience” when he writes:  
An ambience is defined as an atmosphere, or a surrounding influence: a tint. My 
intention is to produce original pieces ostensibly (but not exclusively) for 
particular times and situations with a view to building up a small but versatile 
catalogue of environmental music suited to a wide variety of moods and 
atmospheres.  
 
Whereas the extant canned music companies proceed from the basis of 
regularizing environments by blanketing their acoustic and atmospheric 
idiosyncracies, Ambient Music is intended to enhance these. Whereas 
conventional background music is produced by stripping away all sense of doubt 
and uncertainty (and thus all genuine interest) from the music, Ambient Music 
retains these qualities. And whereas their intention is to `brighten' the 
environment by adding stimulus to it (thus supposedly alleviating the tedium of 
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routine tasks and levelling out the natural ups and downs of the body rhythms) 
Ambient Music is intended to induce calm and a space to think. 
 
For all his efforts to distinguish his own work from Muzak, Eno’s injunctions here place 
it quite firmly in the same camp: “Ambient Music must be able to accommodate many 
levels of listening attention without enforcing one in particular; it must be as ignorable as 
it is interesting.”26 
In this sense, “ambient music” fundamentally involves a mediation of the 
relationship between environment/space/architecture (one could say “background,” or 
“context” per Morton’s description) and some activity, text, or subject that might 
otherwise occupy a more conventional “foreground”. Both “ambient music” and Lin’s 
“ambient poetics” appear to share the term’s first definition in that they both aim to 
efface perceptual distinctions between background and foreground. Like ambient music, 
Lin’s poetics, constructed out of the elaboration of the relaxation formats like the TV, 
                                                
 Even as Eno attempts to explain how his own work is distinct from Muzak, his work inadvertently 
nods to it via its own association with the work of Erik Satie, who experimented earlier with aurally 
mediating spaces of social activity. In a way, Muzak was the more overtly consumeristic 
manifestation of ideas about functional, regulatory music that the American and French avant-garde 
had already been exploring for a few decades. Satie’s coining of the term “furniture music” (musique 
d’ameublement) predates Muzak by thirty or forty years. Satie composed five short pieces to which he 
applied this title, with each piece’s title specifying a particular room, purpose, and occasion for its 
performance;Tapestry in forged iron - for the arrival of the guests (grand reception) - to be played in a 
vestibule - Movement: Very rich). The composer wrote of his ambitions to create 
a music which is like furniture – a music, that is, which will be part of the noises of the 
environment, will take them into consideration. I think of it as melodious, softening the noises of the 
knives and forks at dinner, not dominating them, not imposing itself. It would fill up those heavy 
silences that sometimes fall between friends dining together. It would spare them the trouble of paying 
attention to their own banal remarks. And at the same time it would neutralize the street noises which 
so indiscreetly enter into the play of conversation. To make such music would be to respond to a need. 
 
Given this description, Satie’s work could very well be found guilty of Eno’s charge against Muzak of 
“blanketing [environments’] acoustic and atmospheric idiosyncracies”; a charge which actually is not 
necessarily negative and that somewhat redoubles back onto Eno’s own work. Like Muzak, Satie’s 
“furniture music” does not seek to “dominate” or “impose” but seeks to be “[heard] but not [listened 
to]”. 
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Internet, and book, creates an ambient reading environment, in which the foregrounded 
individual personhood of first person experience (the aunt) is dissolved by her equation to 
her surroundings (“a place called Concrete”). 
In an interview with Chris Alexander, Kristen Gallagher, and Gordon Tapper, Lin 
outlines some of his ambitions for HEATH/plagiarism/outsource, a text which recreates 
within itself some digital forms of the Web, as does Insomnia and the Aunt. Though 
these texts could certainly be classified as experimental in its play across multiple genres, 
Lin distances his work from an aesthetics of “shock” that characterizes another strain of 
the avant-garde:  
Here I would say that the project is about a softer, ambient avant-garde that works 
against radical disjuncture or the montage/shock effect, and perhaps the most 
shocking effect is that of the author (in relation to his/her own or somebody else’s 
textual material). These effects seem dated to a specific period of the historical 
avant-garde or the neo avant-garde, and I wanted to question some of these 
assumptions with work that might be relaxing, boring, absorptive, sampled freely 
and without effort, easy, etc. This kind of textual material is appealing for reasons 
specific to particular text production and distribution formats. In other words, I 
didn’t want this to be avant-garde, I wanted YOU or me or her to read it like web 
surfing, or a mash up or something we do all day long, or like Pepys’ Diary. (n.p.) 
 
Lin identifies a kind of intensity that acts as a formal convention/marker of a particular 
avant-garde in order to turn away from it and emphasizes instead the “relaxing, boring, 
absorptive, sampled freely and without effort, easy, etc.” Collectively, they suggest a 
kind of reading practice that embodies the antithesis of “difficulty”, one which would suit 
the reading of “a piece of low-level durational energy,” as Lin has characterized his 
Seven Controlled Vocabularies (7CV). Lin’s grouping of these terms, which are not 
necessarily interchangeable with each other, explicitly suggests a relation between 
“relaxation” and “boredom” as characteristics of an ambient stylistics, one whose ability 
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to be “sampled freely and without effort” once again counters the notion of authenticity, 
here with regard to authorship in particular.  
The search engine queries of Insomnia and the Aunt, which appear as footnotes in 
oblique relation to the musings on television in the “main” text, could be thought to 
model such a reading practice, exploring how Lin uses keywords, as well as linguistic 
lacunae like ellipses and elisions, to comment on the link between aura, affect, and the 
reproducibility of performance entailed by television. This second reading, aligned with 
Jerome McGann’s notion of texts as “autopoietic mechanisms operating as self-
generating feedback systems that cannot be separated from those who manipulate and use 
them," not only suggests a cyborgian reconceptualization of subjectivity (in which the 
human and the tool cease to be distinguished from one another) but raises the question of 
what changes in reader perception if/when television and its interface ceases to be 
thought exclusively as medium and becomes thought also as genre (15). What follows, 
then, is a reading of the interface of Insomnia and the Aunt as a televisual text whose 
ambience has the effect of inducing either boredom, the uneasy discomfort of a soporific 
“relaxation,” or a distracted conscription into the unquestioning acceptance of 
commercialized taste (as Adorno feared). 
However, there is another, less well-known definition of ambience, one which I 
suggest is not incompatible with what Muzak and Eno take it to be:  
Audio. The acoustic quality of a particular environment, as reproduced in a 
recording; spec. a sense of some specific or individual atmosphere, esp. an 
impression of live performance, created or enhanced by recording techniques 
(such as added reverberation), or by the presence of background noise. (OED) 
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The common ground between this more obscure definition of ambience and the 
former, more well-known one may not be immediately evident. However, considering 
this “impression” or “illusion” of liveness conveyed through sound raises the question: 
what is it about “background noise” that gives the “sense” of liveness? The “authenticity” 
which these sounds artificially lend to a recording come from these sounds’ 
unexpectedness, their ability to signal their seeming unintentionality. In other words, a 
recording sounds “live” if there are sounds in it that the listener does not categorize 
within the anticipated surroundings and that exceed the auditory parameters of the 
performed work.  
Unlike Eno’s manifesto on “Ambient Music”, Lin’s essay titled “Ambient 
Stylistics” does not explicitly lay out a definition of what an “ambient stylistics” is, or 
what it hopes to accomplish; however, it recounts a narrative that I suggest can be 
understood as “ambient” in both the previously mentioned definitions, in that it both 
conveys a setting/mood and presents seemingly extraneous information that contributes 
to its sense of “liveness” or authenticity. The essay details the journey and personal 
musings of a narrator, who, like the narrator of Insomnia and the Aunt, goes out west to 
visit an aunt (half-Chinese in “Ambient Stylistics” and Chinese in Insomnia), who owns a 
motel. In the middle of describing the operations of the aunt’s motel, the narrator 
interjects an account of a romantic relationship with a woman who speaks multiple 
languages, but who “could lie best in English, because it was not her favorite language 
and was most free in it but when she was in bed with someone she preferred to make the 
sounds of endearment and physical longing in Chinese”. This account of the (ultimately 
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severed) relationship itself becomes interlaced with recollections of the narrator’s father, 
and ultimately concludes with a return to the logistics of the aunt’s motel (“Everybody 
needs to lie to someone. As I was saying, the rooms at the Big Bear Park rent for $37 a 
night.”). 
Like John Yau and Marilyn Chin, Lin is interested in destabilizing this notion of 
“authenticity” and calling essentialist constructions of identity into question. In “Ambient 
Stylistics,” Lin does this by overlaying the concept of “lying” onto itself, such that the 
reader is forced to contend with the question of whether lying about lying constitutes 
telling the truth, and whether lying about lying about lying is the real lie. “One night I 
remember she had told me she was a virgin. I knew she was not really lying because she 
was lying to me in my favorite language, which is English because it is the only one that I 
really possess as a language to imagine things in, and because I have always thought that 
she is probably one of those persons that can only lie well over the phone. I continue to 
believe to this day that she was a terrible liar in person, although I am probably lying to 
myself…” This constant switchback frames this personal narrative and its poignant 
depictions of an interlingual mediation of love and kinship, silhouetting a very real affect 
against the backdrop of a very likely made-up personal narrative.  
In this other sense of “ambient”, Insomnia and the Aunt gives off an illusion of 
“liveness,” an illusion which is honest about its imitative qualities (“liveness” being, in 
Lin’s aesthetics, the extraneous details that give a recounted story the quality of an 
authentic memory/actual experience having happened to the individual narrator).  
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This liveness – which I suggest parallels the notion of a narrative “original 
version” of events, in which present temporality authenticates individual experience –  is 
called into question by Lin’s presentation of Asian American identity in Insomnia and the 
Aunt as a kind of “hyperreality”, one which elicits an unconventional racial melancholia 
from the narrator and his aunt.  
Racial Melancholia in Insomnia and the Aunt  
 
Freud’s well-known Mourning and Melancholia describes the origin-process of 
melancholia as the malfunctioning of a subject’s attachment to another person as object: 
An object-choice, an attachment of the libido to a particular person, had at one time 
existed; then, owing to a real slight or disappointment coming from this loved person, the 
object-relationship was shattered. The result was not the normal one of a withdrawal of 
the libido from this object and a displacement of it on to a new one, but something 
different, for whose coming-about various conditions seem to be necessary. (248-249) 
In The Melancholy of Race, Anne Anlin Cheng maps this object-relationship onto 
the relationship between a white America and its racial others. Cheng writes:   
On the one side, white American identity and its authority is secured through the 
melancholic introjection of racial others that it can neither fully relinquish nor 
accommodate and whose ghostly presence nonetheless guarantees its centrality. 
On the other side, the racial other (the so-called melancholic object) also suffers 
from racial melancholia whereby his or her racial identity is imaginatively 
reinforced through the introjection of a lost, never- possible perfection, an 
inarticulable loss that comes to inform the individual's sense of his or her own 
subjectivity. (xi) 
 
Freud’s theorizing of the object-relationship, however, can also be mapped on to the 
relationship between the racial other and a particular ideal of self. In their study of Asian 
American identity and melancholia, David Eng and Shinhee Han write:  
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Melancholia describes an unresolved process…to describe the unstable 
immigration and suspended assimilation of Asian Americans into the national 
fabric. This suspended assimilation…suggests that, for Asian Americans, ideals of 
whiteness are continually estranged.  They remain at an unattainable distance, at 
once compelling fantasy and a lost ideal. (A Dialogue on Racial Melancholia 345) 
 
However, Insomnia and the Aunt, I suggest, takes a different estranged ideal as its 
object: a “hyperreal” signifying of Asian American identity that grapples with the 
incommensurability between the performance of a “false” or “borrowed” identity and a 
sense of “authenticity” that its performers know does not exist. Furthermore, the terms of 
this “loss” are complicated in Insomnia and the Aunt because the text destabilizes the 
“authenticity” in such a way that the loss of this performed fake “identity” appears to 
always be “not one’s own”.  
Freud writes: 
The distinguishing mental features of melancholia are a profoundly painful 
dejection, cessation of interest in the outside world, loss of the capacity to love, 
inhibition of all activity, and a lowering of the self-regarding feelings to a degree 
that finds utterance in self-reproaches and self-revilings, and culminates in a 
delusional expectation of punishment. (244) 
 
While Freud defines general melancholia as a psychic state of intense grief with extreme 
symptoms, racial melancholia, as Cheng argues, “serves not as a description of the 
feeling of a group of people but as a theoretical model of identity that provides a critical 
framework for analyzing the constitutive role that grief plays in racial/ethnic subject-
formation” (xi). In Insomnia and the Aunt, “boredom,” “relaxation”, and “distraction” are 
not symptomatic of a deeper racial melancholia; rather they are the very effects of routing 
racial difference through the ambient medium of the TV such that canned representations 
of that difference create a kind of “hyperreality”.  
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Here I turn to the following passage by Michael McKeon in Theory of the Novel: 
A Historical Approach on the transmission of storytelling to draw out several aspects of 
Lin’s work. The text, though not by appearances aware of or addressing itself to Insomnia 
and the Aunt, can be read with a double meaning such that it is both a mostly 
straightforward accounting of memory’s relation to storytelling even as it also perfectly 
captures the relationship between “storytelling” as the anti-essentialist “lying” of Lin’s 
essay, “assimilation” as a cause of racial melancholia, and the Internet, the “web in which 
the gift of storytelling is cradled”:  
There is nothing that commends a story to memory more effectively than that 
chaste compactness which precludes psychological analysis. And the more natural 
the process by which the storyteller forgoes psychological shading, the greater 
becomes the story’s claim to a place in the memory of the listener, the more 
completely is it integrated into his own experience, the greater will be his 
inclination to repeat it to someone else someday, sooner or later. This process of 
assimilation, which takes place in depth, requires a state of relaxation which is 
becoming rarer and rarer. If sleep is the apogee of physical relaxation, boredom is 
the apogee of mental relaxation … For storytelling is always the art of repeating 
stories, and this art is lost when the stories are no longer retained. It is lost 
because there is no more weaving and spinning to go on while they are being 
listened to. The more self-forgetful the listener is, the more deeply is what he 
listens to impressed upon his memory. When the rhythm of work has seized him, 
he listens to the tales in such a way that the gift of retelling them comes to him all 
by itself. This, then, is the nature of the web in which the gift of storytelling is 
cradled. This is how today it is becoming unraveled at all its ends after being 
woven thousands of years ago in the ambience of the oldest forms of 
craftsmanship. (82) 
 
Both the actual content of McKeon’s passage, as well as my willful double reading of it, 
are intrinsically relevant to Insomnia and the Aunt’s preoccupations with memory as the 
content of personal experience and the forms of the consumer’s sensory relationship to 
media. At a fundamental level, McKeon’s passage embodies the hyperreality of growing 
up Chinese-American in that it invokes the transmission of stories from one individual’s 
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memory to another. When McKeon writes, “This process of assimilation, which takes 
place in depth, requires a state of relaxation which is becoming rarer and rarer. If sleep is 
the apogee of physical relaxation, boredom is the apogee of mental relaxation,” he means 
the psychological assimilation of a foreign story into one’s own “memory” such that it 
becomes “integrated into one’s own experience”, such that one could be inclined to 
“repeat” one’s own memory of a story that didn’t originate with oneself. This 
understanding of “assimilation” with regard to memory resonates with Insomnia and the 
Aunt’s gestures, however subtle, to the memory of a China and an immigration 
experience that the non-lyric narrator only has ties to through his parents, aunt and 
uncle’s recountings, if only to point out the persistent failure of this assimilation of 
memory to become part of the the narrator’s “own experience”.  
It is, of course, also “assimilation” as the overcoming of both linguistic and 
cultural difference. As the following passage shows, Lin ties these understandings of 
“assimilation” together within the framework of a kinship characterized by an always-
not-yet comprehension:  
As any linguist can tell you, it is possible to read a thing without being able to 
speak it and it is possible to speak a thing without knowing what it is, and this is 
in fact how many people learn their second and third languages, which they 
suddenly hear, as if for the first time, when the meanings to words pronounced for 
hours in a classroom are delivered by a dictionary into an understanding. And this 
is how my aunt’s understanding of her life in America was arrived at, as a delay 
in the speed of an understanding. In my aunt’s case, this delay was a place called 
Concrete. In mine, it was an aunt. (n.p.) 
 
 Relaxation and boredom in Insomnia and the Aunt, as McKeon’s formulation 
helps articulate, signal a self-forgetting that is necessary for acquiring “the gift of 
storytelling”. This “gift of storytelling” entails the repetition of memories that may or 
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may not be “authentic” in that they do not originate with the narrator and may or may not 
be true. Furthermore, it is “cradled in [the web]” of digital and broadcast networks, meta-
forms, which  
…in other words, serve as a kind of informational survival strategy, a way of 
filtering or managing the ‘overload’ of images, sounds and data that make up 
contemporary media cultures. Through these forms, viewers and consumers 
attempt to maintain a sense of control over the burgeoning world of media and 
information culture”. (Rutsky 281)  
 
In the section “Seventh Preface 2003” of Seven Controlled Vocabularies and 
Obituary 2004, Lin remarks,  
Literature should be an elaboration of relaxation formats, sensory deprivation and 
disordered or arbitrary input that has been channeled or reduced to non-stimuli. 
Thus, after relaxation or sensory deprivation is induced the following forms might 
be hallucinated because they are utterly redundant. The brain is the great averager. 
It knows how to program its own boredom. (n.p.) 
 
The immediate thing to note here is the word “should” and the freedom it leaves for Lin’s 
writing to either embody or eschew this post-medium (which is possibly more of a hyper-
multi-medium) kind of non-signifying “input” and yet still make a gesture towards it. The 
second subtlety of Lin’s description where Insomnia and the Aunt is concerned is that “an 
elaboration of relaxation formats” ironically does not necessarily imply “relaxing to 
read”; on the contrary, there’s a way in which Insomnia and the Aunt could be read as 
adhering to the former without at all being relaxing. 
In a Jacket2 article on Lin’s Seven Controlled Vocabularies, Kristen Gallagher 
remarks that 
…the suggestive nature of the content not only plays on our habits of reading but 
consistently tempts us to lapse into those habits…The reader is invited to ‘read’ 
autobiography, to lapse into that comfortable pleasure, but is also given the 
opportunity to begin thinking about the triggers that evoke “autobiography” and 
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why even the most trained readers are so susceptible to its codes. (“Cooking a 
Book”)  
In order to situate this “invitation towards autobiography”, I return again to Morton’s 
essay, in which he posits a redefinition of “personhood”: 
One may pose differently the question of the distinction between person and 
environment: what if people were more like environments? If James Lovelock 
noted that the weather worked like a person (Lovelock 1-12), why not imagine a 
person as being like the weather? In other words, perhaps one might deconstruct 
personhood into ambience, atmosphere, surroundings, dwelling, environment. . . 
This would provide a more appropriate philosophical view (I am reluctant to say 
"ontological foundation") for a deep ecology, an ecology that could assume that a 
politics of the environment must be coterminous with a change in the view of 
those who exist in/as that environment. A poetry that articulated the person as 
environment would not invert anthropocentrism into "ecocentrism," it would 
thoroughly undo the notion of a center.  
 
 It is important here to recount Lin’s (auto)biographies not only because like 
Berssenbrugge, his identity as an Asian American writer is not as frequently discussed, 
but because in a way, these narratives of his life history are intimately tied to the 
hyperreality of a simulated assimilation in his work. Tan Lin was born in Seattle in 1957; 
his mother and father, who immigrated from China, were an English professor and a 
ceramist respectively, and his sister, Maya Lin, would eventually go on to design the 
Vietnam Veterans Memorial. Lin’s work spans a wide array of genres and mediums, 
from Powerpoints like Bibliographic Sound Track to performance pieces like Chalk 
Playground/LitTwitChalk. His texts, in addition to embodying a genre-refusing plurality 
of forms, remain in flux and challenge normative conventions of authorship and reading, 
as his continual revisions of works like Seven Controlled Vocabularies and HEATH 
show. 
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Earlier this year, Lin published a piece in The Brooklyn Rail called “A False 
Accounting”, which functions as part autobiography, part family memoir of sorts. (In true 
keeping with Lin’s commitment to the idea of family as a “sort of an ongoing affair with 
blurry temporal markers”, the piece is categorized under “Fiction”.) The piece proceeds 
backwards in time from the narrator’s experience of sorting through his parents’ 
belongings after their deaths, recounting the way that their family relationships were 
constellated in particular by such interests of his father as used cars and wrestling. One 
passage notes:  
To my father, wrestling was real. To my sister and me, in the 70’s, when we were 
both in our teens, the line between fact and fiction, between adolescence and 
adulthood, or between the real lives of the wrestlers in the ring and the law of 
kayfabe, which is the theatrical portrayal of things in the ring as “real” i.e. not of a 
“worked” nature, was similar to the line between a Chinese family in America 
that watched fake wrestling and a Chinese-American family that did not. In other 
words, the line between faked American wrestling and being Chinese in America 
was ambiguous, just as real adult life was delayed by something faked, which in 
the case of my sister and me was the large, mostly forgotten expanses of a quasi-
Chinese childhood, most of which did not end till after our parents’ deaths. In 
other words, Maya and I had American childhoods that were mostly made up, 
with the help of various documents and photo albums, some of which were also 
made up. 
 
 Lin’s reflections call up Jean Baudrillard’s theorizing of simulacra and the 
hyperreal, in which Baudrillard observes that “The simulacrum is never that which 
conceals the truth--it is the truth which conceals that there is none” (“Simulacra and 
Simulations”). Baudrillard’s claims that “Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a 
referential being or a substance. It is the generation by models of a real without origin or 
reality: a hyperreal” is paralleled in Lin’s figuring of the kitschy theatricality of 
“kayfabe” as a faked production that generates something else “fake” - in this case, 
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“American childhoods” - something “made up” that generates another “made up” 
identity. Baudrillard describes the “hyperreality” that this chain of generative falsehoods 
produces:  
The real is produced from miniaturized units, from matrices, memory banks and 
command models - and with these it can be reproduced an indefinite number of 
times. It no longer has to be rational, since it is no longer measured against some 
ideal or negative instance. It is nothing more than operational. In fact, since it is 
no longer enveloped by an imaginary, it is no longer real at all. It is a hyperreal: 
the product of an irradiating synthesis of combinatory models in a hyperspace 
without atmosphere. 
 
Assimilation for the racialized subjects of Insomnia and the Aunt, I suggest, can 
be thought of as such a hyperreal experience, in which the incommensurability between 
the performance of a “false” or “borrowed” identity and a sense of “authenticity” that one 
knows does not exist leads to a kind of melancholia. At the same time, this melancholia 
in Insomnia and the Aunt manifests itself as boredom, relaxation, and distraction, all of 
which are the ideal effects of ambient music and TV. Peter Toohey points out in 
Melancholy, Love and Time: Boundaries of the Self in Ancient Literature that early Greek 
and Latin terminology for “boredom” is not consistent; however, as he notes, the most 
accurately representative term would be something like alus, or “being other to oneself,” 
“grief-stricken,” “distracted” (106).  
Like McKeon’s pairing of “relaxation” and “boredom”, Toohey’s paratactic 
linking of these three drastically different definitions paints a particular kind racial 
melancholia that pervades the ambient stylistics of Insomnia and the Aunt. In a New York 
Times sampler of her writings, Sontag files the following thoughts under the heading “Art 
is Boring”:  
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People say “it’s boring” — as if that were a final standard of appeal, and no work 
of art had the right to bore us. But most of the interesting art of our time is boring. 
Jasper Johns is boring. Beckett is boring, Robbe-Grillet is boring. Etc. Etc. 
Maybe art has to be boring, now. (This doesn’t mean that boring art is necessarily 
good — obviously.) We should not expect art to entertain or divert anymore. At 
least, not high art. Boredom is a function of attention. We are learning new modes 
of attention — say, favoring the ear more than the eye— but so long as we work 
within the old attention-frame we find X boring … e.g. listening for sense rather 
than sound (being too message-oriented). Possibly after repetition of the same 
single phrase or level of language or image for a long while — in a given written 
text or piece of music or film, if we become bored, we should ask if we are 
operating in the right frame of attention. Or — maybe we are operating 
in one right frame, where we should be operating in two simultaneously, thus 
halving the load on each (as sense and sound). 
 
Sontag’s characterization of boredom as a mode of reception dovetails with other 
scholars’ characterizations of ambient music and ambient poetry’s effects. Morton 
delineates three aspects of ambient poetry: it minimizes signification, it involves the 
medium of communication becoming the message, and it involves contact as content 
(“Twinkle Twinkle Little Star”)27. In her move to recuperate “boredom” from its 
vilification, Sontag draws out a few distinctive traits of boredom as a mode of reception: 
it is a “function of attention,” it occurs often in instances of repetition over a long period 
of duration, and it is more prone to happen within one sensory frame of perception. It is a 
difficult move to make, however, and Sontag’s provocative opening claim that “most of 
the interesting art of our time is boring” fails to escape the centrifugal pull of perceiving 
“boredom” as a problem (one which can be solved by attending to multiple sensory 
dimensions) by the end of this short passage.  
                                                
27 Morton arrives at these three qualities of ambient poetry via a reading of “Twinkle, Twinkle Little 
Star” as Romantic lullaby, focusing on illocutionary statements, which as he points out, are context 
specific.  
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 Insomnia and the Aunt recuperates boredom much more completely via its meta-
forms of the TV, Internet, and book than Sontag’s description here does. In an interview 
with Lin, David Foote has remarked of the text that  
Technology serves as a tool for the integration and navigation of family 
relationships in Insomnia and the Aunt. It serves as a way of blocking out chunks 
of time or remembering each other’s company, allowing family members to be 
bored in each other’s company and thus coexist. (“Your Closest Relative is a TV 
Set”) 
 
I posit Erich Fromm’s characterization of boredom from The Pathology of Normalcy 
alongside Foote’s in order to suggest that while the technology of the TV and Internet 
serves as a means of enabling a kind of kinship through “boredom”, that kinship of 
“boredom” is also tied to the melancholia of racial difference, the transmission of 
experiences of racialization: 
I would say that boredom is perhaps the word for a more normal average 
experience, which in pathology would be called depression and melancholia. 
Boredom is the average state of melancholia, whereas melancholia is the 
pathological state of boredom that one finds in certain individuals. (60) 
 
Boredom, as a byproduct of Lin routing the family relationships of Insomnia and the 
Aunt through the medium of the TV, is not only an effect of ambience, it’s a condition of 
connectivity, one which may seem low-stakes, but in fact is the very form of the grief 
over being “other to oneself” that the racialized subject, who is always already made 
aware of its own difference, experiences. In Lin’s aesthetics, boredom, along with the 
ambient effects of distraction and relaxation, undermines the “authenticity” of the 
emotional affect that one might attribute to narratives of the immigrant family, even as 
this affect remains compelling to readers despite its almost fictional nature. In an 
interview with Lin, Katherine Elaine Sanders asks regarding SCV, “While providing a 
 
 
144 
relaxing environment, it also deprives readers of traditional narrative structure, traditional 
form, and other comforts of familiarity, which, in some ways, is uncomfortable. How do 
you reconcile this?” Lin’s response is very telling: “the book, as a modality of software, 
is not about gut-wrenching emotions but minor feelings or moods that are not quite our 
own. This is consonant with a culture of distraction today, but also with modes of 
cognitive or pre-cognitive processing and affective attunement.”  
In another of Lin’s interviews with David Foote, Foote asks, “Does technology 
function to relieve us of the burden of emotion?”, to which Lin replies “No. TV is by 
definition emotive. Anyone who watches TV knows this. We get most of our emotions 
from TV. And we get our families from TV too.”  
Theorizing TV and “Authenticity” 
In his address at the “Vision 65” conference in 1965, Marshall McLuhan 
remarked that  
Since television, the movie form has been reprocessed. The form of movie that 
once was environmental and invisible has been reprocessed into an art form, and, 
indeed, a highly valued art form…The television form has remained quite 
invisible – and will only become visible at the moment that television itself 
becomes the content of a new medium. The next medium, whatever it is – it may 
be the extension of consciousness – will include television as its content, not as its 
environment, and will transform television into an art form. (221)  
 
This remark might be understood in two ways, and it is an aporia between those two 
(non-competing, non-mutually exclusive) interpretations that the genre-refusing plurality 
of Tan Lin’s Insomnia and the Aunt performs.  One might read McLuhan’s take on 
television’s transformation of the movie more literally, as a transitively anticipatory 
prophecy pointing towards the next major technological reframing of these existing 
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mediums through the computer and the Internet. In its play with the mutability of Asian 
American identity, Insomnia and the Aunt engages with the move from one kind of 
screen to another, the move from one form of transmitted reproducibility to another, the 
shift between shifts in the relation of public-private. Exploring this change in the ocular 
paradigm of the screen, particularly as it mediates the “lying” with which the narrator 
gestures towards an “authenticity” of identity which never fully appears or verifies itself, 
might mean approaching the question of interface as the acts of negotiating with the 
boundary-between, the deceptively discrete separation between “reality” and “virtuality.”  
In “The Face and the Public: Race, Secrecy, and Digital Art Practice,” Jennifer 
Gonzalez critiques approaches towards the anonymity of the digital/virtual as potentially 
enabling visions of a post-racial utopia: “If vision and visibility are central to the 
operative dynamics of race, as has been argued by not only Frantz Fanon but many others 
subsequently, then might it be possible to undo the power of race discourse as an 
oppressive regime by decoupling it from vision or the visible? Or, alternately, might it be 
that visual culture is the very place where contemporary race discourse might be most 
powerfully critiqued and transformed?” (38). Though there is a sense in which 
“decoupling [race] from vision or the visual” and making interventions in visual culture 
as a way of critiquing race discourse can actually be productively compatible, Insomnia 
and the Aunt engages the uncomfortable relation of racializing sight and power that 
Gonzalez raises even as it transposes the televisual medium into such a genre which 
performs an “elaboration of relaxation formats.” The double-figuring of eyes as both that 
which sees through at the same time that it is seen through (as screen or window or face) 
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is perhaps a useful way of illustrating the rubrics (or shibboleths, or questionnaires) of 
belonging that “lying” and “authenticity” construct in Insomnia and the Aunt.   
The narrator’s observation that “It is impossible to lie to a computer that’s turned 
off. A blank computer screen can still remind us of a face,” not only evokes the 
Orientalist stereotype of the inscrutable other (problematizing the presumed immediacies 
of looking and knowing) but also Levinas’ hexis of (sur/inter)faces, an exterior-oriented 
ethical obligation structuring one’s relation to the racialized other. Insomnia and the Aunt 
links the affect of the geneaological/kinship ties which shape Asian immigrant identity 
(and which are thought to shape Asian American identity) to the work of the screen 
divested of the aura of live performance, using the aunt’s preference for the temporal 
disjuncture of the “canned” to problematize the immediacies of looking upon the face of 
(and thereby knowing) the other.  
Indeed, the contrast between the screen as the frame through which faces 
encounter each other at a distance (or, when thought opaquely, which stands in as a 
metonym for the surface of the incomprehensible other, the surface of racialized 
difference which refuses to be understood  and thus projected into) – and the screen as the 
locus of what appears to be a neutral, bored escape into a relaxing distraction comprised 
of name-brandism and  an always-already of non-live performance (which is also in its 
temporal inauthenticity a kind of death) can be highly jarring for the way it engages 
questions of identity.  
Insomnia and the Aunt opens with a gesture towards an “authenticity” of 
Americanness that is more like a pointing to an empty place whose emptiness is 
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predicated on the framing of its history of exclusions. The narrator notes “From a 
genealogical perspective, my aunt and uncle started their lives in America with a Chinese 
restaurant in Spokane and later in Seattle,” an observation which lays claims to being 
“about” genealogy or lines of descent, but which is more about an attempted migration 
away from an assimilation, initiated at the moment of commodifying one’s difference by 
offering it up for consumption (in the case of the aunt and uncle, literally with “Ming’s 
Garden”). The decision to close the restaurant and go “east, into the wilderness” is cast 
by the logic linking “but” and “so” (“but they got tired of serving people American 
Chinese food, so in the early 80s they decided to close the restaurant down and travel 
east, into the wilderness”) as a reversion of the pioneer impulse to go “west”, one whose 
“manifest destiny” takes the illusion of some pristine originary “authenticity” as its 
frontier (and which is perhaps ironized by “a place near North Cascades National Park” 
being called “Concrete”).  
This ironic locating, this tensi on of something which doesn't "belong" in the 
frame silhouettes the face of the aunt "wearing a white cowboy hat and dark sunglasses 
that seem out of place in the wilderness" in the photograph that "[signals] the sort of 
disruption or lie that I associate with Asians in the movies or in Ohio where I grew up, or 
Asians in fast food restaurants." The narrator’s observation that “lying is the most sincere 
way of expressing oneself, and the best way anyone has of connecting one thing to 
another” parodically connects straightforward self-disclosure to the non-straightforward, 
non-obvious act of connecting itself, a misequation of the two via “lying” which is itself a 
kind of lie. The matter of fact way in which Insomnia and the Aunt announces a “Part II” 
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about halfway into Insomnia and the Aunt – without having announced a “Part I” – is this 
kind of satirizing which would take advantage of the reader’s failure to do a double-take, 
mocking the way in which the apparently normal/sensible is unquestioningly accepted in 
the very state of distraction represented by the TV (and which the text tempts the reader 
into).  
In Section XV of “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” 
Walter Benjamin suggests that distraction is a mode of reception.  
Distraction and concentration form polar opposites which may be stated as 
follows: A man who concentrates before a work of art is absorbed by it. He enters 
into this work of art the way legend tells of the Chinese painter when he viewed 
his finished painting. In contrast, the distracted mass absorbs the work of art…. 
 
Reception in a state of distraction, which is increasing noticeably in all fields of 
art and is symptomatic of profound changes in apperception, finds in the film its 
true means of exercise. The film with its shock effect meets this mode of 
reception halfway. The film makes the cult value recede into the background not 
only by putting the public in the position of the critic, but also by the fact that at 
the movies this position requires no attention. The public is an examiner, but an 
absent-minded one. 
 
Benjamin’s claims about distraction as a mode of reception are founded on his notion that 
films have a kind of “shock effect” from the zerstückelt, or tearing apart, of cinematic 
images that the spectators might otherwise associate (285). Benjamin argues that the 
disjunctive, shocking visuality of the film is what actually distracts its viewers and allows 
them to absorb the film (instead of being absorbed by it they way the concentrated viewer 
of a painting might be). 
Jennifer Scappettone remarks that Lin “translates many of “Dub’s” diffusing aims 
into a book form highly aware of its own material seam, even as it seeks to exceed its 
own status as static, temporally suspended inscription by marking off sporadically the 
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presumable period of time that each section would take to register” (72). While she bases 
her readings of Lin’s poetics mostly off texts like BlipSoak01, Seven Controlled 
Vocabularies and Obituary and more overtly multimedia works like “Dub Version .V01” 
and his “ambientreading.blogspot.com” project. However, her observations apply just as 
aptly to Insomnia and the Aunt. Scappetone notes that “[T]he surface of the ambient 
poem you are gazing towards is highly distracting, filled with imprecisions, typos and 
forms of the hypnotic, which function backwards, just as boredom itself does” (Blipsoak 
01 recto text 11)   “The surface obliges reading to flicker, sending eyes skittishly back 
and forth, as if they were engaged as sweepers in search of refuse to eradicate” (73-74). 
In the same way, TV within Insomnia and the Aunt obliges viewing to flicker with a 
discontinuous, broken gaze, even as the finger flickers across the material book itself, 
turning its pages.  
The unease is effected by contrasts and heightened by the interface of race (the 
TV screen made visible by the computer screen, the pages on which Lin’s search-
framings create a textual window which is not only the glass window of the motel 
through which the aunt views but also Dubois' veil of double consciousness); the all-
American “white cowboy hat” contrasts sharply with the inscrutability of the “dark 
glasses,” the “blank” screen whose opacity – or absence of expressed affect – the narrator 
registers in the observation that “there was never the slightest bit of emotion on [the 
aunt’s] face when she told me this story.” This absence of expressed affect is also the 
refusal to let the seer see that the seen is also seeing the seer: “I have watched hundreds 
of movies with Asians and fake Asians in them, and the one thing that makes them all the 
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same (except the white Asians) is that the Asians never stare into your eyes through the 
glass of a TV screen and you are never allowed to look too deeply into theirs.” The 
reciprocity of gazing, then, is vexed here as the litmus test of “authenticity” whose only – 
but striking – critique of yellowface performances is that they don’t adhere to the reality 
of the stereotype because they pass too easily through the opaque screen, the barrier 
between the contact of gazes.  
This reciprocity of gazing is also complicated by Lin’s blurring of the temporal 
disjuncture which supposedly distinguishes the present liveness of gazing – a kind of 
performance – from the “deadness” of the past, the pre-recorded and the re-played, the 
always-already quality of the TV material which the narrator and the aunt prefer. The 
narrator makes the association of “death” and the recorded explicit with the observation 
that “[for the aunt]…”running a motel was a ritual enhanced by television…In retrospect, 
I now realize it was the re-run of something inessential in a life, or a death inside a life” 
even as the same statement destabilizes that simple correlation by opening up space 
within the present temporality associated with “life” into which the “dead” time of the re-
run can be brought. 
The illusion of the screen as barrier which Lin sets up is the illusion that these 
temporalities’ appearing to blur into each other is merely a coincidental quality of the 
TV, when in fact the kind of “fake-time” that Lin creates by artificially opposing the live 
and the canned also acts as a clever means of complicating the ease of distinguishing 
between the family’s “authentic” and “fake” experiences of what is meant to be some 
kind of Asian American identity, “rehearsed once in real life and once on television, or, 
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in other words, once in somebody else’s life and once in [theirs].” As the narrator 
observes,  
Whenever I visit during the next decade, my aunt will perform the same actions, 
with the same deliberate energy I associate with following a recipe one knows 
very well or watching re-runs on TV. She will cry in exactly the same manner, in 
front of the neon NO VACANCY sign in the window, with the same 
uncontrollable wailing and tears and half-Chinese words I do not understand. 
None of this I can hear very well through the glass.28  
 
The result of the “fake-time” temporality of watching TV that Lin constructs is that the 
aunt’s performance of affect – her mourning of the gap between the experiences in 
“somebody else’s life” and her own family’s a supposedly uncontrollable exemplar of 
“liveness” – becomes reproducible and controllable with a mechanical exactitude that 
parallels the predictability of always already being othered by others’ racializing gazes, 
the narrator’s parents invited to tour apartments over phone calls and turned away “when 
[they]…got out of their car.” The aunt’s “deliberate” re-playing of her performance of 
mourning not only evokes the repetitive familiarizing with loss of Freud’s “fort-da!” but 
                                                
o 28 The narrator’s seemingly offhand comment that “None of this I can hear very well through the 
glass” may seem a turn away from the very play with epistemologies of seeing, racialization, and 
identity which Insomnia and the Aunt performs. And yet it is crucial in a work like Lin’s to open 
up space – however speculatively – for other registers of knowing, other kinds of orientation of 
identity besides the eye-determined “inter-face” and to take note of the narrator’s awareness of 
only being able to see, and not being able to “hear very well through the glass,” particularly given 
the sounds of incomprehensible difference – “uncontrollable wailing and tears and half-Chinese 
words which I do not understand” with which the aunt forgets the very “ideal of whiteness” she 
mourns. Might it be then that the glass of the TV screen or motel window also provides the false 
illusion of comprehending the other with auditory clarity on the other side, of transparently 
hearing the muffled sounds of canned difference? If this illusion – this “lying” which “is the most 
sincere way of expressing oneself” – is “best expressed with the eyes, whose motions are 
perceived to be distinct from the somaform and somatic expressions,” it is perhaps also the irony 
that “no one really hears you when you talk on TV. That is why it is easy to lie on TV, because it 
is just like real life” which suspends the critical act of listening to Insomnia and the Aunt’s 
register of televised noise at the level of discerning a faint but indistinct audibility of identity.  
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also the melancholic, permanent “delay in an understanding” that the narrator attributes 
to the aunt.  
And yet the narrator noting later that “the repetition of my aunt’s tears meant 
something completely different ten years after it first happened” does not necessarily 
entail the resolution of this melancholia, nor the implication that the aunt has in some 
way gotten over the loss of this “ideal.” Rather, Lin ironizes the loss which the aunt’s 
repetitive mourning is meant to be in service of, emptying “ideals of whiteness” of its 
“compelling fantasy” with the narrator’s observation that  
For an immigrant like my aunt, America is not the images on a TV, it basically is 
the TV…my aunt thinks all TV, even live TV, is canned…For my aunt, the live 
broadcast of the Vietnam War of my youth and her early middle ages resembled a 
re-run. My aunt accordingly has very few memories of violence or even racism in 
America. TV has made her forget all these things. 
 
The irony of “accordingly” here is that the “violence or even racism” represented on TV 
is effaced from the aunt’s memory by its very representation and repetition through the 
medium; accordingly, one might also surmise the more the aunt re-runs her performance 
of mourning, the less the narrator who watches her through the screen recalls what it is 
that is being represented and repeated.  The transformation of what the aunt’s repetition 
of tears to “[mean] something completely different ten years after it first happened” may 
not so much be one of cathartic resolution realized through mourning as one of 
desensitization and forgetting what exactly the unattainable ideal to be mourned was.      
Links and Mediums 
McLuhan’s most well-known phrase “the medium is the message” is an attempt to 
undo the opposition between form and content by subsuming the latter under the former 
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(McLuhan argued that it didn’t matter so much what was transmitted over the TV, simply 
that the TV was on) (8). In his next most well-known formulation –the distinction 
between “hot” and “cool” media – McLuhan frames the input/output flow particular to 
the TV as an interactive exchange between the sensory data provided by the interface of a 
medium and user perception:  
There is a basic principle that distinguishes a hot medium like radio from a cool 
one like the telephone, or a hot medium like the movie from a cool one like TV. A 
hot medium is one that extends one single sense in "high definition." High 
definition is the state of being well filled with data…hot media do not leave so 
much to be filled in or completed by the audience. Hot media are, therefore, low 
in participation, and cool media are high in participation or completion by the 
audience. (22) 
 
In this case, the participatory act that McLuhan identifies of the user “filling in” gaps in 
the data provided by the medium’s interface in his classifications of pre-digital media 
(some of which are arguably arbitrary, or implicitly take the criteria of “realism” as their 
standard: the photograph - hot, the cartoon – cool, radio – cool, television – cool) was a 
concept which actually structured the bodily hexes through which people navigated the 
internet; Alan Kay, one of the earliest designers of the computer infrastructure, drew on 
models from theories of constructivist learning and adapted several features of the user 
interface (overlapping windows, pointer, etc) to principles outlined in Charles Peirce’s 
writing on icon/symbol/index. Though McLuhan’s writing predates the web by almost 
thirty years, it wouldn’t be unreasonable to imagine that he might also have classified the 
Internet as a cool medium for its digital interface’s user-manipulated visual parataxis and 
user-directed search functions.   
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In rendering one “cool” medium visible through another, or indexing “the history 
of TV itself [migrating] to the internet,” Insomnia and the Aunt isn’t so much trying to 
literally imitate TV or the Internet (a text like that might have dials, or some structuring 
akin to a search bar) in the exact ways those mediums operate, but to be the same kind of 
medium by reproducing some of the principles of interface which mediate and enable 
visual exchanges to take place through those technologies. Ironically, the text uses its 
own content to convey the impression that it’s not so much the content transmitted but 
the form of the medium which shapes its users, though “the uses of TV are just as 
ambiguous as the people watching it.” Indeed, the narrator muses that “No TV I know is 
capable of ideological domination although it might be capable of clairvoyance or 
bringing back the dead,” a comment that seems to playfully sidestep Adorno’s concern in 
“How to Look at Television” that formulaic television show plots were psychologically 
conditioning in potentially totalitarian ways for a figuring of text as television 
reminiscent of Hannah Weiner’s work (213). Here I take a momentary aside: Michael 
Kerr spells out the connection between television as genre and Weiner’s work explicitly 
when he remarks in a blog post that “If Amiri Baraka’s poem AM/TRAK channels jazz, 
then Hannah Weiner’s Clairvoyant Journal is television. Clairvoyant Journal is a barrage 
of words and images that reminded me of channel surfing on cable—150 channels of 
nothing on. It is the commercials, reality TV programs, late night infomercials, and FOX 
news pundits run through a blender and splashed on the page” (“Clairvoyant Journal by 
Hannah Weiner and Tjanting by Ron Silliman”). This description could easily double for 
the narrator and the aunt’s “communal watching preferences,” which include everything 
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from “competing old westerns,” “Jackie Gleason re-runs,” Conan O’Brien, and 
“commercials during peak broadcast moments.” However, Kerr actually inverts the 
relation of TV to literature when he remarks of Clairvoyant Journal, “Obviously I had a 
hard time with this poem—and not just because it reminded me of TV (and I can barely 
stomach TV) or that it was particularly difficult in the way that some poems are 
difficult—it just didn’t allow me the one thing that I enjoy most about poetry—the 
opportunity to escape from reality. In fact, it did the opposite—it reminded me way too 
much of our hyper-consumerized, over-industrialized, super-sized culture”.  
Ironically, for Kerr, poetry – and not TV – is “the opportunity to escape from 
reality”; TV actually grounds him in the reality of “our hyper-consumerized, over-
industrialized, super-sized culture.” And yet maybe it’s not so ironic after all, if one sees 
Silliman’s description of Clairvoyant Journals and the detritus of cultural commodities 
and the diffused kitsch in Insomnia and the Aunt as representing two sides of the same 
coin, or getting at the same kind of knowledge – the meaning which is embodied through 
the form of the medium rather than through some notion of content transmitted by the 
medium. Though “[the] aunt thinks TV should be a relaxing, circular consumer activity 
that is continually on,” it is also “a TV set [that] made [the] aunt disappear into the black 
and white wilderness that is the truth,” a reality of racialization which is perhaps alluded 
to in the connection between Weiner’s clairvoyance and the attention TV draws to ways 
of seeing (and being seen by/as) the other. After all, the narrator notes that the aunt “was 
clairvoyant and an insomniac. She knew that TV lovers are basically ‘undetectable, 
overwhelmingly numerous, unknown and unscientific’. In short, they are hopeless.” The 
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quote within the quote, whose source is not identified in the text (despite the use of 
footnotes elsewhere in the text), comes from a distinction between “strong” and “weak” 
links in Peter Csermely’s Weak Links: The Universal Key to the Stability of Networks and 
Complex Systems. The outlining of the contrast between normative link behavior and an 
aberrant link behavior that mirrors the threat posed by the Asiatic racial other follows:  
Science has grown used to examining strong links. Strong links are always there. 
Strong links are reproducible. Strong links are few in number and hence 
comprehensible. Strong links are already known. Strong links are scientific. 
Strong links are exciting. In short, strong links are like friends to us. In contrast, 
weak links are transient. Weak links are undetectable. Weak links are 
overwhelmingly numerous. Weak links are unknown. Weak links are hopeless. In 
short, weak links are like foes to us. (102) 
 
The knowledge which the “clairvoyance” and “insomnia” of the aunt, who embodies 
and/or is embodied by the text, connects “weak/foe” to “TV lovers” – “lovers” for whom 
“America is not the images on a TV, it basically is the TV,” for whom the lived 
experience of identity “[has] been rehearsed once in real life and once on television, or in 
other words, once in somebody else’s life and once in ours.”  
Conclusion 
By connecting something as non-individualized as the consumption of images on TV to 
personal encounters with racism, Insomnia and the Aunt recuperates and reconfigures the 
mode of autobiographical individualized lyric testimony even as it uses boredom, 
relaxation, and distraction to figure the memory of experiences of racialization as a re-
run. In the first sense of ambience, Lin’s novel makes it impossible to distinguish 
between the foreground of the racialized subject navigating the uncertain and absurd 
terrain of assimilation and the general environment of 21st century American 
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consumerism, littered with the proliferation of various media forms. In the second sense 
of ambience, the novel serves as an example of how these effects of ambient music and 
television, are also symptoms of a racial melancholia in response to a “hyperreal” Asian 
American identity.  
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EPILOGUE 
 
In conclusion, I revisit Dorothy Wang’s Thinking Its Presence, which attempts to 
engage with the continued opposition of the aesthetic and social within literary studies 
and to push back against what she sees as the exclusion of the sociohistorical and 
political contexts of race from broader conversations about classifications within 
American poetry studies. Wang invokes Marjorie Perloff’s 2006 MLA address, in which 
Perloff exhorts scholars to return to more rigorous training within literary studies, “no 
matter how culturally and politically oriented [their] own particular research may be” 
(686). Wang’s study, which traces the work and critical reception of Li-Young Lee, 
Marilyn Chin, John Yau, Mei-mei Berssenbrugge, and Pamela Lu, is not simply a 
reconsideration of poems by these authors but an interrogation of the very terms and 
conditions of the either-or manner in which these poems and poets have been read. In 
response to the dilemma Wang poses, I suggest that theorizing sound’s potential for 
rethinking alterity contra the Asiatic racial form prescribed by an Orientalist modernism 
can help us better read the various, formally unique ways in which Asian American poets 
invoke but also supersede the generic constraints of a representative and metaphorical 
“lyric” subjectivity.   
 Even as I state the aims of my dissertation, however, I acknowledge its 
limitations. The reach of my dissertation only covers Asian American poets of the U.S. 
and not the whole scope of Asian North American literature; additionally, my selection of 
poets in this dissertation represents a heavily East Asian concentration of Asian American 
writers. This is partially due to my dissertation taking certain poets’ sonic responses to 
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the visuality of modernism as a launching point; nonetheless, I recognize that the poets I 
cover in this study, however capacious and formally innovative their work may be, still 
represent only a narrow subset of Asian American poets who experiment with sound 
formally in innovative and important ways (Asian American Writers’ Workshop does a 
much better job highlighting the range of writers who are doing this work). My 
dissertation also focuses temporally on Asian American poets within the range of the 
1960’s to the present, and I think it important to note that Asian American experimental 
poetry begins as early as the late 1800’s, with the likes of Sadakichi Hartmann.  
 I also want to consider future directions for the kind of close listenings I have 
tried to model in this work. Part of why it’s important to talk about sound in poetry is that 
it remains somewhat difficult to do – because on the one hand, as Reuven Tsur has 
pointed out, the interdisciplinary vocabulary necessary to discuss the production and 
reception of sound is often missing. A great deal of work has been done on visual 
semiotics (and it seems like this has been more easily integrated into literary studies) but 
comparatively speaking, there has not been as much done on sonic semiotics, in part 
perhaps because it borrows more from fields like cognitive linguistics, and the theoretical 
apparati of these fields are harder to appropriate because of the technical background 
required to understand the language, and possibly also because of wariness about 
empiricist scientific approaches. As sound studies continues to develop traction as a field, 
poetic practices of close listening can only benefit from more interdisciplinary exposure 
to fields that theorize the aesthetics of sensory reception, like cognitive linguistics, 
haptology, and musicology (which is not necessarily to say that poetics must necessarily 
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adopt critical apparatuses from those fields, but is to encourage a broadening of 
perspectives on the materiality of sound).  
 Additionally, I want to emphasize the importance of attending to works that 
bridge Asian American poetry with new media forms, as they open up another dimension 
through which sound enters into and shapes our experience of language. Peter Cho’s 
2005 MFA project Takeluma, for instance, is a multimedia experiment in creating a 
“sound symbolic, phonetic alphabet” that probes the possibilities of aurally representing 
meaning. The work, which includes Cho’s assigning of visual linear shapes that “match” 
the qualitative perceptions of individual consonants’ and vowels’ sounds, a series of art 
installations, and an accompanying written explanation, is an exercise in both theorizing 
and inventing systems of sonic representation. I have already covered some of the ways 
Insomnia and the Aunt interrogates the conditions and generic environment of reading via 
a particular notion of ambience; Lin’s Powerpoint piece The PhD Sound (how fittingly 
titled for this conclusion), which is set to danceable songs like “Showroom Dummies” by 
Kraftwerk and “A Place We Both Belong” by Scritti Politti, creates the experience of a 
multimedia reading platform wherein the music of commodified pop runs alongside the 
visual unveiling of various citations. I want to end this my conclusion – and begin our 
conversation – by engaging in a call for critical attention, for more critical listening the 
relationship between paradigms of sound and structurings of subjectivity in the works of 
these experimental Asian American poets. 
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